Court’s Decision
The Bombay High Court, in a significant ruling delivered by Justice Ranjitsinha Raja Bhonsale and Justice A.S. Gadkari, dismissed a writ petition challenging the preventive detention of a 23-year-old under the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1981 (MPDA Act).
The petitioner had sought quashing of a detention order dated 21 October 2024, passed by the Commissioner of Police, Pune City, on grounds that it relied upon stale offences and that his alleged acts amounted only to breaches of “law and order,” not “public order.”
Rejecting these contentions, the Bench observed:
“The petitioner has created an atmosphere of fear and terror in the locality. His conduct clearly affects the even tempo of society and is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.”
Accordingly, the Court upheld the detention, concluding that the detaining authority’s subjective satisfaction was “well-founded, lawful, and based on cogent material.”
Facts
The petitioner was detained under Section 3(2) of the MPDA Act for being a “dangerous person” involved in repeated violent acts within the jurisdiction of Sahakarnagar Police Station, Pune.
Two offences formed the foundation of the detention:
- Crime No. 254/2024 – registered under Sections 324(1) and 342(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Section 4(25) of the Arms Act, and Sections 34(1)/135, 142 of the Maharashtra Police Act, along with Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act.
- Crime No. 255/2024 – registered under Section 4(25) of the Arms Act and Sections 34(1)/135, 142 of the Maharashtra Police Act.
Additionally, two in-camera statements (Witnesses “A” and “B”) alleged that the petitioner routinely threatened locals with weapons, demanded money (“hafta”), and created public fear.
The Commissioner of Police concluded that such behaviour endangered public peace and safety, warranting preventive detention under the MPDA Act.
Issues
- Whether reliance on prior offences or preventive actions vitiated the detention order for want of “live link” with present circumstances.
- Whether the alleged acts constituted mere breaches of “law and order” or amounted to threats against “public order” warranting preventive detention.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner’s counsel argued that the detaining authority impermissibly relied on stale incidents mentioned in earlier paragraphs (3.1 and 3.2 of the detention order), violating settled principles that only recent and relevant conduct can justify detention.
It was contended that in the alleged offences, no physical evidence, such as broken glass or weapons, corroborated the prosecution story. The counsel highlighted that the petitioner had been granted default bail and no conditions were imposed thereafter — demonstrating the absence of a continuing threat.
Citing Shaik Naznee v. State of Telangana (2023) 9 SCC 633, the petitioner argued that isolated private disputes cannot be equated with acts prejudicial to public order. It was urged that the allegations of mischief and intimidation affected individuals, not the larger community, and could be addressed under ordinary criminal law rather than preventive detention.
Respondent’s Arguments
The Public Prosecutor contended that the detention was justified as the petitioner habitually threatened, extorted, and terrorized members of the public. The FIRs and witness statements clearly established a pattern of violent conduct, creating fear in the locality.
It was emphasized that the past criminal history was only referred to, not relied upon, in determining subjective satisfaction. The detaining authority had relied exclusively on the two fresh offences and two in-camera statements.
Relying on Khaja Bilal Ahmed v. State of Telangana (2020) 13 SCC 632 and Ram @ Pappu Arun Kore v. State of Maharashtra (2023), the State submitted that reference to past offences is permissible to establish background, provided the order is based on live, recent acts indicative of a continuing threat to public order.
Analysis of the Law
The Bench noted that preventive detention laws like the MPDA Act are exceptional measures, balancing individual liberty with societal safety. Under Section 3(2), the authority must be subjectively satisfied that a person’s acts are prejudicial to public order, not merely breaches of law and order.
Citing Section 2(b-1) of the Act, the Court reaffirmed that a “dangerous person” is one who habitually commits violent offences or exhibits conduct posing a threat to the public.
On examining the detention record, the Court found that the detaining authority had explicitly relied on two recent offences and two witness statements, while the older references were made only to “illustrate the petitioner’s pattern of habitual criminality.”
Therefore, the subjective satisfaction was lawful and in conformity with the principle laid down by the Supreme Court that past conduct may be referred to, but not relied upon, unless there is a direct nexus with the present need for detention.
Precedent Analysis
The Bench discussed three significant precedents:
- Khaja Bilal Ahmed v. State of Telangana (2020) 13 SCC 632
The Supreme Court held that only recent offences with a clear causal connection to the need for detention can justify preventive action. Merely citing old cases does not satisfy Section 3 of the Act. - Shital @ Nitin Bhimrao Kharat v. District Magistrate, Satara (2021)
The Bombay High Court reiterated that detention must be based on a “live link” between the alleged conduct and current threat to public order, not on stale antecedents. - Ram @ Pappu Arun Kore v. State of Maharashtra (2023)
This Court reaffirmed that while the detaining authority can mention prior criminal acts for context, detention must rest on immediate, proximate offences that establish a real and present danger.
The Court also observed that the petitioner’s reliance on Raju @ Shendi Bhishan Tak v. State of Maharashtra (2025) was misplaced, as that ruling was rendered per incuriam, having failed to consider the above binding precedents.
Court’s Reasoning
The Bench meticulously examined the FIRs and in-camera statements. It found that the petitioner had repeatedly:
- Extorted money from local vendors by threatening them with weapons.
- Terrorized the public, causing shopkeepers to shut their establishments.
- Asserted dominance in the area, declaring himself as “Bhai of Tangewala Colony.”
The Court observed:
Bombay High Court Denies Bail in NDPS Case: “Personal Liberty Must Yield to Public Interest in Drug Trafficking Offences” The public interest in combating narcotics prevails over individual liberty under Article 21
Further, the Court noted that under Section 5A of the MPDA Act, even if one ground of detention is invalid, the order remains sustainable on other valid grounds. Thus, the detention was legally sound.
Conclusion
The High Court concluded that the detaining authority’s satisfaction was properly formed on the basis of recent, relevant, and credible material. The acts complained of went beyond individual disputes, directly affecting the public’s sense of safety and security.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the writ petition and discharged the rule, upholding the detention order.
“The petitioner’s conduct has disturbed the even tempo of society. Preventive detention is necessary to prevent further acts prejudicial to public order.”
Implications
This judgment reinforces the thin line between ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’, clarifying that habitual, fear-inducing conduct disrupting community life warrants preventive detention.
Key takeaways include:
- Past acts can contextualize, but not form the sole basis for detention.
- Recent acts with public repercussions justify preventive custody.
- Section 5A ensures partial validity even if one ground fails.
- Courts defer to the detaining authority’s subjective satisfaction, provided it rests on proximate material.
The ruling strengthens the jurisprudence balancing Article 21 liberty with collective societal security under preventive detention law.