Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the daughter challenging the High Court’s review order that had remanded her partition claim for fresh trial. The Court held that the High Court had exceeded its review jurisdiction under Section 114 and Order 47 Rule 1 CPC by reappreciating facts and reversing earlier findings as if sitting in appeal. It restored the earlier High Court order (dated 23.09.2022) that had recognised the appellant’s coparcenary rights under the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, entitling her to a 1/3rd share in the ancestral property.
The Court reiterated that review is confined to correcting errors apparent on the face of the record, not for rehearing or substituting views.
Facts
The dispute arose from a partition suit filed in 2000 by a son against his father, seeking division of ancestral properties. The trial court passed a preliminary decree in 2003, declaring equal shares between father and son. The daughter (appellant) was not made a party at this stage.
After the decree, in 2004, the father executed a sale deed of certain properties in favour of a purchaser (first respondent) and a settlement deed in favour of the daughter. Later, in 2008, he executed a will bequeathing his share to her. He died in 2011, after which the daughter was impleaded as his legal heir.
In 2018, the daughter filed an application to amend the preliminary decree, asserting her coparcenary right as a daughter under the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, which conferred equal rights by birth. She claimed entitlement to 1/3rd share and an additional share through the will.
The trial court dismissed her application in 2019, holding that the amendment could not be applied retrospectively and that the preliminary decree had attained finality. The High Court, however, allowed her revision in 2022, granting her 1/3rd share based on Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020). On review, the High Court reversed itself in 2024, remanding the matter for fresh consideration. This review order was challenged before the Supreme Court.
Issues
- Whether the daughter, as a coparcener, was entitled to a share under the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, despite a preliminary decree of 2003.
- Whether the High Court exceeded its powers of review by reappreciating evidence and reversing its prior order.
- Whether transfers of property made pendente lite (during the suit) by the father could defeat the daughter’s rights.
- Whether estoppel applied to the daughter for attesting the sale deeds.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The appellant argued that under the 2005 amendment and Section 29A (Tamil Nadu Amendment Act, 1989), daughters became coparceners by birth. Since her father was alive when the amendment came into force, she was entitled to equal share. She relied on Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020), which clarified the retrospective application of the amendment to living daughters and fathers.
She submitted that the High Court’s review jurisdiction was limited to correcting errors apparent on the record. By reopening findings and remanding the case, the High Court had acted as an appellate court, which was impermissible.
She further argued that transfers made by her father after the preliminary decree were void as they violated the doctrine of lis pendens and injunction orders. The sale to the first respondent could not prejudice her rights as a coparcener.
Respondent’s Arguments
The respondents contended that the preliminary decree of 2003 had finalised the shares, and the daughter could not reopen it fifteen years later. They argued that the sale deed of 2004 was valid, especially since the daughter herself was an attesting witness, making her estopped from challenging it.
They maintained that the High Court was correct in reviewing its earlier order because the rights of a pendente lite purchaser (the first respondent) were ignored in the 2022 decision. The review was necessary to safeguard her ability to defend her purchase.
It was argued that the daughter, having remained silent for years, could not now disturb settled shares.
Analysis of the Law
The Supreme Court carefully distinguished between review jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction:
- Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, review is limited to correction of patent errors or discovery of new evidence unavailable earlier.
- A review cannot be used to rehear a matter or substitute a different view.
The Court relied on settled precedents:
- Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (1995) – review is confined to correcting errors apparent on the face of the record.
- Parison Devi v. Sumitri Devi (1997) – review cannot be an appeal in disguise.
- Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) – review power is narrower than appellate power.
- Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020) – daughters have coparcenary rights by birth, irrespective of prior preliminary decrees.
Applying these principles, the Court held that the High Court’s review order had impermissibly reassessed facts and allowed defences beyond the scope of review.
Precedent Analysis
- Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020) 9 SCC 1 – Clarified that daughters are coparceners by birth with equal rights, applicable irrespective of prior decrees. Relied upon to affirm the appellant’s entitlement.
- Meera Bhanja (1995), Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma (1979), Parsion Devi (1997), Lily Thomas (2000) – Laid down the limits of review jurisdiction. Cited to strike down the High Court’s expansive review.
- Inderchand Jain v. Motilal (2009), Shivdev Singh (1963) – Reiterated that review is not a substitute for appeal, invoked only to correct manifest errors.
These cases collectively guided the Court to restore the daughter’s coparcenary rights and set aside the review order.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court emphasised that the High Court’s review order had not pointed out any patent error but instead revisited factual findings and entertained new defences, such as questioning the ancestral nature of properties. This went beyond the limited grounds for review.
It observed: “Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and cannot be permitted to be an appeal in disguise.”
The Court clarified that the daughter’s rights under the 2005 amendment could not be defeated by the pendente lite purchaser, whose rights were subordinate to those of coparceners. The sale deed could only bind the father’s share and could not extinguish the daughter’s entitlement.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s review order of 2024 and restored its earlier 2022 decision recognising the daughter’s 1/3rd coparcenary share. It directed the trial court to expedite disposal of pending applications within three months.
The judgment reaffirms that daughters enjoy equal coparcenary rights by birth under the 2005 amendment and that review powers cannot be stretched to reopen concluded findings.
Implications
This ruling has significant implications for both family property disputes and procedural law:
- It strengthens daughters’ rights in ancestral property, reiterating equality under the 2005 amendment.
- It protects finality of decrees by limiting misuse of review jurisdiction.
- It clarifies that pendente lite purchasers cannot override statutory coparcenary rights.
The judgment balances substantive justice with procedural discipline, safeguarding both gender equality in succession and judicial finality.
FAQs
Q1. Can a daughter claim coparcenary rights even if a preliminary decree was passed before 2005?
Yes. The Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma held that daughters have rights by birth, and such rights cannot be denied based on prior preliminary decrees.
Q2. What is the scope of review jurisdiction under CPC?
Review is confined to correcting patent errors or considering new evidence not available earlier. It cannot be used to rehear a case or substitute a new view.
Q3. Can a purchaser during pendency of litigation defeat a daughter’s coparcenary rights?
No. A pendente lite purchaser’s rights are subject to the doctrine of lis pendens and subordinate to coparcenary rights.