1. Court’s decision
The Delhi High Court has set aside the conviction and seven-year sentence imposed in 2017 on the appellant for the offence of rape under Section 376 of the Penal Code. After re-examining the evidence presented at trial, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had sexual relations with the prosecutrix by deceiving her into believing he would marry her. The Court noted significant gaps in the investigation and serious inconsistencies regarding the prosecutrix’s knowledge of the appellant’s marital status. Importantly, the prosecutrix admitted that sexual relations were consensual, and there were no allegations of force. On the totality of evidence, the High Court extended the benefit of doubt and acquitted the appellant.
2. Facts
The prosecutrix, a college student from West Bengal, met the appellant—her distant relative—during a family ceremony in June 2013. Thereafter, they remained in contact over mobile calls and SMS. On 24 December 2013, the appellant allegedly travelled to Kolkata to meet her. The following day, they went for an outing. On 26 December 2013, under his alleged promise to marry her, she left for Delhi with him.
She claimed they established physical relations in the train journey and again after reaching Delhi at a rented room in Rohini. Thereafter, the appellant allegedly abandoned her and later informed her that he was married. Distressed, she contacted her family, and her relatives picked her up from Old Delhi Railway Station on 29/30 December 2013.
A complaint was then lodged, followed by medical examination and investigation. The trial court convicted the appellant in 2017. He appealed to the High Court challenging both conviction and sentence.
3. Issues
- Whether the prosecutrix’s consent was obtained under a misconception of fact arising from a false promise of marriage.
- Whether the evidence established that the appellant concealed his marriage and deceived the prosecutrix.
- Whether contradictions in family testimonies indicated that the prosecutrix’s family already knew of the appellant’s marital status.
- Whether the lack of electronic evidence—call records, messages, mobile phones—fatally weakened the prosecution case.
- Whether consensual sexual relations, without evidence of coercion, could sustain a conviction under Section 376.
4. Appellant’s arguments
The appellant argued that the prosecutrix was aware of his marriage, and therefore allegations of deception were false. He denied travelling with her, arranging the train tickets, taking a room in Delhi, or establishing sexual relations. Counsel highlighted that in her statement under Section 164, the prosecutrix expressed a desire to marry the appellant, showing continued willingness inconsistent with a claim of deception.
He further argued that the trial court erred in treating consensual intimacy as rape without proof that consent was obtained through a false promise. The appellant pointed out that the prosecution failed to produce call records, text messages, mobile phones, travel tickets or any other corroborating evidence. He therefore sought acquittal on grounds of lack of proof and material inconsistencies.
5. Respondent’s arguments
The State and Amicus Curiae supported the conviction, arguing that the prosecutrix consistently stated that the appellant induced her with a promise of marriage and concealed his marital status. They submitted that the prosecutrix’s vulnerability as a young student must be considered and that her movement from Kolkata to Delhi indicated reliance on the appellant’s assurances.
They argued that the appellant’s prior marriage was a material fact, knowingly withheld, which vitiated consent. They maintained that inconsistencies in the prosecutrix’s recall—such as inability to name the train—did not dilute the core allegation that sexual relations were based on deception. The prosecution urged the High Court to uphold the conviction.
6. Analysis of the law
The Court examined whether the prosecutrix’s consent was obtained through misrepresentation or false promise of marriage. It reiterated that for consent to be vitiated, the promise must be false from the outset, and the prosecutrix must have believed it solely because of the deception. Mere failure to fulfil a promise is insufficient.
(a) Absence of corroborative digital evidence
The Court noted that neither party’s phone was seized, no call detail records were collected, and no electronic evidence of messages or communication—central to the prosecution narrative—was produced. This significantly weakened the allegation that the relationship was driven by persistent promises of marriage.
(b) No evidence of travel or ticketing
Although the prosecutrix stated that the appellant arranged train tickets, no travel documents were seized or proved. This cast doubt on the prosecution’s version of events.
(c) Family knowledge of marriage
Multiple relatives, including PW-11 and PW-12, acknowledged attending or being aware of the appellant’s marriage. Their close connection to the prosecutrix suggested that knowledge of the appellant’s marital status may have reached the prosecutrix earlier, undermining claims of deception.
(d) Admitted consensual relations
The prosecutrix admitted, during deposition, that the physical relations were consensual. There was no allegation of force or coercion. Consent obtained in an adult relationship, absent proof of deception, does not constitute rape.
(e) Forensic evidence did not support prosecution
The FSL report yielded no positive results. The prosecutrix refused internal medical examination, reducing the possibility of medical corroboration.
Given these deficiencies, the prosecution failed to discharge the burden of proving that the accused induced sexual relations by deliberate and sustained deception.
7. Precedent analysis
While the Court did not cite external judgments, the reasoning aligns with established Supreme Court principles:
1. Consent and misconception of fact
For Section 376 on false promise of marriage, the prosecution must show:
• the promise was false from inception, and
• the prosecutrix relied on it solely to consent.
2. Burden of proof in rape cases
Although the Court adopts a sensitive approach to sexual offences, the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be diluted.
3. Importance of corroboration
Where the prosecution alleges deception through digital communication, absence of such records creates major evidentiary gaps.
4. Benefit of doubt
When evidence leads to two plausible views—guilt or innocence—the accused must receive the benefit of doubt. These cumulative principles drove the High Court’s conclusion that the conviction could not stand.
8. Court’s reasoning
The Court found multiple areas where the prosecution story lacked support:
• No electronic evidence for alleged calls, messages or planning.
• No proof of train travel or rented accommodation.
• Family members of both sides were on visiting terms; several had attended the appellant’s marriage, making concealment improbable.
• The prosecutrix admitted consensual relations.
• No allegation that she believed the appellant would end his existing marriage.
• The FSL report and medical examination did not support allegations.
Taken together, these factors created reasonable doubt about whether the prosecutrix was misled into consenting. Judicial sensitivity cannot substitute for evidentiary requirements. Because the prosecution failed to establish the ingredients of Section 376, the appellant was entitled to acquittal.
9. Conclusion
The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant. His personal bond was cancelled and surety discharged. The Court acknowledged the valuable assistance of the Amicus Curiae.
10. Implications
This decision reinforces key principles in cases alleging rape on the basis of a false promise to marry:
• Consent must be clearly vitiated by deception; mere relationship breakdown is insufficient.
• Evidentiary gaps, especially in digital communication, can be fatal.
• When families are interconnected, alleged ignorance of marital status must be scrutinised carefully.
• Medical and forensic corroboration, though not mandatory, plays an important role where other evidence is weak.
• Courts will extend benefit of doubt where material inconsistencies remain unresolved.
The ruling underscores the importance of rigorous investigation and the limits of prosecutorial assumptions in consent-based sexual offence cases.
CASE LAW REFERENCES
1. Consent under misconception of fact
Consent induced by a promise must be founded on intentional deception from inception.
2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
Criminal convictions require strong, consistent, corroborated evidence.
3. Benefit of doubt doctrine
If evidence allows two interpretations, courts must prefer the view favourable to the accused.
FAQs
1. Why did the High Court acquit the accused in a false-promise-to-marry rape case?
Because the prosecution failed to prove deception, and evidence suggested consensual relations with significant investigative gaps.
2. Does consensual sex become rape if marriage does not occur?
No. Only when consent was obtained through deliberate falsehoods known to the accused at the outset.
3. Did the Court find that the prosecutrix knew of the accused’s marriage?
Yes. Testimony of family members created a real possibility that she knew or ought to have known, destroying the deception theory.