consistency

Patna High Court Emphasises Principle of Consistency in Criminal Sentencing: “When Evidence Is Common, Conviction Cannot Differ Merely on the Basis of Presence” — Life Imprisonment Converted to 10 Years’ Rigorous Imprisonment

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Court’s Decision

The Patna High Court, in a significant judgment, modified a life sentence imposed by the trial court, holding that the principle of parity must apply where co-accused are tried on the same evidence and under identical circumstances. The Division Bench reduced the petitioner’s sentence from imprisonment for life to ten years of rigorous imprisonment, while maintaining the conviction under Section 304 Part I of the Indian Penal Code.

The Court observed that the trial court failed to appreciate the commonality of evidence and the mitigating factors that applied equally to all accused. It reiterated that sentencing must be proportionate and consistent, especially where the prosecution evidence against multiple accused is identical in character and intensity.

“When the role, evidence, and circumstances are similar, the punishment cannot be disproportionate merely because of the nature of presence,” the Bench remarked.


Facts

The prosecution case stemmed from a violent altercation that resulted in the death of one individual during a dispute in a village in Bihar. The petitioner and his family members were accused of jointly assaulting the deceased, allegedly with lathis and rods, following a long-standing land and boundary dispute.

During the trial, several eyewitnesses were examined, and the prosecution claimed that the petitioner had inflicted fatal blows. The trial court convicted all accused persons under Section 304 Part I IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) but imposed different sentences—granting lesser sentences to some and life imprisonment to the petitioner.

Aggrieved by the differential treatment, the petitioner filed an appeal, arguing that the same evidence and circumstances were relied upon for all accused, and therefore, imposing a harsher punishment on one individual was legally unsustainable.


Issues

  1. Whether the trial court was justified in imposing a life sentence on the petitioner when co-accused were convicted on identical evidence but awarded lesser sentences?
  2. Whether the principle of parity in sentencing applies to cases arising from the same occurrence and evidence?
  3. Whether the appellate court can modify a life sentence in the absence of distinct aggravating circumstances against a particular accused?

Petitioner’s Arguments

The petitioner contended that the trial court acted arbitrarily and discriminated between similarly situated accused, although the prosecution had not established any separate or graver role on his part. The same set of witnesses, evidence, and circumstances were used to convict all accused under Section 304 Part I IPC, yet the petitioner alone was awarded imprisonment for life, while the others were sentenced to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment.

He argued that this disparity violated Article 14 of the Constitution, which mandates equality before law and equal treatment of persons similarly circumstanced. The petitioner relied on the well-settled principle that sentencing must not be disproportionate to the culpability proved, citing judicial precedents emphasizing consistency in punishment among co-accused in the same trial.

It was further submitted that there was no finding of a distinct overt act or aggravating factor specific to him, and the entire occurrence was a group altercation without premeditation. Therefore, the petitioner sought reduction of the sentence in line with the co-convicts’ punishment.


Respondent’s Arguments

The State opposed the appeal, asserting that the petitioner was the primary aggressor who had inflicted the fatal injury, as testified by certain eyewitnesses. It was contended that the trial court rightly distinguished the petitioner’s role, as his actions were instrumental in causing the victim’s death.

However, upon being queried by the Court, the State could not establish any qualitative difference in the nature of evidence against the petitioner vis-à-vis other co-accused. The State conceded that all accused were charged, tried, and convicted under the same section, and the evidence against each was substantially the same.

Nevertheless, the prosecution argued that the quantum of punishment falls within judicial discretion, and unless the sentence is manifestly perverse or shocking, the appellate court should refrain from interference.


Analysis of the Law

The Court examined the sentencing philosophy under Section 304 Part I IPC, observing that while the provision empowers courts to impose imprisonment for life, the punishment must correspond to the degree of culpability inferred from the facts. The Court reiterated that sentencing is not a mechanical process but must be guided by principles of justice, proportionality, and consistency.

