1. Court’s decision
The Bombay High Court allowed the defendant’s application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure and rejected the plaint filed by a public charitable trust seeking recovery of ₹17.20 crore from its former trustee for alleged illegal occupation of trust premises. The Court held that, on the plaintiffs’ own pleadings and documents, the defendant was repeatedly acknowledged as a trustee or permanent trustee during the period of occupation. Once the suit was against a trustee for alleged misconduct, breach of duty, or misuse of trust property, Sections 50 and 51 of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act (MPT Act) were squarely attracted, making prior consent of the Charity Commissioner mandatory. The absence of such consent rendered the suit not maintainable.
2. Facts
The plaintiff is a public trust administering a well-known hospital and medical facility. The defendant served as a trustee between 2001 and 2023. The suit, filed in December 2024, sought recovery of compensation for the defendant’s use of two trust-owned premises: a residential flat on the 12th floor of the hospital building (occupied from 2007 to 2015) and a 360 sq. ft. office space used between 2007 and 2009. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s occupation was illegal and that he misused his fiduciary position.
The defendant moved an application for rejection of the plaint, arguing that the trust itself had repeatedly acknowledged him as a trustee throughout the relevant period, and therefore any such action required compliance with Sections 50–51 of the MPT Act. The plaintiffs resisted by branding him a trespasser and contending that no Charity Commissioner’s consent was required.
3. Issues
The case turned on the following issues:
• Whether the plaintiffs’ own pleadings and annexed documents established that the defendant occupied the premises in his capacity as a trustee.
• Whether recovery of compensation from an “erstwhile trustee” falls within Sections 50(i), 50(ii), and 50(f) of the MPT Act.
• Whether the plaintiffs’ attempt to recast the defendant as a trespasser could bypass the statutory requirement of obtaining prior consent under Section 51.
• Whether a plaint can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) when, on its face, it is barred by statute.
4. Defendant’s arguments
The defendant argued that the trust’s own pleadings demonstrate:
• The defendant was a permanent trustee during 2001–2023;
• The trust never claimed that he denied their title;
• He occupied the premises while overseeing the trust’s affairs; and
• Various letters, court filings, internal correspondence, and even Supreme Court materials repeatedly recognized him as a trustee.
Counsel pointed to numerous plaint paragraphs (2, 3, 10, 13, 15) and Exhibits “D”, “L-1”, “I”, “O”, and “S” to show that the trust consistently addressed him as “Trustee”, “Permanent Trustee”, or “Member of the Board of Trustees.” On this basis, the suit was necessarily one for breach of trust, misconduct, or wrongful use of trust property—squarely falling under Section 50(i), 50(ii), and 50(f), which cannot be invoked without the Charity Commissioner’s consent.
He further argued that plaintiffs were attempting to disguise a trustee-liability suit as a trespass suit purely to avoid the statutory requirement. The defence of limitation was noted but not pressed, given that Order VII Rule 11(d) required only a statutory-bar analysis.
5. Plaintiffs’ arguments
The plaintiffs insisted that the defendant was never a valid trustee and that he acted throughout as a trespasser. They relied on an order dated 14 December 2023 passed by the Assistant Charity Commissioner rejecting the defendant’s change report and holding that he was “illegally appointed.” According to plaintiffs, this automatically rendered his occupation unauthorised.
The plaintiffs argued that the suit did not seek trustee-removal, scheme modification, or administrative relief, but merely compensation for illegal occupation. They further cited Supreme Court orders from 2015 and 2016, wherein the defendant had agreed to vacate and to pay charges, arguing that these orders demonstrated unlawful use of trust property.
Relying on a 2025 decision (Shri Hari Ashram v Vijay Jayantilal Patel), they contended that suits for eviction of a trespasser, licensee, or tenant do not require Charity Commissioner’s consent. They argued that Order VII Rule 11(d) cannot be invoked merely because the defendant raises a defence based on trustee capacity.
6. Analysis of the law
The Court applied the settled test under Order VII Rule 11(d): it must decide solely on the plaintiffs’ pleadings and documents, without considering the defence. On this basis, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ attempt to portray the defendant as a trespasser was contradicted by their own pleadings and annexed documents.
