Court’s Decision
The Bombay High Court at Aurangabad allowed the civil revision application and set aside the trial court’s order refusing to reject the plaint. The Court held that the granddaughter had no locus standi to institute a suit for partition in the property of her maternal grandfather while her mother was alive. It categorically ruled that such property constitutes obstructed heritage and the granddaughter cannot claim a share by birth. Consequently, the plaint in the partition suit was rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Facts
The plaintiff, granddaughter of the propositus Namdev, filed a civil suit for declaration, partition, possession, perpetual injunction, and mesne profits in respect of the suit lands. Namdev had four sons and four daughters. The plaintiff’s mother, Prabhavati, was one of the daughters and alive at the time of suit filing. The plaintiff claimed entitlement to half of her mother’s 1/8th share in the joint family property and alleged that her maternal uncles had denied her mother’s share and were creating third-party interests.
The defendants filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC contending that the plaintiff could not maintain such a suit since her mother was alive and had not claimed partition. They argued the suit was not maintainable, had no cause of action, and was barred by law. The trial court rejected this application, holding that such issues required trial. Aggrieved, the defendants approached the High Court.
Issues
- Whether a granddaughter can maintain a suit for partition in her maternal grandfather’s property during her mother’s lifetime.
- Whether the property inherited from a maternal grandfather constitutes coparcenary property or obstructed heritage.
- Whether the plaint disclosed a valid cause of action or was liable to rejection under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioners contended that the plaintiff had no birthright in the property since she was not a coparcener. The suit property devolved from the maternal grandfather and thus amounted to obstructed heritage. As long as the plaintiff’s mother, who alone had a coparcenary right under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, was alive and had not sought partition, the plaintiff could not claim a share. The plaint disclosed no cause of action, and the trial court erred in refusing to reject it.
Respondent’s Arguments
The respondent supported the trial court’s order and asserted that under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, the plaintiff was a coparcener entitled to claim partition. It was argued that the defendants had denied the share of her mother and were creating third-party interests, which provided sufficient cause of action to institute the suit. The respondent submitted that all prayers in the plaint demonstrated maintainability and warranted trial.
Analysis of the Law
The Court examined Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (as amended in 2005). It clarified that only a daughter has a coparcenary right by birth in her father’s property, but not a granddaughter in her maternal grandfather’s property. The Court drew a distinction between coparcenary property and obstructed heritage.
The Court emphasized that:
- Coparcenary arises only in the paternal line.
- Property inherited from a maternal grandfather is obstructed heritage and no coparcenary rights accrue by birth.
- A granddaughter cannot claim partition when her mother (the daughter of the propositus) is alive.
Additionally, Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act confers absolute ownership on a female once she is allotted a share. Hence, only upon the death of the mother intestate would the daughter inherit.
Precedent Analysis
- Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020) 9 SCC 1 – Reiterated that daughters acquire coparcenary rights by birth at par with sons but clarified that coparcenary is confined to the paternal line. This supported the Court’s conclusion that the plaintiff, being a granddaughter through her mother, had no coparcenary rights.
- Sunil Kumar v. Ram Parkash (1988) 2 SCC 77 – Discussed the nature of coparcenary and sapindaship, emphasizing that coparcenary is limited to paternal male lineage.
- Muhammad Husain Khan v. Kishva Nandan Sahai, AIR 1937 PC 233 – Privy Council held that property inherited from a maternal grandfather is not ancestral property, and a son does not acquire rights by birth. This principle was directly applied to the present case.
- Uttam v. Saubhag Singh (2016) 4 SCC 68 – Cited by the respondents, but distinguished by the Court since that case dealt with paternal ancestral property, not maternal grandfather’s property.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court observed:
- The plaintiff’s mother was alive, yet she had not filed for partition. Without her claim, the granddaughter could not bypass and institute a suit on her own.
- The cause of action pleaded in the plaint, namely denial of share and creation of third-party interests, was illusory. The real aggrieved person was the plaintiff’s mother.
- Allowing the suit would amount to entertaining cleverly drafted pleadings camouflaging the bar of law.
- Section 14 makes it clear that once the mother receives her share, she becomes absolute owner, and the plaintiff would only inherit upon her death intestate.
Therefore, the plaint disclosed no cause of action and was barred by law, warranting rejection under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
Conclusion
The High Court allowed the civil revision application, quashed the trial court’s order, and rejected the plaint. It categorically ruled that a granddaughter cannot claim partition in her maternal grandfather’s property during her mother’s lifetime. Such property is obstructed heritage, and the plaintiff had no locus standi.
Implications
This ruling reinforces the settled principle that coparcenary rights under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act apply only in the paternal lineage. Grandchildren cannot claim partition in maternal grandfather’s property while their mothers are alive. The judgment also underscores that courts must exercise caution against cleverly drafted pleadings designed to create an illusion of cause of action when the law bars such claims.
FAQs
1. Can a granddaughter claim partition in her maternal grandfather’s property?
No. The Bombay High Court clarified that such property constitutes obstructed heritage and a granddaughter has no coparcenary rights by birth. She can only inherit through succession after her mother’s death, if intestate.
2. What is the difference between obstructed and unobstructed heritage in Hindu law?
Unobstructed heritage (apratibandha daya) arises by birth in paternal ancestral property, allowing coparcenary rights. Obstructed heritage (sapratibandha daya) accrues only upon the death of the last holder without male heirs, such as property inherited from a maternal grandfather.
3. Why was the plaint rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC?
The Court found that the plaint disclosed no valid cause of action, as the plaintiff’s mother was alive and had not claimed partition. Clever drafting could not override the bar of law.