* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

Reserved on: 18.08.2026
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\# **CNR No. DLHC010120292025**

\+ **CRL.M.C. 1633/2025, CRL.M.A. 7403/2025 & CRL.M.A. 27928/2025**

SUDHIR BHARGAVA & ORS. .....Petitioners

Through: Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal, Sr. Adv., Mr. Nikhil Pillai, Mr. Athak Walia, Ms. Vismita Dewan, Ms. Nishita, Ms. Versha Singh, Advs.

versus

STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR. .....Respondents

Through: Ms. Richa Dhawan, APP.
Mr. Surendra Bhargava, Adv. for R-2.
SI K.P. Singh, PS New Ashok Nagar.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MADHU JAIN

JUDGMENT

MADHU JAIN, J.

1. The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ("BNSS") seeking quashing of ***FIR No. 386/2022***, registered at P.S. New Ashok Nagar for offences under Sections 406/420/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("IPC"), as well as the orders dated 03.10.2024 and 17.02.2025 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi, in C.R. Case No. 5422/2022 titled ***State v. Unknown1***. By the said orders, the learned Trial Court directed further investigation pursuant to

the protest petition filed by respondent No.2 and directed submission of a supplementary chargesheet.

BRIEF FACTS

2. The brief facts giving rise to the present petition are that Petitioner No.1, Sudhir Bhargava, is the brother of respondent No.2/complainant, Kumud Bhargava. Petitioner Nos.2 and 3 are the wife and son of petitioner No.1, respectively. The dispute between the parties arises from the estate and business interests of their late parents, Shri K.P. Bhargava and Smt. Ganga Bhargava. Shri K.P. Bhargava passed away on 01.02.1994 and Smt. Ganga Bhargava passed away on 24.08.2009. They were survived by their children, including petitioner No.1 and respondent No.2.

3. The family had interests in the business carried on through Associated Chemical Industries ("ACI"), a partnership concern, and Associated Chemical Industries (Kanpur) Pvt. Ltd. ("ACIKPL"). The record indicates that respondent No.2 was also associated with ACIKPL as a shareholder and director, while petitioner No.1 was involved in the management of the family business.

4. On 11.08.1993, Shri K.P. Bhargava executed a Will concerning his assets and interests in ACI and ACIKPL. Under the said Will, his interest in ACI was stated to devolve upon his wife, Smt. Ganga Bhargava, while certain shares and movable assets were bequeathed to his children and grandchildren. Following his death, a partnership deed dated 02.02.1994 was executed between petitioner No.1 and Smt. Ganga Bhargava, under which they became partners in ACI.

5. Probate proceedings in relation to the 1993 Will were instituted by petitioner No.1 before the District Court at Kanpur in or around 1998-1999. Respondent No.2 contested those proceedings, *inter alia* questioning the genuineness of the Will. The probate proceedings were subsequently disposed of by order dated 03.11.2011 on the ground that probate was not required in respect of the assets situated at Kanpur.

6. Smt. Ganga Bhargava subsequently executed a Will dated 26.10.2001 and thereafter another Will dated 03.04.2009, the latter being registered before the Sub-Registrar, Kanpur on 06.04.2009. The 2009 Will purportedly revoked the earlier Will and made dispositions in favour of various members of the family, including petitioner Nos.1 to 3 and respondent No.2.

7. After the death of Smt. Ganga Bhargava, respondent No.2 instituted Original Suit No. 2371/2009 before the Kanpur Civil Court challenging the validity of the 2009 Will and seeking, *inter alia*, a declaration that the same was forged and fabricated. Interim relief sought by respondent No.2 was declined by the learned Kanpur Civil Court vide order dated 26.03.2011. The said order was challenged before the Allahabad High Court and thereafter before the Supreme Court.

8. Respondent No.2 also instituted Original Suit No. 1560/2010 before the Kanpur Civil Court challenging the 1993 Will of Shri K.P. Bhargava. In the said proceedings, respondent No.2 also questioned the 1994 partnership deed. The suit challenging the 1993 Will was dismissed by the Kanpur Civil Court vide order dated 15.02.2012 on the ground of limitation. The appeal filed thereagainst before the Allahabad High Court

was dismissed on 10.07.2014. The order of the Allahabad High Court was thereafter challenged before the Supreme Court, where the SLP was dismissed on 01.12.2014. A subsequent review petition before the Allahabad High Court was also dismissed on 08.07.2016.