The Court emphasized that Section 50 applies when a suit alleges:
• breach of trust,
• negligence or misconduct by a trustee, or
• a direction is required to recover property or proceeds from a trustee or ex-trustee.
Section 50(f) is particularly broad—it covers orders directing trustees or “others” to pay the trust for loss caused by misconduct or breach. Because the plaint itself alleged misuse of fiduciary position, breach of duties under Section 51 of the Trusts Act, and wrongful occupation during trusteeship, the statutory scheme applied in full.
The Court rejected the argument that calling the defendant a “trespasser” in one paragraph could override multiple unequivocal admissions, including letters addressing him as “permanent trustee” and pleadings in other courts describing him as a trustee. A litigant cannot rely on selective characterisation to escape statutory requirements.
7. Precedent analysis
Although the plaintiffs relied on Shri Hari Ashram, the Court distinguished it because that case involved a person in unauthorised occupation without any fiduciary relationship. Here, the defendant’s relationship with the trust was defined entirely through trusteeship, as shown by the plaintiffs’ own exhibits.
The Court reaffirmed long-standing principles that:
• suits falling under Section 50 require mandatory prior consent;
• the Charity Commissioner is a necessary party under Section 51(3);
• statutory compliance cannot be bypassed by re-characterising the nature of occupation; and
• courts must rely on plaintiffs’ pleadings, not the defendant’s claims, when applying Order VII Rule 11.
These principles justified treating the plaint as barred by Section 50–51.
8. Court’s reasoning
The Court held that the plaintiffs’ case was inherently self-defeating. Every crucial document described the defendant as a trustee, including communications from 2009, 2017, and internal opinions. Even the Supreme Court orders noted that he was a trustee at the time of occupation.
Because the suit was expressly for recovery of compensation arising out of alleged breach of fiduciary obligations, the plaintiffs were required to first obtain Charity Commissioner’s consent. Their failure to do so meant the plaint was barred by statute.
The Court found it impermissible for the plaintiffs to now argue that the defendant’s trusteeship was illegal, when their own pleadings repeatedly acknowledged him as a trustee and sought recovery based on misuse of that position. The Court concluded that the core of the suit was trustee liability—not trespass—which brings it unequivocally within Section 50.
9. Conclusion
The Court allowed the defendant’s application and rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d). It held that:
• the suit required prior consent under Sections 50–51;
• the failure to obtain such consent rendered the proceedings non-maintainable;
• describing the defendant as a trespasser was inconsistent with the plaintiffs’ detailed admissions; and
• all consequential interim applications were disposed of.
The decision reaffirms that statutory prerequisites in trust litigation are mandatory and cannot be avoided through strategic drafting.
10. Implications
The ruling has significant implications for trust governance:
• Trusts cannot pursue claims for breach, misuse, or compensation against former trustees without complying with Sections 50–51.
• Any suit linked to fiduciary misconduct must include the Charity Commissioner as a necessary party.
• Litigants must maintain consistency—documents acknowledging trusteeship cannot be ignored when re-characterising occupation as trespass.
• Order VII Rule 11(d) remains a powerful tool to weed out statutorily barred suits at the threshold.
The judgment strengthens procedural discipline in public trust litigation.
CASE LAW REFERENCES
1. Shri Hari Ashram v Vijay Jayantilal Patel (2025)
Held that suits against trespassers do not require consent; distinguished because the defendant here was acknowledged as a trustee.
2. Supreme Court orders dated 11.05.2015 and 21.01.2016
Showed that the defendant occupied premises while being treated as a trustee; relied upon to demonstrate fiduciary connection.
3. Established jurisprudence under Sections 50–51 MPT Act
Reaffirmed that trustee-liability suits require prior consent and cannot be filed as ordinary civil actions.
FAQs
1. When is Charity Commissioner’s consent mandatory under the MPT Act?
Consent is mandatory when a suit alleges breach, misconduct, misuse of trust property, or seeks recovery from a trustee or ex-trustee. Such actions fall under Section 50.
2. Can a trust sue a former trustee as a “trespasser” to avoid Section 50?
No. If pleadings or documents show the person acted as a trustee, statutory consent becomes unavoidable. Labels in the plaint cannot override substantive admissions.
3. What happens if a suit requiring Section 51 consent is filed without it?
The plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) as being barred by statute.
