1. Court’s decision
The Bombay High Court has directed the municipal corporation to grant a rehabilitation cabin to a pavement dweller whose application was rejected on the ground that her address and identity documents allegedly displayed “inconsistencies.” The Court held that urban poor often update documents as addresses change, and such evolution cannot by itself be treated as fraud or grounds for disqualification from the city’s pavement-dweller rehabilitation scheme.
The Court found the denial to be arbitrary, emphasising that schemes created to protect vulnerable populations must be implemented with a humane, inclusive, and constitutionally compliant approach. After examining the record and noting the petitioner’s residence on the site before the cut-off date, the Court directed authorities to allot a rehabilitation cabin within four weeks.
2. Facts
The petitioner applied for allotment of a rehabilitation cabin under the civic body’s pavement-dweller relocation programme. The scheme provides temporary cabins to qualifying individuals residing on specified city pavements before a notified cut-off date.
The municipal corporation rejected the application primarily because:
• the petitioner’s Aadhaar card and voter ID reflected different addresses over time,
• ration card entries had been updated at different intervals,
• no continuous single-address proof was provided, and
• the scrutiny committee concluded that the applicant had “failed to prove residence.”
The petitioner argued these changes reflected routine address updates caused by shifting between nearby pavements, a common survival practice among unhoused individuals, and not any form of fraudulent claim. She asserted she had indisputably lived on or near the same road segment prior to the cut-off date.
The matter reached the High Court after repeated rejections by the rehabilitation authorities.
3. Issues
The Court addressed the following issues:
- Whether identity-document inconsistencies can justify refusal of rehabilitation to a pavement dweller.
- Whether the petitioner had established residence on the relevant pavement before the cut-off date.
- Whether denial of rehabilitation benefits violated constitutional protections for the urban poor.
- Whether the municipal corporation followed fair, reasonable, and non-arbitrary procedure.
4. Petitioner’s arguments
The petitioner argued that the municipal authorities adopted a hyper-technical approach, ignoring ground realities. She stated that:
• pavement dwellers seldom possess continuous or perfect documentation,
• identity documents undergo changes when they shift between pavements due to eviction drives or police movements,
• inconsistencies do not negate longstanding residence, and
• the corporation ignored independent material showing her presence in the area before the cut-off date.
She contended that the municipal corporation’s process violated Articles 14 and 21, given that rehabilitation of pavement dwellers is not a charity but a constitutional obligation flowing from the right to life with dignity.
5. Respondent’s arguments
The municipal authority defended its rejection by asserting that:
• the petitioner failed to provide consistent proof of residence,
• the documents showed different addresses at different times, undermining her claim,
• the scrutiny committee acted within its powers, and
• strict verification was necessary to prevent misuse of public rehabilitation schemes.
The corporation argued that without uniform documentation it could not confirm that the petitioner lived on the pavement before the cut-off date.
6. Analysis of the law
The High Court placed significant emphasis on the constitutional jurisprudence governing rights of slum dwellers and pavement dwellers. It noted that relocation and rehabilitation schemes are intended to fulfil the right to life under Article 21, which includes the right to shelter, minimal security, and humane treatment.
The Court reiterated several principles emerging from urban-poverty jurisprudence:
• Pavement dwellers constitute a vulnerable class lacking stable residence and formal identity infrastructure.
• Minor inconsistencies in documentation are natural, not suspicious.
• Authorities must adopt a beneficiary-oriented approach, avoiding technical denials that defeat policy objectives.
• Verification processes must be realistic, not based on assumptions applicable only to persons with regular housing.
The Court held that authorities must consider not merely formal documents but supplementary indicators, including affidavits, local verification, past government surveys, and field inspections.
Here, the petitioner produced multiple documents demonstrating her presence in the area before the cut-off date. The corporation did not dispute her general locality of residence, but pointed only to non-identical addresses among different IDs. The Court held that such discrepancies “reflect the lived realities of pavement life, not disqualifying inconsistencies.”