9. During the pendency of the aforesaid disputes, respondent No.2 also approached the Company Law Board in proceedings concerning the affairs of ACIKPL, including her directorship and the transmission of shares pursuant to the 1993 Will. The Company Law Board passed an order dated 28.05.2013. The proceedings thereafter continued before the appellate forums, including the Allahabad High Court and the Supreme Court, with the subsequent proceedings ultimately culminating in orders passed between 2017 and 2023.

10. According to the petitioners, respondent No.2 had, over the years, also instituted various proceedings before the Registrar of Companies concerning the functioning of ACIKPL. Respondent No.2 disputes the characterization of such proceedings and submits that they concerned her rights as a shareholder and director and other issues relating to the affairs of the company.

11. On 05.05.2022, respondent No.2 lodged a complaint before P.S. New Ashok Nagar alleging, *inter alia*, that the 1993 Will of Shri K.P. Bhargava, the 2001 and 2009 Wills of Smt. Ganga Bhargava and the partnership deed dated 02.02.1994 had been forged or fabricated and had been used to deal with the assets and business interests of the deceased to her detriment. The complaint also contained allegations of cheating and criminal misappropriation against the petitioners. On the same date, FIR

No. 386/2022 was registered under Sections 406/420/34 IPC.

12. During investigation, notices under Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were issued to the petitioners. The Investigating Officer examined persons connected with the disputed Wills, including the attesting witnesses, contacted the office of the Sub-Registrar at Kanpur and collected material relating to the civil proceedings between the parties. According to the petitioners, the witnesses to the Wills supported their execution and the Sub-Registrar's records confirmed the registration of the relevant documents.

13. Upon completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer filed a closure report dated 27.07.2022. The report recorded the material collected during investigation and concluded that no cognizable offence was made out, inter alia, taking note of the civil proceedings concerning the same subject matter.

14. Respondent No.2 filed a protest petition against the closure report. The Investigating Officer also filed his response thereto. Thereafter, the learned Trial Court, vide order dated 03.10.2024, disposed of the protest petition and directed further investigation in the matter, including investigation concerning the disputed Wills and partnership deed.

15. In the course of the further proceedings, the Investigating Officer issued a notice dated 16.01.2025 under Section 91 CrPC seeking, inter alia, the original 1993 Will, the partnership deed dated 02.02.1994 and the registered Wills dated 26.10.2001 and 03.04.2009. Petitioner No.3 responded on 14.02.2025 stating that the original documents were not in his possession and also placed before the Investigating Officer material

concerning the earlier civil proceedings.

16. Thereafter, vide order dated 17.02.2025, the learned Trial Court directed the concerned DCP to ensure further investigation and directed submission of a supplementary chargesheet.

17. The petitioners have challenged the aforesaid FIR and orders principally on the ground that the criminal proceedings arise out of a longstanding family and inheritance dispute, that the allegations concerning the disputed documents have already been raised in civil and company law proceedings, and that the learned Trial Court erred in directing further investigation despite the closure report submitted by the Investigating Officer.

18. The principal controversy before this Court, therefore, concerns the legality of the continuation of the criminal proceedings pursuant to the impugned FIR and, in particular, the orders directing further investigation after submission of the closure report by the Investigating Officer.

SUBMISSIONS MADE ON BEHALF OF THE PETITONERS:

19. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the present proceedings arise out of a longstanding intra-family inheritance dispute concerning the Wills executed by late Shri K.P. Bhargava and late Smt. Ganga Bhargava. It is submitted that petitioner Nos.2 and 3, being the wife and son of petitioner No.1, have been arraigned only with a view to exert pressure upon petitioner No.1 in relation to the civil disputes already pending between the parties.

