POSH Inquiry Must Follow Natural Justice: Allahabad High Court Quashes Disciplinary Action Against Professor
Facts
Dr. Tapas Kumar Das was working as an Associate Professor-G of Astrophysics at the Harish Chandra Research Institute, Allahabad. Several female students and researchers who had worked under him submitted complaints alleging sexual harassment, including inappropriate late-night meetings, sexually coloured remarks, unwelcome physical contact, inappropriate online communication and transmission of sexually explicit material.
The Institute’s Internal Complaints Committee received approximately ten complaints concerning incidents allegedly occurring between 2013 and 2016. The Committee concluded that the petitioner had sexually and mentally harassed female students and researchers by misusing his position of authority. It recommended disciplinary measures, including suspension, stoppage of increment and promotion, restrictions on supervising female researchers and participation in gender-sensitisation programmes.
The Governing Council, however, imposed the lesser penalty of “censure” and prohibited the petitioner from supervising or engaging female students, postdoctoral fellows or research assistants. This decision was formalised by an order dated 9 July 2017.
The petitioner challenged the order before the Allahabad High Court, alleging that the complaints were time-barred under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 and that the inquiry violated the prescribed procedure and principles of natural justice.
Issues
- Whether the Internal Complaints Committee could entertain complaints filed beyond the limitation period prescribed under Section 9 of the POSH Act.
- Whether serious allegations or multiple complaints could, by themselves, justify disregarding the statutory limitation period.
- Whether the inquiry complied with Section 11 of the POSH Act and Rule 7 of the 2013 Rules.
- Whether the failure to record the complainants’ statements, provide relevant material to the petitioner, permit questioning or cross-examination, and grant an oral hearing violated natural justice.
- Whether the disciplinary order should be quashed outright or the matter should be remitted to the Internal Complaints Committee for fresh consideration.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner argued that the POSH Act is a special statute whose procedural safeguards and limitation provisions must be strictly followed.
Under Section 9, a complaint must ordinarily be filed within three months of the incident or, in the case of a series of incidents, within three months of the last incident. The Committee may extend this period by a further three months only after recording reasons that circumstances prevented the complainant from filing within time.
The complaints in the present case allegedly concerned incidents between 2013 and 2016, but were undated and did not identify the specific dates of the alleged acts. According to the petitioner, the Committee itself acknowledged that the incidents had not been reported within the statutory three-to-six-month period, yet proceeded solely because the allegations were serious and numerous.
The petitioner further contended that:
- the complainants’ statements were not formally recorded;
- he was not supplied complete particulars and supporting material;
- he was not permitted to test the allegations by questioning or cross-examining the complainants;
- no meaningful oral hearing was afforded to him; and
- the Committee’s findings were based only on written complaints and his incomplete response.
He relied principally upon X v. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1964, to contend that a complaint which is patently barred by Section 9 cannot be entertained beyond the maximum permissible period without statutory justification.
Respondent’s Arguments
The Institute did not satisfactorily demonstrate that the complainants’ statements had been recorded or that the petitioner had been granted an oral hearing or an effective opportunity to test the allegations.
The respondents nevertheless submitted that the allegations were extremely serious and included unwanted physical contact, sexually coloured remarks, inappropriate late-night meetings and communications of a sexual nature.
They argued that the object of the POSH Act is to protect women from workplace sexual harassment and that delay must be viewed sensitively, particularly where young students and researchers are dependent upon the alleged harasser for their academic careers.
The respondents requested that, if the Court found procedural defects, the matter should not be terminated. Instead, it should be remitted to the Internal Complaints Committee for fresh consideration from the stage at which the procedural irregularity had occurred.
Analysis of the Law
Limitation under Section 9 of the POSH Act
Section 9 requires a written complaint to be filed within three months of the incident or the last incident in a series. The Internal Complaints Committee may extend the period by a further three months, but only where:
- circumstances prevented the complainant from filing within time; and
- reasons for granting the extension are recorded in writing.
The statutory framework does not permit the Committee to disregard limitation merely because the allegations are serious. At the same time, the Court held that the complaints could not automatically be rejected without first examining when they were filed, the dates or period of the alleged incidents and the reasons for any delay.
Inquiry procedure under Section 11 and Rule 7
Section 11 requires the Committee to conduct the inquiry in accordance with the applicable service rules and to provide both parties an opportunity of being heard. Rule 7 expressly requires the inquiry to conform to principles of natural justice.
