Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Executing Court, Revisional Court, and High Court which had dismissed an Execution Petition (EP) on the ground of satisfaction recorded in an earlier EP. The Court held that:
“A satisfaction recorded in one EP would not result in the dismissal of a further EP filed on the ground of a subsequent interference caused.”
The Court restored EP No. 2 of 2012 to the file of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Champaran, to be decided afresh, observing that:
“When a permanent injunction is granted it operates perpetually against the judgment debtors, their assignees and successors and it could be enforced at any time breach is occasioned.”
Facts
The predecessor-in-interest of the appellants had instituted Civil Suit No. 44 of 1988 seeking a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction against the respondents from interfering with possession over agricultural land in Village Kharkhari, Tehsil and District Champawat. The suit was decreed, and a supplemental sale deed dated 22.08.1998 in favour of the respondents’ predecessors was cancelled.
The first EP was closed when both parties were absent, and satisfaction was recorded based on the written undertaking by the judgment-debtor that they would not interfere. A second EP was filed but not pressed. A third EP (EP No. 2 of 2012) was then filed by the legal heirs of the decree-holder (the appellants).
Issues
- Whether a satisfaction recorded in a previous EP can bar the maintainability of a subsequent EP seeking enforcement of a permanent prohibitory injunction.
- Whether the principle of res judicata applies to successive execution petitions in such cases.
- Whether the EP was barred by limitation.
Petitioner’s Arguments
- The earlier EP was closed due to non-appearance and the court assumed satisfaction based on the judgment-debtor’s undertaking.
- There was fresh interference with possession which entitled the decree-holders to seek enforcement through a new EP.
- The nature of the decree—being one of permanent prohibitory injunction—entitled them to approach the court whenever a breach occurred.
- The objection filed by the judgment-debtor under Section 47 CPC was unsustainable because the sale deed relied upon by them was already rendered void.
Respondent’s Arguments
- Objected to the third EP under Section 47 of the CPC, claiming that the decree was already satisfied in earlier proceedings.
- Claimed that the decree was based on cancellation of a supplemental deed of 1998, whereas their title flowed from a prior sale deed dated 29.09.1984.
- Alleged that they had filed a separate application for setting aside the decree, and thus enforcement was premature.
Analysis of the Law
The Court emphasized that:
- A decree for permanent injunction is not time-barred under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
- The 12-year limitation does not apply to such decrees. The proviso to Article 136 specifically excludes decrees of perpetual injunction from the limitation period.
- The principle of res judicata would not apply to bar successive EPs in cases where fresh cause of action arises due to new acts of interference or obstruction.
Precedent Analysis
While no specific earlier precedents were cited in the judgment, the Court’s reasoning aligns with settled principles regarding:
- The executability of decrees granting perpetual injunctions;
- The interpretation of Article 136 of the Limitation Act as it relates to decrees for injunction;
- Limited applicability of res judicata in successive execution proceedings when fresh cause of action exists.
Court’s Reasoning
- The High Court “misconstrued the facts” and misunderstood the orders in the writ petition.
- Recording of satisfaction in a previous EP does not extinguish the decree-holder’s right to enforce the decree in future if breach occurs again.
- The earlier satisfaction was based on the undertaking of the judgment-debtor and absence of the decree-holder; this could not act as a bar to subsequent EPs.
- The rights under a permanent injunction decree are enforceable perpetually and can be invoked whenever breach occurs.
The Court clarified:
“The decree-holder, their assignees and successors, has a perpetual right in personam against the decree holders, their assignees and successors.”
Conclusion
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments of the High Court, Revisional Court, and Executing Court, and restored EP No. 2 of 2012 for fresh consideration. It directed that:
- The executing court shall consider the matter afresh, uninfluenced by prior conclusions, except those regarding the sustainability of the decree and pendency of cancellation proceedings.
- Objections under Section 47 CPC and the result of any pending cancellation proceedings may be considered by the executing court.
Implications
This decision reinforces that:
- Decrees granting permanent injunctions are enforceable at any time upon breach, without being barred by limitation.
- Satisfaction recorded in one execution proceeding does not bar a fresh execution proceeding if a subsequent breach occurs.
- The principle of res judicata does not apply rigidly in execution proceedings involving injunctions, particularly where new acts of interference or obstruction are alleged.
This judgment strengthens the enforceability of injunction decrees and protects decree-holders from technical barriers to execution in cases of continuing or recurring breaches.