20. Learned Senior Counsel submits that respondent No.2 had been

aware of the 1993 Will of her father for several years and had earlier challenged the same before the Kanpur Civil Court. The said challenge was dismissed on 15.02.2012 on the ground of limitation, which order was affirmed by the Allahabad High Court on 10.07.2014 and thereafter by the Supreme Court on 01.12.2014. The subsequent review petition was also dismissed on 08.07.2016. It is submitted that respondent No.2 had, therefore, already pursued the issue before the competent civil fora.

21. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that respondent No.2 had also challenged the 2009 Will of her mother in Original Suit No.2371/2009 before the Kanpur Civil Court, which proceedings continue to remain pending. The interim relief sought by respondent No.2 was declined by the Kanpur Civil Court and the challenge thereto before the Allahabad High Court and the Supreme Court did not result in any interim relief in her favour.

22. It is submitted that despite the aforesaid litigation, respondent No.2 instituted the present criminal proceedings in May 2022 alleging forgery of the 1993 and 2009 Wills and the partnership deed dated 02.02.1994. Learned Senior Counsel contends that the complaint was lodged after an inordinate delay and without disclosing the complete background of the civil and company law proceedings between the parties. It is argued that the criminal process has thereby been invoked to give a criminal colour to what is essentially an inheritance and property dispute.

23. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the investigation conducted by the police culminated in a closure report dated 27.07.2022. During investigation, the Investigating Officer had examined the attesting

witnesses to the Wills, approached the Sub-Registrar's office at Kanpur and collected material from the relevant authorities and courts. According to learned Senior Counsel, the attesting witnesses supported the execution of the Wills and the investigation did not disclose any criminality.

24. It is further submitted that the learned Trial Court, while allowing the protest petition, did not properly consider the investigation already undertaken and directed further investigation by order dated 03.10.2024. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the subsequent order dated 17.02.2025 directing further investigation and filing of a supplementary chargesheet was likewise passed without proper consideration of the material collected during investigation.

25. Learned Senior Counsel also places reliance upon the material concerning the handwriting expert opinions relied upon by respondent No.2 and submits that such opinions, particularly in relation to decades-old documents, cannot by themselves displace the statements of the attesting witnesses regarding due execution of the Wills. It is submitted that expert opinion is at best an opinion evidence and cannot be treated as conclusive proof of forgery.

26. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the allegations relating to the 1994 partnership deed are equally belated. According to him, respondent No.2 had knowledge of the said deed and had raised issues concerning the family partnership in earlier civil proceedings, yet no criminal proceedings alleging forgery of the document were initiated for several years.

27. Learned Senior Counsel submits that, even on the allegations

contained in the FIR, the ingredients of Sections 406 and 420 IPC are not made out against the petitioners. It is contended that there is no specific allegation of entrustment of property so as to attract Section 406 IPC and no allegation of fraudulent inducement by the petitioners resulting in delivery of property so as to constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC.

28. It is further submitted that petitioner Nos.2 and 3 have no independent role in the alleged acts forming the subject matter of the dispute and have been implicated only on account of their relationship with petitioner No.1. Learned Senior Counsel accordingly submits that their arraignment further demonstrates the misuse of criminal proceedings for exerting pressure in the family dispute.

29. Learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors.*, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335**.

30. Learned Senior Counsel has also relied upon ***Haji Iqbal v. State of U.P.*, 2023 INSC 688**, to submit that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS, this Court is required to examine the FIR and the attending circumstances with due care, particularly where mala fides and abuse of process are alleged. Reliance has further been placed upon ***M. Srikanth v. State of Telangana, (2019) 10 SCC 373, Anil Rastogi v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 5744, G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636, Krishna Lal Chawla v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 5 SCC 435, Kishan Singh v. Gurpal Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 775, Rohit Arora v. State, 1996 SCC OnLine Del 542, Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy v. Baddam Pratapa Reddy, (2019) 14 SCC 220, S.P.S. Rathore v. CBI, (2017) 5 SCC***

817, and ***Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh,* (2024) 10 SCC 690**.

SUBMISSIONS MADE ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS:

31. *Per contra*, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2, opposing the present petition, submits that the closure report filed by the Investigating Officer was not a finding that no offence was disclosed, but was substantially premised on the existence of proceedings at Kanpur and the pendency of civil litigation between the parties. It is submitted that even in the subsequent status report dated 17.03.2025, the position taken by the Investigating Officer continued to be founded on the same consideration. Learned counsel submits that the learned Trial Court, upon consideration of the protest petition and the material on record, rightly declined to accept the closure report and directed further investigation.