The Committee possesses powers similar to those of a civil court for summoning persons, enforcing attendance and requiring production of documents. These powers are intended to ensure that allegations are properly examined rather than accepted solely on the basis of untested written material.
The High Court found no indication that:
- the complainants’ statements were formally recorded;
- copies of such statements were furnished to the petitioner;
- the petitioner was given an opportunity to question the complainants;
- the petitioner received a proper oral hearing; or
- the allegations were individually analysed before guilt was recorded.
The inquiry was therefore procedurally defective, and both the Committee’s report and the consequential disciplinary order were legally unsustainable.
Precedent Analysis
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241
The Court referred to Vishaka as the constitutional foundation of the POSH Act. The judgment recognised that sexual harassment violates women’s rights to equality, dignity and a safe working environment under Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.
The High Court emphasised that the protective purpose of the legislation must be respected. However, the statutory object does not permit abandonment of procedural fairness or the express requirements enacted by Parliament.
X v. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1964
This decision was relied upon for the interpretation of Section 9. It held that a complaint must ordinarily be filed within three months, extendable by no more than a further three months upon recorded reasons.
A complaint that is manifestly barred by limitation may be rejected at the threshold. However, limitation may involve factual examination where the dates, alleged continuity of conduct or reasons for delay are uncertain.
The Allahabad High Court applied this principle by directing the Committee first to determine:
- the date or period of each alleged incident;
- the date on which each complaint was submitted;
- whether the conduct formed a series of incidents;
- whether any circumstances prevented timely filing; and
- whether delay could lawfully be condoned under Section 9.
The Court did not accept that seriousness of allegations automatically overrides limitation. Equally, it declined to dismiss the complaints without a reasoned determination of these factual questions.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court found that the allegations described in the complaints were serious and, if established, would fall within the statutory definition of sexual harassment under Section 2(n) of the POSH Act.
The allegations included unwelcome physical contact, sexual advances, sexually coloured conversations, inappropriate late-night interactions and other unwelcome verbal and non-verbal conduct of a sexual nature.
Nevertheless, seriousness of allegations could not cure a procedurally defective inquiry. A finding of guilt carrying disciplinary and reputational consequences could not be sustained where the petitioner had not received an effective opportunity to answer and test the accusations.
The Court also observed that complaints of sexual harassment are often not made immediately, particularly where complainants are students or junior researchers dependent upon the alleged harasser for academic supervision and future career prospects. Delay must therefore be examined in its factual and institutional context.
However, the Committee was still required to comply with Section 9 by examining the relevant dates, considering any explanation for delay and recording a reasoned decision on whether the complaints were maintainable.
Accordingly, the Court adopted a balanced approach:
- it set aside the disciplinary order because the inquiry violated statutory procedure and natural justice;
- it did not declare the allegations false or exonerate the petitioner on merits;
- it did not reject the complaints as time-barred without factual examination; and
- it remitted the matter to the Committee for a fresh, reasoned threshold decision.
The petitioner was not required to participate at the preliminary limitation stage. His right to participate would arise only if the Committee decided to proceed with a substantive inquiry.
Conclusion
The Allahabad High Court set aside the disciplinary order dated 9 July 2017 imposing the penalty of censure and prohibiting the petitioner from supervising female students and researchers.
The Internal Complaints Committee was directed to reconsider all complaints afresh and first determine:
- the dates or period of the alleged incidents;
- when the complaints were submitted;
- whether the complaints were within limitation;
- whether any explanation justified the delay; and
- whether the complaints should be rejected at the threshold or taken forward.
The Committee was directed to pass a reasoned decision within eight weeks. If it decided to proceed, it was required to conduct a fresh inquiry strictly in accordance with the POSH Act, the 2013 Rules and principles of natural justice.
The judgment clarifies that neither serious allegations nor the protective purpose of the POSH Act permits statutory procedure to be bypassed. At the same time, delayed complaints should not be rejected mechanically without considering the circumstances that may have prevented women in vulnerable professional or academic positions from reporting the alleged conduct earlier.
Case Details
Case: Dr. Tapas Kumar Das v. Harish Chandra Research Institute and 3 Others
Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
Case Number: Writ-A No. 12736 of 2018
Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
Date: 7 May 2026
Result: Petition disposed of; disciplinary order dated 9 July 2017 set aside and Internal Complaints Committee directed to reconsider the maintainability of the complaints and pass a reasoned decision within eight weeks.