7. Precedent analysis
The Court relied on established principles from earlier rulings (though the judgment avoided explicit citations), including:
Right to shelter jurisprudence — Courts have repeatedly held that state agencies must uphold humane rehabilitation standards and cannot refuse benefits on technical grounds when the claimant’s circumstances inherently limit formal documentation.
Administrative fairness doctrine — Decision-making must conform to Article 14 standards of non-arbitrariness; technical inconsistencies cannot outweigh substantive evidence.
Inclusive-benefit interpretation — Beneficial schemes must be interpreted broadly to fulfil their purpose and protect vulnerable groups.
The High Court noted that its role was to ensure that administrators do not undermine the scheme’s objectives by adopting rigid and unrealistic standards.
8. Court’s reasoning
The High Court found the corporation’s reasoning unsustainable for several reasons:
1. Address inconsistencies are inherent to pavement life
The Court recognised that pavement dwellers regularly shift within the same road, sometimes due to eviction drives, temporary construction, police movement, or monsoon-related compulsion.
Thus, “consistency” in identity documents cannot be demanded as if dealing with housed citizens.
2. There was adequate proof of pre-cut-off residence
The petitioner produced multiple documents—ration card entries, earlier voter rolls, identity affidavits, and local certifications—demonstrating residence in the same locality before the cut-off.
3. The scrutiny committee’s reasoning was mechanical
Instead of undertaking field verification or cross-checking with local authorities, the committee relied purely on documentary discrepancies.
4. Beneficial schemes must be liberally interpreted
Authorities must facilitate, not obstruct, the entitlement of pavement dwellers. The refusal defeated the legislative intent behind rehabilitation frameworks.
5. Denial violated constitutional guarantees
The Court held that denying rehabilitation on such narrow grounds infringes Articles 14 and 21 as it imposes unreasonable and discriminatory requirements on the poor.
The Court therefore directed the municipal corporation to allot a rehabilitation cabin within four weeks.
9. Conclusion
The High Court concluded that the corporation’s rejection of rehabilitation was arbitrary, insensitive to the realities of pavement life, and violative of constitutional protections. The Court stressed that documentation for pavement dwellers often evolves with changing circumstances, and such evolution cannot be construed as lack of eligibility.
The petition was allowed, and the civic body was ordered to issue an allotment letter and complete all formalities within one month.
10. Implications
This ruling has broad implications for urban-poverty governance:
• Authorities must recognise the fluid identity-document patterns of pavement dwellers.
• Rehabilitation schemes must be applied liberally, not restrictively.
• Scrutiny committees cannot deny benefits based solely on address variations.
• Verification must be ground-based, not merely document-based.
• The judgment reinforces that urban rehabilitation is a constitutional obligation, not discretionary benevolence.
The decision strengthens protections for thousands of pavement dwellers vulnerable to eviction, displacement, and procedural exclusion.
CASE LAW REFERENCES
(Summarised in principle form, as the judgment does not cite specific names)
• Right to shelter precedents — Courts require humane, realistic evaluation of pavement dwellers’ claims; documentation deficits cannot defeat core entitlements.
• Non-arbitrary state action doctrine — Administrative decisions affecting fundamental rights must satisfy fairness and proportionality.
• Beneficial scheme interpretation — Rehabilitation policies must be construed to fulfil their social-justice objectives.
FAQs
1. Can a city deny rehabilitation to a pavement dweller because their documents show different addresses?
No. Courts hold that address inconsistencies among pavement dwellers are natural and cannot be grounds for disqualification.
2. What proof is needed to qualify for a pavement-dweller rehabilitation scheme?
A mix of documents, local verification, and pre-cut-off presence evidence is sufficient. Continuous uniform address proof is not required.
3. Are authorities required to consider ground realities when assessing eligibility?
Yes. Scrutiny committees must apply humane, practical standards and cannot rely on rigid document-based tests alone.