Court’s Decision:
The Madras High Court dismissed the criminal appeals challenging the order of the Special Court under Section 33 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), confirming that the attachment of properties during the trial was justified. The court held that the attachment under Section 33 is a separate provision that gives the court the power to attach properties during the trial, independent of any action taken by the investigating agency under Section 25 of the UAPA. The High Court found no infirmity in the Special Court’s order and upheld it, emphasizing that this attachment is an interim measure and not a final decision on the property’s status.
Facts:
- The appellants are accused of conspiring to commit terrorist acts as part of a violent campaign against a specific community. The incident involved the brutal murder of a Hindu organization spokesperson in Coimbatore in 2016. The appellants are linked to the Popular Front of India, which is a banned organization.
- After the initial investigation by the State’s Crime Branch CID, the Central Government handed over the case to the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in 2018, which re-registered the FIR and filed a chargesheet.
- During the investigation, it was found that the appellant (Accused No. 3) had transferred a portion of his property to his mother after the charges were framed against him, allegedly to shield it from legal scrutiny.
Issues:
- Whether the Special Court’s order of property attachment under Section 33 of UAPA was justified.
- Whether the property in question falls under the category of “proceeds of terrorism” as defined under Section 2(1)(g) of the UAPA.
- Whether the NIA had the locus standi to move the petition for attachment under Section 33.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
- The appellants contended that the property attachment under Section 33 is unjustified as the property was purchased in 2012, well before the commission of the alleged terrorist act in 2016.
- It was argued that the attachment provisions under Chapter V of the UAPA, specifically Section 33, are limited to properties obtained from the proceeds of terrorism or funds traceable to such proceeds. The appellants argued that there was no evidence linking the property to any such activities.
- Citing the Supreme Court’s interpretation in People’s Union For Civil Liberties v. Union of India, they contended that unless it is proved that the property was derived from terrorist activities, any attachment under the UAPA is beyond the law’s purview.
- Further, they argued that the NIA did not have the authority to move an attachment petition under Section 33 because only the Director General can order such actions under Section 25.
Respondent’s Arguments:
- The NIA, represented by the Additional Solicitor General, argued that Section 33 of the UAPA grants independent powers to the court to attach properties of the accused during the trial, regardless of whether the property is directly linked to terrorism proceeds.
- It was asserted that the Special Court’s order is consistent with the legislative intent behind the UAPA, which aims to prevent the use of properties for terrorism-related activities.
- The NIA emphasized that the High Court of Jharkhand’s judgment in Santhosh Construction v. Union of India does not hold precedential value as it was dismissed by the Supreme Court without a ruling on the merits.
Analysis of the Law:
- The court examined the interplay between Sections 25 and 33 of the UAPA. While Section 25 confers the power to seize or attach properties by the Investigating Officer with the approval of the Director General, Section 33 is a standalone provision that gives the court the discretion to attach properties during the trial.
- The court also looked into the definition of “proceeds of terrorism” under Section 2(1)(g), which includes properties obtained from a terrorist act, acquired through terrorist funds, or intended for use in a terrorist act.
Precedent Analysis:
- The appellants relied on the Supreme Court’s judgment in People’s Union For Civil Liberties, which dealt with the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (POTA). The court distinguished that case, noting that the interpretation under POTA is not directly applicable to the UAPA’s broader provisions.
- The court also considered the Jharkhand High Court’s interpretation in Santhosh Construction v. Union of India, which limited the scope of Section 33. However, the High Court found that the Supreme Court’s subsequent dismissal of the appeal in that case left the question open, thereby allowing a broader reading of Section 33 in this context.
Court’s Reasoning:
- The court observed that the legislative intent behind the UAPA is to empower the judiciary to take proactive measures to ensure that properties of accused persons are not used to further terrorist activities.
- It clarified that Section 33(1) allows attachment of any property, irrespective of whether it is linked to terrorism proceeds, to prevent its misuse during the trial.
- The court emphasized that this attachment is an interim measure that ensures the property’s availability for final determination at the end of the trial.
Conclusion:
The appeals were dismissed, and the Special Court’s order of attachment was upheld. The court clarified that the NIA has the locus standi to move a petition under Section 33 and that the attachment is a valid exercise of judicial discretion under the UAPA.
Implications:
- The judgment sets a precedent that under Section 33, courts can attach properties even if they are not directly linked to proceeds of terrorism, as long as the accused is facing charges under Chapter IV or VI of the UAPA.
- This decision underscores the court’s expansive powers under anti-terrorism laws to prevent misuse of properties by accused persons during the pendency of trials.