Court’s Decision
The Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court comprising Justice D.K. Singh and Justice Rajesh Rai K. dismissed a writ petition that had challenged an interlocutory order passed by an arbitral tribunal. The Court noted that since the arbitral award had already been rendered during the pendency of the writ petition, the matter had become infructuous.
The Bench observed that “when an arbitral award has been passed, the writ petition loses its purpose and stands dismissed as having been rendered infructuous by efflux of time.” Accordingly, the writ petition was disposed of as infructuous, with no further orders.
Facts
The petitioner, a private educational service provider, had entered into an agreement with a trust operating educational institutions. Disputes arose between the two parties concerning the contractual terms, leading to arbitration proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
During the pendency of the arbitration, the petitioner approached the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, challenging an order dated 31 May 2022 passed by the learned Arbitrator in A.C. No. 14/2021 on an interlocutory application (IA No. 1/2022). The petitioner sought to set aside the said order and prayed that the High Court allow the application filed before the arbitrator.
While the writ petition was pending adjudication, the arbitral tribunal proceeded with the main matter and ultimately pronounced the arbitral award, thereby concluding the proceedings before it. Consequently, the petitioner’s challenge to the interim order became redundant.
Issues
- Whether a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 challenging an interim arbitral order can be sustained after the arbitral award has been passed.
- Whether continuation of the writ petition serves any purpose once the arbitral proceedings have culminated in a final award.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner initially sought to challenge the interim order passed by the Arbitrator, contending that the said order adversely affected its contractual rights during the pendency of the arbitration. However, by the time the matter came up for final hearing before the High Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the arbitral award had already been delivered, and thus, the writ petition had become infructuous.
Counsel candidly stated that the petitioner no longer wished to pursue the writ petition and requested that the same be dismissed as infructuous. The statement was recorded by the Bench, indicating the petitioner’s acknowledgment that the relief sought could no longer be granted.
Respondent’s Arguments
Since the petitioner itself sought dismissal on the ground of infructuousness, the respondent was not required to advance any detailed arguments. The respondent had earlier opposed the writ petition on the grounds of maintainability, arguing that arbitral matters should be dealt with under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, not through writ jurisdiction.
The respondent maintained that the petitioner had the statutory remedy of challenging the final arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, rendering the writ petition unsustainable. The respondent’s position was effectively vindicated when the petitioner conceded the infructuousness of the matter.
Analysis of the Law
The High Court’s order underscores a well-established procedural principle — that a writ petition becomes infructuous once the underlying proceedings have concluded or the cause of action has ceased to exist.
Under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, parties are provided with a comprehensive dispute resolution framework. Section 34 of the Act offers a specific statutory mechanism to challenge an arbitral award. Hence, when an arbitral award has already been passed, a pending writ challenging an interim order loses relevance.
The Court implicitly reaffirmed the doctrine of “efflux of time” — meaning that judicial remedies must be pursued within their operative timeframe, and once the core issue ceases to exist, the courts will refrain from adjudicating academic or redundant matters.
Precedent Analysis
Though the Court did not cite precedents in the brief oral order, the legal position aligns with established jurisprudence on the limited scope of judicial intervention in arbitral matters.
- SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618 — The Supreme Court emphasized judicial restraint in interfering with ongoing arbitration, except as provided under the Act.
- M/s Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd., (2020) 15 SCC 706 — The Supreme Court reiterated that High Courts should not entertain writ petitions challenging arbitral orders when effective statutory remedies exist.
- Bhaven Construction v. Executive Engineer, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd., (2022) 1 SCC 75 — It was held that writ jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases involving bad faith or patent lack of jurisdiction.
In the present case, since the arbitral award had already been passed, these precedents supported the High Court’s conclusion that the writ petition had become infructuous and need not be examined on merits.
Court’s Reasoning
The Division Bench, after noting the submission made by the petitioner’s counsel, concluded that nothing survived in the writ petition for adjudication. Justice D.K. Singh, delivering the order, held that the pendency of the writ petition no longer served any purpose once the arbitral award was rendered.
The Court reasoned that in light of the final award, any interference with an interlocutory order passed during the arbitration would be futile, as the arbitration proceedings themselves had reached their conclusion. Therefore, the petition was dismissed as infructuous, without entering into the merits of the dispute or the validity of the arbitral order.
Conclusion
The Karnataka High Court dismissed the writ petition as infructuous by efflux of time, noting that the arbitral award had already been passed. The Bench clarified that once arbitration proceedings culminate in a final award, any pending challenge to interim orders becomes redundant.
This decision reiterates the principle that courts will not adjudicate matters that have lost their cause of action or serve no practical purpose. The petitioner remains free to challenge the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, if aggrieved.
Implications
The judgment underscores the importance of procedural finality and discourages parallel or premature judicial interventions in arbitral matters. It highlights that once an arbitral award is delivered, the proper statutory remedy lies in challenging that award under the Arbitration Act rather than pursuing earlier writ petitions.
For litigants and practitioners, this order serves as a reminder that courts view arbitration as a self-contained mechanism with limited judicial interference, and that writ petitions cannot survive the conclusion of arbitral proceedings.
Judgments Referred
- SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618 — Judicial restraint in interfering with arbitration proceedings.
- M/s Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd., (2020) 15 SCC 706 — High Courts should refrain from entertaining writ petitions when statutory remedies exist under the Arbitration Act.
- Bhaven Construction v. Executive Engineer, SSNNL, (2022) 1 SCC 75 — Limited scope of writ jurisdiction in arbitration-related matters reaffirmed.
FAQs
Q1. What does “infructuous” mean in legal proceedings?
A case is said to become infructuous when the underlying cause of action ceases to exist or when the relief sought is no longer relevant due to subsequent developments, such as conclusion of proceedings.
Q2. Can a writ petition challenge an order passed by an arbitrator?
Generally, no. Writ petitions against arbitral orders are discouraged unless there is a clear lack of jurisdiction, as parties have statutory remedies under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.Q3. What remedy is available after an arbitral award is passed?
The aggrieved party can file an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act to set aside the arbitral award on specific legal grounds.