The Bench highlighted that differential sentencing among co-accused can only be justified when:

  1. The evidence distinctly attributes separate and more grievous acts to one accused; or
  2. There exist aggravating factors such as prior criminal record, motive, or leadership in the commission of the offence.

In the absence of such differentiating factors, uniformity in sentencing becomes a constitutional requirement under the equality clause. The Court emphasized that the trial court failed to record any finding of special culpability that would justify imposing a life sentence on the petitioner.


Precedent Analysis

The Court referred to several authoritative rulings emphasizing parity in sentencing:

  • Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 5 SCC 546 – The Supreme Court observed that sentencing must balance aggravating and mitigating factors, and inconsistency in similar cases undermines justice.
  • State of U.P. v. Sattan (2009) 4 SCC 736 – The apex court held that co-accused similarly placed must be treated alike unless distinguishing circumstances exist.
  • Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 – While upholding the death penalty’s constitutionality, the Court laid down the principle that sentence must be individualized but consistent with the circumstances of the offence.
  • Ajmer Singh v. State of Haryana (2010) 3 SCC 746 – The Supreme Court reduced a life sentence to ten years for parity, noting that the same evidence and allegations applied to all accused.

Drawing from these precedents, the Patna High Court held that a sentencing disparity without rational basis violates judicial uniformity and leads to miscarriage of justice.


Court’s Reasoning

The Court found that the trial court had not recorded any reasoned distinction between the petitioner and other accused who were convicted on the same evidence. The alleged fatal blow attributed to the petitioner was based on omnibus witness statements, which did not specify precise acts or corroborate medical evidence conclusively.

The Court underscored that mere allegation of presence or participation cannot justify a harsher penalty when all accused are found guilty under the same provision. It noted that the trial court’s conclusion was inconsistent and arbitrary, particularly since it itself recognized the absence of premeditation and downgraded the offence to Section 304 Part I from Section 302 IPC.

Holding that the principle of parity was a cornerstone of sentencing jurisprudence, the Bench declared that “equal culpability warrants equal punishment.” It found that the petitioner’s conviction was justified, but the sentence of life imprisonment was excessive and disproportionate.


Conclusion

The Patna High Court, therefore, partly allowed the appeal, affirming the conviction under Section 304 Part I IPC but reducing the sentence from life imprisonment to ten years of rigorous imprisonment.

The Court directed that the petitioner shall be entitled to set-off under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the period already undergone. The judgment reinforced that justice must be tempered with equality and consistency, ensuring that courts maintain proportionality between offence, evidence, and punishment.

“Equality in culpability must reflect equality in sentencing; disparity in punishment without justification erodes the integrity of criminal justice,” the Bench concluded.


Implications

This ruling fortifies the principle of parity in sentencing, serving as a vital precedent for appellate courts reviewing differential punishments among co-accused. It underscores that sentencing discretion must be exercised judiciously and uniformly, not arbitrarily.

The judgment also reiterates the evolving trend in Indian criminal jurisprudence towards rational, evidence-based sentencing, ensuring that punishment corresponds with both the gravity of the act and the fairness owed to all participants in a joint offence.


FAQs

1. Can co-accused receive different sentences for the same offence?
Yes, but only when there are clear and provable distinctions in their roles, evidence, or aggravating circumstances. Otherwise, uniform sentencing must apply.

2. On what grounds can appellate courts modify life imprisonment?
Appellate courts can reduce the sentence if they find the punishment disproportionate or inconsistent with co-accused convicted on identical evidence.

3. What legal principle did the Patna High Court reaffirm in this judgment?
The principle of sentencing parity, emphasizing that when culpability and evidence are equal, punishment must also be equal.

Also Read: Bombay High Court: ‘Integrity of Selection Process Must Prevail Over Individual Hardship’ — Court Upholds Cancellation of Police Patil Appointments After Irregularities in Viva Voce, fairness in selection processes for public posts cannot be compromised

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