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Bombay High Court Says Developer Can Be Added As Party In Society Dispute Over Land Conveyance Settlement If Its Presence Is Needed To Decide The Case Properly

Bombay High Court Upholds Developer’s Impleadment in Co-operative Society Dispute, Says Co-operative Court Can Add Necessary Parties Beyond Section 91 List

Facts

The petitioners, members of Bramha Suncity Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., filed Dispute No. 106/2021 before the Co-operative Court, Pune, challenging two resolutions passed by the Society: the Special General Body Resolution dated 14.10.2018 and the Managing Committee Resolution dated 20.10.2018.

The dispute arose from settlement talks between the Society and the developer/promoter, Bramha Corporation Ltd., concerning conveyance of land in favour of the Society. The petitioners alleged that the settlement reduced the Society’s land entitlement from about 96,196.30 sq. mtrs. to 69,222 sq. mtrs.

In the co-operative dispute, the petitioners impleaded only the Society through its Chairman and Secretary, along with the ex-Chairman and ex-Secretary. The developer, Bramha Corporation Ltd., filed an application seeking impleadment as a party opponent. The Co-operative Court allowed the application, and the Co-operative Appellate Court upheld that order. The petitioners then approached the Bombay High Court.

Issues

  1. Whether the Co-operative Court’s power to implead parties under Section 94(3)(c) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 is restricted only to persons listed under Section 91(1)(a) to (e).
  2. Whether a developer/promoter, who is not covered under Section 91(1)(a) to (e), can still be impleaded in a co-operative dispute if its presence is necessary for effective adjudication.
  3. Whether impleading the developer would take the dispute outside the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court.

Petitioner’s Arguments

The petitioners argued that the developer was a stranger to the co-operative dispute and could not be impleaded because it did not fall within the categories of persons mentioned under Section 91(1)(a) to (e) of the MCS Act.

They submitted that the Co-operative Court is a statutory forum with limited jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate disputes involving persons outside the statutory categories.

The petitioners further argued that Section 94(3)(c) cannot be used to expand the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court. According to them, the phrase “whose presence before the Court may be necessary” must be confined only to persons who otherwise qualify under Section 91(1)(a) to (e), or at most to pendente lite purchasers under Section 94(3)(a).

They also contended that the dispute was only about resolutions passed by the Society, and any issue regarding conveyance or rights of the developer would have to be agitated before a civil court.

Respondent’s Arguments

The developer argued that it was rightly impleaded because the petitioners had made serious allegations of collusion against it. Since the resolutions under challenge arose from a settlement proposal involving the developer, the dispute could not be effectively decided without giving the developer an opportunity to participate.

The developer submitted that Section 94(3)(c) gives wide power to the Co-operative Court to add any person whose presence is necessary to effectively and completely adjudicate the questions involved in the dispute.

It was argued that Section 94(3)(c) is similar to Order I Rule 10 CPC and operates independently of Section 91(1)(a) to (e) and Section 94(3)(a). Therefore, its scope should not be artificially narrowed.

Analysis of the Law

The Court analysed Sections 91 and 94 of the MCS Act.

It held that Section 91 has two parts: first, it defines the subject matters that can be brought before the Co-operative Court; second, it identifies the categories of persons between whom such disputes may arise. Therefore, the Co-operative Court’s jurisdiction is controlled both by the subject matter and by the nature of parties.

However, Section 94(3)(c) performs a different function. It empowers the Co-operative Court to add a person whose presence is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the questions involved in the dispute.

The Court held that Section 94(3)(c) is not limited to persons listed under Section 91(1)(a) to (e), nor is it limited to pendente lite purchasers under Section 94(3)(a). The expression “any person” in Section 94(3)(c) is deliberately broad.

At the same time, the Court clarified that this power is not unbridled. The Co-operative Court cannot use Section 94(3)(c) to bring into the dispute subject matters that are outside the scope of Section 91. The impleadment must be only for effective adjudication of the co-operative dispute, and not for adjudicating independent rights between the existing parties and the newly impleaded party.

Precedent Analysis

The petitioners relied on Margret Almeida v. Bombay Catholic CHS Ltd., arguing that disputes regarding society resolutions and conveyance can be segregated. The Court held that Margret Almeida dealt with the jurisdiction of the civil court versus the Co-operative Court in a composite challenge to a resolution and conveyance. It did not decide the scope of impleadment under Section 94(3)(c).

The Court also held that Parimal Solanki and Komal Arvind Vesavkar dealt with jurisdictional issues concerning whether certain subject matters could be tried by the Co-operative Court. They did not answer the question of whether a necessary party could be impleaded under Section 94(3)(c).

The developer relied on Eknath Namdev Lashkare, but the Court held that even that judgment primarily dealt with jurisdiction and the concept of a developer as an agent, not directly with the power of impleadment under Section 94(3)(c).

The Court ultimately held that none of the cited judgments directly answered the issue, and the answer had to be found from the plain language of Section 94(3)(c).

Court’s Reasoning

The Court held that the petitioners had made serious allegations that the Society acted in collusion with the developer while passing the impugned resolutions. Since the resolutions were connected with settlement between the Society and the developer, the developer’s presence was necessary for effective adjudication.

The Court clarified that impleading the developer would not mean that the Co-operative Court would decide the validity of conveyance or adjudicate independent rights between the petitioners and the developer. The dispute would remain a challenge to the Society’s resolutions.

The Court also rejected the petitioners’ apprehension that impleadment of the developer would take the dispute outside the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court. Since the developer was being added only to assist effective adjudication, and not for adjudication of independent claims against it, the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court remained intact.

Conclusion

The Bombay High Court dismissed the writ petition and upheld the orders of the Co-operative Court and Co-operative Appellate Court permitting impleadment of the developer.

The Court held that Section 94(3)(c) of the MCS Act allows the Co-operative Court to implead even persons not listed under Section 91(1)(a) to (e), where their presence is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the dispute. However, such impleadment cannot be used to expand the subject matter of the dispute beyond the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court.

Case Details

Case: Shreesh Kumar and Others v. Bramha Suncity Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. and Others
Court: Bombay High Court
Case Number: Writ Petition No. 15261 of 2023
Judge: Justice Sandeep V. Marne
Date: 8 July 2026
Result: Writ petition dismissed; developer’s impleadment in co-operative dispute upheld.

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