Delhi High Court Upholds Acquittal in POCSO Case, Holds Delayed Disclosure and Improvements Created Reasonable Doubt
Facts
The State filed a criminal appeal under Section 378 CrPC challenging the judgment dated 2 March 2016 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, North-West, Rohini District Courts, Delhi.
The Trial Court had acquitted the respondent, Phool Chand, of charges under Section 3(d) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, punishable under Section 4, and in the alternative under Section 376(2)(i) IPC.
The prosecution case was that on 23 February 2014, around 9:00 p.m., the minor prosecutrix was at her house in Machhli Market, Wazirpur, Delhi. The respondent, who was related to her as her paternal uncle and was referred to as “Bade Papa”, allegedly entered the house and committed sexual assault.
According to the prosecution, the father of the prosecutrix reached during the incident, slapped the respondent, and neighbours also gathered. A call was made to the police at 100 number. However, the first information given to the police was only about a quarrel, not sexual assault.
When SI Azad Singh reached the spot, public persons produced the respondent before him. The respondent was taken for medical examination, and his MLC recorded smell of alcohol in his breath.
On the next day, 24 February 2014, the prosecutrix and her mother went to Police Station Ashok Vihar. The prosecutrix then narrated the allegation of sexual assault, after which her statement was recorded, the FIR was registered, she was medically examined, and her statement under Section 164 CrPC was recorded.
The Trial Court held that the prosecution failed to explain why the allegation of sexual assault was not disclosed at the first opportunity when the police reached the spot. It also noted the background dispute regarding the adjoining jhuggi and held that the possibility of a coloured version could not be ruled out. The respondent was therefore acquitted.
Issues
- Whether the Trial Court’s acquittal of Phool Chand under Section 3(d)/4 POCSO Act and Section 376(2)(i) IPC was perverse or illegal.
- Whether the testimony of the minor prosecutrix was sufficiently reliable to reverse the acquittal.
- Whether the delay in disclosing the allegation of sexual assault created reasonable doubt.
- Whether improvements in the prosecutrix’s statements and omissions in the father’s testimony affected the prosecution case.
- Whether the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act could be invoked when foundational facts were themselves doubtful.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The State argued that the Trial Court erred in acquitting the respondent despite the prosecutrix consistently supporting the prosecution case.
It submitted that the prosecutrix was a minor and had clearly identified the respondent as the person who entered the jhuggi and committed the alleged offence.
The State relied on the prosecutrix’s statement under Section 164 CrPC, her deposition before the Trial Court, and the history recorded in her MLC to argue that her version was substantially consistent.
The State further argued that the prosecutrix’s testimony was corroborated by her father, PW-7, who claimed to have reached the house during the incident and found the respondent with the prosecutrix in incriminating circumstances.
It was contended that the Trial Court wrongly treated the delay in disclosure as fatal. According to the State, the respondent was a close family member, and the initial hesitation to disclose the allegation was sufficiently explained by the prosecutrix.
The State also argued that conviction in a sexual assault case can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence.
Respondent’s Arguments
The respondent supported the Trial Court’s acquittal.
He argued that when the police first reached the spot pursuant to the PCR call, no allegation of sexual assault was made. The first information was only about a quarrel.
The respondent submitted that PW-12 SI Azad Singh stated that the father of the prosecutrix had described the matter as personal and expressed an intention to compromise. Therefore, the allegation of sexual assault surfaced only the next day, after deliberation.
The respondent also pointed out improvements in the prosecutrix’s statements. Certain facts, such as the respondent being under the influence of liquor, asking the prosecutrix to worship Saraswati Mata, and offering to bring samosas and clothes, were not stated in the earliest statement but appeared later.
He also relied on inconsistencies between the prosecutrix and her father regarding the condition of the door. The prosecutrix stated that the door was open, while her father stated that it was bolted with an iron nail and that he opened it from outside.
The respondent further argued that there was an existing dispute regarding the adjoining jhuggi occupied by his son. This, according to him, supported the possibility of false implication.
It was also argued that the mother of the prosecutrix refused internal gynaecological examination, and no forensic or DNA evidence was collected.
Analysis of the Law
The High Court first examined the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal.