32. Learned counsel submits that the learned Trial Court has specifically noticed three sets of allegations which required investigation, namely, the alleged fabrication of the partnership deed dated 02.02.1994, the Will dated 11.08.1993 stated to have been executed by K.P. Bhargava, and the Will dated 03.04.2009 stated to have been executed by Ganga Bhargava. It is submitted that the learned Trial Court found that the genuineness of these documents had not been meaningfully investigated and that no forensic or handwriting examination had been obtained, despite the allegations of forgery.

33. Learned counsel submits that the mere fact that the allegations have a civil dimension, or that some part of the alleged transaction took place

outside the territorial jurisdiction of the police station, cannot by itself furnish a ground for terminating a criminal investigation. It is submitted that the existence of civil proceedings and criminal proceedings arising out of the same transaction is not, in law, mutually exclusive.

34. Learned counsel submits that the principal contention of the petitioners regarding delay is also untenable. It is submitted that the allegations in the FIR concern a continuing chain of acts allegedly commencing from 1993 and extending to the subsequent transmission and dealing with the estate and assets of the parents of the parties.

35. It is further submitted that the FIR came to be registered after an enquiry spanning the period from 2020 to 2022 and that the registration of the FIR was not an abrupt or unexplained step. Learned counsel submits that once information discloses a cognizable offence, registration of an FIR is mandatory and that any preliminary enquiry, where conducted, is only for ascertaining whether the information discloses a cognizable offence and not for adjudicating upon the truth or otherwise of the allegations.

36. On the petitioners' contention that the dispute is essentially civil in nature, learned counsel submits that the civil proceedings relied upon by the petitioners do not conclude the question of criminal culpability arising from the alleged fabrication and use of documents.

37. Learned counsel submits that the fact that respondent No.2 may have received certain amounts during the course of the family arrangements or transactions does not amount to an election or waiver of her claims. It is submitted that the amounts received were only a few lakhs

and are insignificant in comparison with the share in the estate which is under dispute and which, according to respondent No.2, has a value of approximately Rs.20 crores.

38. Learned counsel submits that the allegations, when considered cumulatively, disclose a continuous course of alleged deception and wrongful gain rather than isolated civil disputes. It is contended that the three documents in question were allegedly relied upon at different stages to secure control over the estate and business interests of K.P. Bhargava and Ganga Bhargava and, thereafter, to retain and deal with the assets.

39. On the aspect of forensic evidence, learned counsel submits that the handwriting expert's opinion relied upon by respondent No.2 formed part of the material placed before the Investigating Officer and, according to the respondent, supports the allegation that the signatures appearing on the disputed Wills were not genuine. Learned counsel submits that this material could not have been brushed aside merely because the petitioners dispute its authenticity or evidentiary value.

40. On territorial jurisdiction, learned counsel submits that the investigation cannot be interdicted merely because certain documents or transactions originated at Kanpur. It is contended that respondent No.2 is residing in Delhi, that consequences of the alleged acts were suffered in Delhi and that the allegations also concern property and assets in respect of which demand and retention are alleged.

41. Learned counsel submits that the objection regarding delay also cannot be adjudicated at the stage of exercise of inherent jurisdiction. It is contended that respondent No.2 came to know of the alleged acts and their

consequences only subsequently, including through documents and information obtained in relation to the financial and tax records. He further submits that fraud may remain concealed for considerable periods and that the computation of limitation or the effect of concealment depends upon the facts of each case.

42. Learned counsel submits that, in any event, whether the delay was adequately explained, whether respondent No.2 had knowledge of the disputed documents at an earlier stage, and what effect the pendency of the earlier civil proceedings has on the credibility of the complaint are matters of evidence and cannot be conclusively determined in proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS.

43. Learned counsel submits that the allegations, taken as a whole, disclose a chain involving alleged forgery and use of disputed documents, deception, wrongful gain, misappropriation and continued retention of property and assets.

