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Delhi High Court sets aside CAT order directing appointment of SC candidate in NITRD recruitment, “A mistake in advertisement cannot create a right to appointment where no vacancy exists”

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HEADNOTE

Case Title: National Institute of Tuberculosis and Respiratory Diseases v. Ms. Shweta & Ors.
Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Mahajan
Date of Judgment: 20 January 2026
Case Number: W.P.(C) No. 527/2026

Laws/Sections Involved:
Article 226, Constitution of India;
Service jurisprudence relating to recruitment and advertised vacancies;
Doctrine of promissory estoppel;
Principles governing public employment

Keywords: government recruitment, advertised vacancies, overage candidate, SC reservation, promissory estoppel, rules of the game, CAT order set aside

Summary

The Delhi High Court set aside an order of the Central Administrative Tribunal which had directed appointment of an SC-category candidate on the basis of an erroneous recruitment advertisement. The Court held that a mistake committed by an outsourced recruiting agency in mentioning SC vacancies cannot create a vested right to appointment when no such vacancy exists in law. Emphasising settled principles that appointments beyond advertised vacancies are impermissible, the Court ruled that the respondent, who was otherwise overage for the unreserved category, could not seek appointment by invoking promissory estoppel or age relaxation. The High Court clarified that there was no “change in rules of the game” since the roster never reflected an SC vacancy. While quashing the Tribunal’s order, the Court granted liberty to the respondent to pursue damages, if available in law, for the administrative error.

Court’s decision

The Delhi High Court allowed a writ petition filed by the National Institute of Tuberculosis and Respiratory Diseases (NITRD), setting aside the Central Administrative Tribunal’s direction to appoint Ms. Shweta to the post of HMTS Dietary (Kitchen Staff). The Division Bench categorically held that an erroneous recruitment advertisement issued by an outsourced agency cannot compel a public employer to make an appointment contrary to the sanctioned roster and existing vacancies. The Court ruled that since no SC-category vacancy existed at any stage, the Tribunal erred in granting relief to the respondent, notwithstanding her performance in the selection process.


Genesis of the dispute

The controversy arose from a recruitment process initiated for the post of HMTS Dietary (Kitchen Staff) at NITRD. The Institute had requisitioned 10 posts to be filled through an outsourced agency, Hindustan Life Care Limited. As per the sanctioned roster, the breakup of posts was: five unreserved (UR), three OBC, one ST, and one EWS.

However, while issuing the recruitment notice, the outsourcing agency committed a clear error by mentioning three posts for the Scheduled Caste (SC) category—posts which did not exist in the sanctioned roster. Acting on this erroneous advertisement, Ms. Shweta, belonging to the SC category, applied for the post and emerged as the topper in the written examination.


Withdrawal of appointment and CAT proceedings

Initially, an offer of appointment was issued to the respondent. Subsequently, upon scrutiny, the Institute realised that no SC vacancy existed and that the respondent was also overage for appointment against unreserved posts. Consequently, the offer of appointment was withdrawn.

Aggrieved, the respondent approached the Central Administrative Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 643/2024. The Tribunal allowed her application and directed the Institute to appoint her, holding that the respondent had acquired a vested right based on the advertisement and the initial offer of appointment.


Challenge before the High Court

The Institute challenged the Tribunal’s order before the Delhi High Court, contending that the CAT had failed to appreciate settled law governing public recruitment. It was argued that:

On behalf of the respondent, it was argued that the Institute could not “change the rules of the game” after selection, that promissory estoppel applied, and that age relaxation ought to be granted, especially since she was the topper.


Key legal issue

The central issue before the High Court was whether an erroneous recruitment advertisement could confer an enforceable right to appointment on a candidate when no sanctioned vacancy existed in the relevant category and the candidate was otherwise ineligible.


Court’s analysis

The Division Bench noted at the outset that there was no factual dispute: the recruitment notice was erroneous, and no SC vacancy existed at any point of time. On a specific query from the Court, counsel for the Institute confirmed that even as on date, there was no SC vacancy available.

The Court rejected the respondent’s contention that the “rules of the game” had been changed. It held that the rules were never altered; rather, the recruitment notice itself was defective. A mistake in advertisement, the Court observed, cannot rewrite the sanctioned roster or create posts that do not exist.


No vested right from a mistake

The High Court firmly held that participation in a selection process pursuant to an erroneous advertisement does not create a vested right to appointment. Even issuance of an appointment letter, if contrary to law, does not cure the defect.

Justice Anil Kshetarpal, speaking for the Bench, observed that public employment must strictly adhere to advertised vacancies and sanctioned posts. Allowing appointment in excess of or contrary to such vacancies would be unconstitutional and without jurisdiction.


Overage candidate and rejection of age relaxation

The Court further noted that the respondent was admittedly overage for appointment against UR vacancies. Once no SC vacancy existed, the respondent could not seek age relaxation by shifting to a non-existent reserved post. The Bench held that eligibility conditions cannot be diluted to accommodate an individual candidate, howsoever meritorious.


Promissory estoppel rejected

The plea of promissory estoppel was also rejected. The Court clarified that promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the State or its instrumentalities to act in violation of law. Since appointment without a vacancy would be illegal, no estoppel could operate against statutory provisions.


Reliance on Supreme Court precedent

The Bench relied on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Rakhi Ray v. High Court of Delhi, which unequivocally held that appointments beyond the number of advertised vacancies are without jurisdiction. The Court observed that the said precedent actually militated against the respondent’s claim rather than supporting it.

The judgment in Union of India v. Sajib Roy was also held to be inapplicable, as that case involved different factual and legal considerations.


Relief limited to damages

While setting aside the Tribunal’s order, the High Court adopted a balanced approach by granting liberty to the respondent to claim damages, if permissible in law, for the inconvenience or prejudice caused due to the erroneous advertisement. However, no direction for appointment was sustained.


Final order

The writ petition was allowed. The impugned order of the Central Administrative Tribunal dated 15 October 2025 was set aside. All pending applications were disposed of accordingly.


Conclusion

The judgment reinforces the principle that public employment must strictly conform to sanctioned vacancies and eligibility norms. Errors in recruitment advertisements, even if made by State-appointed agencies, cannot confer enforceable rights contrary to law.


Implications

This decision has significant implications for government recruitment processes. It sends a clear message that administrative mistakes cannot dilute constitutional requirements of equality and legality in public employment. At the same time, it leaves open the possibility of compensatory remedies for candidates misled by official errors, striking a balance between fairness and legality.

Also Read: Delhi High Court quashes criminal defamation case arising from bitter family property dispute, “Mere averments made in pleadings to prosecute or defend oneself do not amount to defamation”

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