The Court held that although an appellate court can reappreciate evidence, interference with acquittal is justified only when the Trial Court’s view is perverse, impossible, or contrary to the record. If the Trial Court has taken a possible view, the acquittal cannot be reversed merely because another view is also possible.
The Court then examined Section 3(d) of the POCSO Act and Section 376(2)(i) IPC. It held that to sustain the POCSO charge, the prosecution had to prove that the prosecutrix was a child, that the alleged act fell within Section 3(d), and that the respondent committed the act.
The Court accepted that the school record established that the prosecutrix was a minor and below 16 years of age on the date of the alleged incident.
However, the Court clarified that proof of age and the legal character of the allegation did not automatically prove the commission of the offence. The prosecution still had to prove the occurrence and the respondent’s involvement beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court also held that the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act arises only after foundational facts are established. It cannot be used to fill material gaps in the prosecution evidence.
Precedent Analysis
The Court relied on Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, where the Supreme Court reiterated that appellate courts must be cautious while interfering with acquittal. Unless the Trial Court’s view is perverse, impossible, or contrary to evidence, acquittal should not be disturbed.
The State relied on State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, where the Supreme Court held that conviction in a sexual assault case can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it is trustworthy and inspires confidence.
The High Court accepted this legal proposition but held that the principle does not dilute the requirement that the testimony must prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. The question was not whether a conviction can ever be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, but whether the testimony in this case was reliable enough to reverse an acquittal.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court found that the prosecution case rested mainly on the testimony of the prosecutrix and her father.
The Court noted that the prosecutrix’s earliest statement did not contain certain details that were later introduced in her Section 164 CrPC statement and court deposition. These included allegations about the respondent being under the influence of liquor, asking her to worship Saraswati Mata, and offering samosas and clothes.
The Court held that these additions did not by themselves demolish the prosecution case, but they were relevant while assessing whether the testimony was strong enough to reverse an acquittal.
The Court found a more material inconsistency between the prosecutrix and her father regarding the door. The prosecutrix stated that the door was open, whereas the father stated that the door was bolted with an iron nail and that he opened it. Since the father claimed to have reached during the incident, this inconsistency affected the reliability of his version.
The Court also noted that the father’s court testimony contained material omissions when compared with his earlier statement. Details such as his return to the jhuggi to collect gol gappas, the bolted door, the electricity bulb being on, and seeing the prosecutrix lying on the bed were absent from his earlier statement.
The Court further considered that the first police interaction on the night of the incident was only about a quarrel. No allegation of sexual assault was made when the police came to the spot. The father had told the police that the matter was personal and that he wanted to compromise.
The Court also noted the admitted background dispute regarding the adjoining jhuggi, which was occupied by the respondent’s son. This dispute gave some support to the defence plea that false implication could not be ruled out.
The medical evidence was held to be neutral. The prosecutrix’s internal examination was refused, and there was no forensic material corroborating the allegation. The respondent’s MLC only showed smell of alcohol and injuries caused after he was beaten by public persons. This supported the occurrence of a quarrel but did not prove the charged offence.
The Court held that the doubt in the case arose from the prosecution evidence itself. The delayed disclosure, improvements, omissions, contradiction regarding the door, absence of independent public witnesses, neutral medical evidence and background dispute together prevented the prosecution from crossing the threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court dismissed the State’s appeal.
The Court held that the Trial Court had not taken a perverse or impossible view of the evidence. The view favouring the accused was a possible view arising from the record.
The Court held that although an incident and quarrel had taken place on 23 February 2014, the prosecution failed to prove with the certainty required in criminal law that the respondent committed the charged offences.
The statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act could not be invoked because the foundational facts necessary for drawing the presumption were not established.
The acquittal of Phool Chand for the offence under Section 3(d) of the POCSO Act, punishable under Section 4, and in the alternative under Section 376(2)(i) IPC, was upheld.
Case Details
Case: State v. Phool Chand
Court: Delhi High Court
Case Number: CRL.A. 157 of 2018
Judge: Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Madhu Jain
Date: 07 July 2026
Result: State appeal dismissed; acquittal under Section 3(d)/4 POCSO Act and Section 376(2)(i) IPC upheld.
