Court’s Decision
The Kerala High Court quashed the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for the benefit of a minority-run private school at Thripunithura. The Court held that the acquisition was a “dubious attempt to wriggle out of the constitutional embargo under Article 30(1A)” by adopting a private settlement between the State and the school. It ruled that such an arrangement lacked legal backing and did not qualify as a “public purpose” under the Land Acquisition Act. However, considering that possession of the land had already been taken and handed over to the school, the Court directed the State to calculate and pay compensation to the landowners under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (2013 Act). On receipt of compensation, the landowners were to execute conveyance deeds in favour of the Government or its nominee.
Facts
The dispute arose when the State sought to widen the access to a bridge by acquiring land belonging to Sree Venkateswara English Medium School, managed by Thulu Brahmana Yogam, a linguistic minority. Since Article 30(1A) of the Constitution requires a special law for compulsory acquisition of property belonging to minority educational institutions, the State could not directly acquire the school’s land.
Faced with this hurdle, the State and the school entered into a compromise settlement in a writ petition filed by the school in 2006. As per this arrangement, the school’s land was used for the project, and in exchange, the State promised to compensate the school by acquiring land from adjacent private owners (the appellants in this case). Acting on this settlement, the State issued a fresh notification in 2007 to acquire the appellants’ land.
The landowners challenged this acquisition, arguing it was a colourable exercise of power, meant only to benefit a private school under the guise of “public purpose.” A Single Judge dismissed their challenge, leading to this writ appeal. Meanwhile, an award was passed in 2010, and when the appellants sought enhanced compensation, the Reference Court also rejected their claim, resulting in a separate petition tagged with this appeal.
Issues
- Whether the acquisition of private land to compensate a minority-run school amounted to a “public purpose” under Section 3(f) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
- Whether the State could bypass the constitutional safeguard under Article 30(1A) by adopting a compromise settlement.
- Whether the appellants, having lost possession, were at least entitled to compensation under the 2013 Act.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The landowners argued that the acquisition was colourable and unconstitutional, as it was driven solely by a compromise between the State and the school to circumvent Article 30(1A). They pointed out that Article 30(1A), inserted by the 44th Amendment, explicitly mandates that minority educational institutions’ property can only be acquired through a specific law ensuring their rights are not abridged.
They relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Society of St. Joseph’s College v. Union of India (2002) 1 SCC 273, which held that a specific law is necessary for compulsory acquisition of minority institutions’ property. Thus, without such a law, the State had no authority to enter into settlements that burdened third-party landowners.
They also submitted that the acquisition served no genuine public purpose, as the school could continue functioning even after parting with its land, and the arrangement was merely to benefit a private institution.
Respondent’s Arguments
The State defended the acquisition, claiming it was necessitated by public purpose — namely, the widening of access to the bridge. It argued that the compromise settlement was a practical solution to balance the constitutional prohibition under Article 30(1A) while ensuring the infrastructure project was completed.
The school authority also contended that as a minority institution, it was entitled to protection of its property, and the arrangement merely compensated its loss. It was argued that acquisition of adjacent land was incidental and still fell within the ambit of “public purpose” as defined under Section 3(f) of the 1894 Act.
Analysis of the Law
The Court scrutinised the meaning of “public purpose” under Section 3(f) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It noted that Clause (vi) permits acquisition for educational schemes sponsored by the Government or statutory authorities but excludes private schools from its scope. Clause (viii) explicitly excludes acquisition for companies, underscoring that private entities cannot be beneficiaries of State-led acquisitions unless specifically provided by law.
The Court stressed that Article 30(1A) places a constitutional embargo on acquisition of property belonging to minority-run schools without a special law. By adopting a compromise settlement, the State effectively attempted to sidestep this constitutional requirement, rendering the acquisition void.
It also contrasted the provisions of the 2013 Act, which explicitly excludes private educational institutions and hotels from its applicability, reinforcing the legislative intent to restrict acquisition for private benefit.
Precedent Analysis
- Society of St. Joseph’s College v. Union of India (2002) 1 SCC 273) — Acquisition of minority educational institution property requires a specific law under Article 30(1A). Relied on to strike down the acquisition.
- Gopakumar V.M. v. State of Kerala [2009 (3) KHC 361] — Acquisition for temple expansion and parking space was held to fall within “public purpose.” Distinguished here, as the present acquisition lacked plurality of public interest.
The Court noted that unlike in Gopakumar, where larger public interest was evident, here the sole purpose was to protect a private minority school, which could not be equated with a genuine public purpose.
Court’s Reasoning
The Bench held that the acquisition was not genuinely for a public purpose but was instead an attempt to get around the constitutional bar under Article 30(1A). It observed:
“This acquisition is a dubious attempt to wriggle out of the constitutional embargo rather than acknowledging any other elements constituting public purpose under the law.”
The Court emphasised that while infrastructure development may be a valid public purpose, the means adopted here — burdening adjacent private owners to compensate a private minority school — was constitutionally impermissible.
However, considering that the school had already taken possession and the landowners conceded they only required compensation, the Court directed payment as per the 2013 Act to balance equities.
Conclusion
The High Court allowed the writ appeal, quashed the acquisition proceedings including the Section 4(1) notification under the 1894 Act, and set aside the Reference Court’s award. It directed the District Collector to calculate compensation under the 2013 Act, and upon payment, the appellants must execute conveyance deeds in favour of the State or its nominee.
Implications
This ruling underscores that constitutional protections under Article 30(1A) cannot be bypassed by executive settlements. It clarifies that land acquisition for private minority schools does not fall within “public purpose” under the 1894 Act or the 2013 Act.
At the same time, the judgment balances equities by ensuring landowners are fairly compensated. It sends a strong message that the State cannot use “ingenious methods” to sidestep constitutional restrictions, reinforcing the primacy of constitutional guarantees over administrative expediency.
FAQs
Q1. Can land of minority-run schools be compulsorily acquired under the Land Acquisition Act?
No. Article 30(1A) requires a special law for such acquisition; general provisions of the 1894 Act do not apply.
Q2. Was the acquisition in this case for a genuine public purpose?
No. The Court held it was a colourable exercise meant to compensate a private school, not a larger public interest.
Q3. What relief was granted to the landowners?
The Court quashed the acquisition but, since possession was already taken, directed compensation under the 2013 Act.