44. Learned counsel places reliance upon the principles reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401,*** to submit that, at the stage of considering a petition seeking quashing of an FIR or interference with investigation, the High Court does not undertake a meticulous examination of the evidence or conduct a mini-trial. The only question, according to learned counsel, is whether the allegations disclose the commission of cognizable offences and whether the proceedings are so patently groundless as to justify interference in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction.

FINDINGS AND ANLYSIS:

45. This Court has considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record.

46. The jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS is undoubtedly wide but is extraordinary in nature and is to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with circumspection. The well-settled principles governing such jurisdiction, as noticed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Bhajan Lal & Ors (supra)***, permit interference where the allegations, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of any offence or where the continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. At the same time, such jurisdiction cannot be invoked for undertaking a detailed examination of disputed questions of fact or for appreciating the evidence as would be done at the stage of trial.

47. In the present case, the FIR was registered upon allegations concerning the alleged fabrication and use of the Will dated 11.08.1993 stated to have been executed by Shri K.P. Bhargava, the Wills dated 26.10.2001 and 03.04.2009 stated to have been executed by Smt. Ganga Bhargava, and the partnership deed dated 02.02.1994. These allegations are coupled with assertions regarding subsequent dealing with the estate, shares, business interests and other assets of the deceased and the consequential allegations of cheating and criminal breach of trust. The allegations, therefore, cannot, at this stage, be said to be such that, even if accepted on their face, they do not disclose any cognizable offence.

48. The principal submission of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners is that the entire dispute is civil in nature and that the parties have been litigating over the same subject matter before the civil courts, the Company Law Board and other forums for several years. It is true that the parties have been involved in prolonged litigation concerning the estate and business interests of their parents. However, the existence of civil proceedings does not, by itself, constitute a bar to the investigation or prosecution of an offence which is otherwise disclosed from the allegations. The nature of the reliefs sought in civil proceedings and the ingredients of the offences alleged in a criminal case operate in different fields.

49. In the present case, respondent No.2 does not merely assert a different interpretation of the Wills or her share in the estate. She alleges that the very documents on the basis of which rights were asserted and assets were dealt with were forged or fabricated and were thereafter used to secure or retain such rights. Whether these allegations are ultimately established is a different matter altogether. At the threshold, the allegation of fabrication and use of documents, coupled with the alleged consequential dealing with the assets, cannot be characterised as purely civil merely because the same documents have also been the subject matter of civil litigation.

50. The fact that respondent No.2 had earlier instituted civil proceedings challenging the 1993 and 2009 Wills also does not, by itself, result in an adjudication of the criminal allegations. The suit concerning the 1993 Will was dismissed on the ground of limitation and the

subsequent challenge to that order did not result in any adjudication by the competent court establishing the genuineness of the Will. Likewise, the proceedings concerning the 2009 Will are stated to be pending. Consequently, this Court cannot proceed on the assumption that the disputed documents have already been judicially found to be genuine.

51. Equally, this Court cannot, in the present proceedings, determine whether the statements of the attesting witnesses are sufficient to establish due execution of the Wills, whether the handwriting expert opinion relied upon by respondent No.2 is correct, or whether the originals of the documents are available and capable of being proved in accordance with law. These are matters which depend upon evidence. The rival contentions of the parties in this regard disclose disputed questions which cannot be converted into a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS.

52. The next contention concerns the closure report dated 27.07.2022. The submission of a closure report by the Investigating Officer does not, in itself, bring the criminal proceedings to an end. The learned Magistrate is not bound to mechanically accept the conclusion of the Investigating Officer and is entitled to consider the material collected during investigation and the objections raised by the complainant through a protest petition. The question, therefore, is whether the learned Trial Court acted within its jurisdiction in directing further investigation upon consideration of the protest petition.

53. The impugned order dated 03.10.2024 records, inter alia, that the investigation had not sufficiently examined the genuineness of the Will

dated 11.08.1993, the Will dated 03.04.2009 and the partnership deed dated 02.02.1994 and that no effective forensic examination had been undertaken in respect of the disputed documents. The learned Trial Court, accordingly, directed further investigation, including obtaining handwriting/FSL opinion. The subsequent order dated 17.02.2025 was passed in continuation thereof and directed the concerned police authorities to ensure completion of the further investigation.

54. In the considered view of this Court, the direction for further investigation cannot be held to be without jurisdiction merely because a closure report had earlier been submitted. Whether the investigation already conducted was complete or whether some relevant aspects remained to be examined was a matter within the domain of the learned Magistrate while considering the protest petition. The direction to undertake further investigation into the disputed documents is, particularly in the context of allegations of forgery, not such as can be characterised as an impermissible exercise of jurisdiction.

55. The reliance placed by the petitioners upon the statements of the attesting witnesses and the material collected from the office of the Sub-Registrar also does not assist them at this stage. The existence of registration records or the statements of attesting witnesses may constitute material for the Investigating Officer and ultimately, the trial court. However, whether such material conclusively establishes the genuineness of the disputed documents is not a matter to be adjudicated by this Court in proceedings seeking quashing of the FIR. Similarly, the opinion of a handwriting expert is not conclusive by itself. Its evidentiary value, when

read with the other material, is to be assessed at the appropriate stage.

56. As regards the submission that the ingredients of Sections 406 and 420 IPC are not made out, this Court is of the view that the issue cannot be conclusively determined on the basis of the truncated reading of individual allegations. The FIR has to be considered as a whole. The allegations regarding the disputed documents, their alleged use, the subsequent dealing with the assets and the alleged wrongful gain are interconnected. Whether the ingredients of the individual offences are ultimately established against each petitioner is a matter to be determined on the basis of the material collected during investigation and, if so warranted, at the subsequent stage of the proceedings.

57. The judgment in ***Bhajan Lal (supra)*** relied upon by the petitioners does not mandate quashing merely because the accused place before the Court an alternative version of the facts or point to circumstances which may ultimately assist their defence. The categories indicated therein are illustrative and are intended to prevent manifest abuse of the criminal process. The present case, where the allegations concern alleged fabrication of testamentary and other documents and subsequent use thereof in relation to the estate and business interests of the deceased, cannot, at this stage, be said to fall within any such category.

58. On the contrary, the principles reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ***Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra)*** underscore the restraint required while exercising inherent jurisdiction in matters where investigation is either pending or sought to be interfered with. This Court is not required to determine whether the allegations are ultimately true or

whether the defence of the petitioners is likely to succeed. The limited enquiry is whether the allegations discloses an offence and whether continuation of the proceedings would constitute an abuse of process.

59. It is also relevant that the impugned orders do not by themselves, determine the guilt or culpability of the petitioners. The learned Trial Court has directed further investigation so that the disputed documents and the allegations surrounding them may be investigated further. The direction for submission of a supplementary chargesheet is to be understood in the context of such further investigation and does not amount to a pre-determination that the petitioners are guilty of any offence. The Investigating Officer is required to conduct the investigation fairly and in accordance with law and to place before the competent court the material that emerges therefrom.

60. This Court is, therefore, of the considered view that the impugned orders dated 03.10.2024 and 17.02.2025 do not disclose such jurisdictional error or perversity as would warrant interference in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. The learned Trial Court was competent to consider the protest petition and, upon finding that certain aspects required further investigation, to direct further investigation in accordance with law.

61. At the same time, nothing contained herein shall be construed as a finding regarding the genuineness or otherwise of the Wills dated 11.08.1993, 26.10.2001 and 03.04.2009, the partnership deed dated 02.02.1994, or the correctness of the rival versions of the parties. The evidentiary value of the statements of the witnesses, the handwriting

expert opinion, the documentary material and the other evidence collected during investigation shall be considered by the competent court at the appropriate stage, strictly in accordance with law.

62. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no ground to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS to quash FIR No. 386/2022 dated 05.05.2022 or to interfere with the orders dated 03.10.2024 and 17.02.2025 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.

CONCLUSION:

63. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. *Interim* order, if any, also stand(s) vacated.

64. All observations made herein are confined to the disposal of the present petition and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case, which shall be decided by the learned Trial Court uninfluenced thereby.

65. A copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for information and necessary compliance.

MADHU JAIN
(JUDGE)

SEPTEMBER 15, 2026/*ys/P*