Court’s Decision
The Bombay High Court dismissed an election petition seeking to set aside the election of a returned candidate from the Karjat Assembly Constituency. The Court held that the petition lacked the material particulars and specific pleadings required under Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RP Act), and therefore could not proceed to trial. It emphasized:
“Election of a democratically elected candidate cannot be set aside by undertaking an inferential process.”
Accordingly, the Court allowed the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, rejecting the petition at the threshold and refusing to allow the amendment application aimed at filling fundamental gaps in the pleadings.
Facts
The petitioner, an independent candidate, contested the Karjat Assembly elections of 2024 against the returned candidate from a political party. While the petitioner secured 89,177 votes, the returned candidate polled 94,871 votes, winning by a margin of 5,694 votes.
The petitioner challenged the election on multiple grounds: (i) distribution of sarees as bribes to voters, (ii) threats to his party worker by the returned candidate, (iii) fielding of “dummy” candidates with identical names to confuse voters, (iv) suppression of pending criminal cases in the nomination affidavit, and (v) non-counting of votes at a polling booth.
The respondent sought rejection of the petition under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, alleging that the pleadings lacked concise material facts and failed to set forth particulars of corrupt practices as required by Section 83 of the RP Act. The petitioner simultaneously sought amendment to amplify details in the election petition.
Issues
- Whether the election petition disclosed a valid cause of action under Section 100 of the RP Act.
- Whether allegations of corrupt practices, such as bribery, undue influence, or inducement, were supported with sufficient material particulars.
- Whether suppression of a pending criminal case in the nomination affidavit constituted a defect of substantial nature warranting annulment of election.
- Whether the Court should permit amplification of pleadings through amendment under Section 86(5) RP Act to cure deficiencies.
- Whether the petition deserved dismissal under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for want of cause of action.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner argued that the election petition contained sufficient material facts to proceed to trial. He submitted that sarees bearing the respondent’s photograph and party symbol were distributed to women voters, supported by video evidence and media reports. He contended that two dummy candidates with similar names were induced by the respondent to confuse voters, demonstrated by pamphlets and SMS urging votes for “Sudhakarbhau.”
It was also argued that the returned candidate suppressed a pending criminal case by incorrectly stating its year in the affidavit. The petitioner emphasized that under Section 83, evidence is not required to be pleaded, and particulars could be established during trial. He relied on Supreme Court precedents such as Ponnala Lakshmaiah v. Kommuri Pratap Reddy (2012) 7 SCC 788, Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar (2015) 3 SCC 467, and Raj Narain v. Indira Gandhi (1972) 3 SCC 850 to argue that technical objections should not prevent trial of election disputes.
He sought opportunity under Section 86(5) RP Act to amplify particulars through amendment, citing Balwan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain AIR 1960 SC 770.
Respondent’s Arguments
The respondent submitted that the petition was vague and bereft of material particulars. The name of the person distributing sarees was not disclosed, nor was it alleged that such distribution was with the consent of the returned candidate or his agent. He stressed that elections cannot be set aside on mere inferences.
Regarding threats to the petitioner’s worker, it was argued that there was no averment that the worker was an elector or that his electoral right was interfered with. On dummy candidates, it was contended that the symbols were different and photographs of candidates were provided on ballots, preventing confusion. Moreover, those candidates polled only a negligible number of votes compared to the victory margin.
On suppression of criminal cases, the respondent submitted that the discrepancy was a typographical error (2013 case incorrectly shown as 2012), relying on Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang AIR 2024 SC 2121. He cited Kanimozhi Karunanidhi v. A. Santhana Kumar AIR 2023 SC 2366, Rajendra Dhedya Gavit v. Sudhir Jain (2025), and Prakash Rajaram Surve v. Udesh Patekar (2025) to argue that non-compliance with Section 83 warranted rejection at the threshold.
Analysis of the Law
The Court emphasized that an election petition is a statutory remedy, not one based on equity. Strict compliance with the RP Act is mandatory. Section 83(1)(a) requires a concise statement of material facts, while Section 83(1)(b) demands full particulars of corrupt practices, including names, dates, and places.
Failure to disclose material particulars is fatal. Unlike ordinary civil suits, elections cannot be challenged on conjecture or inference. The Court observed that if corrupt practice is alleged, the identity of the person committing it must be pleaded, as consequences differ depending on whether it was by the candidate, election agent, or others.
Precedent Analysis
- Prakash Rajaram Surve v. Udesh Patekar (2025, Bom HC): Held that non-compliance with Section 83 is sufficient to reject election petitions under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
- Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal (1982) 1 SCC 691: Reiterated that election petitions are statutory proceedings requiring strict compliance.
- Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang (AIR 2024 SC 2121): Non-disclosure of every detail is not a substantial defect unless material.
- Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar (2015) 3 SCC 467: Non-disclosure of criminal cases can be a ground for setting aside election.
- Raj Narain v. Indira Gandhi (1972) 3 SCC 850: Allowed amendments to amplify particulars under Section 86(5).
The Court noted that while some precedents favored allowing trial, the absence of basic particulars in the present case rendered the petition incurable.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court held that:
- Allegations of saree distribution failed since the person distributing was not identified.
- Threats to a party worker did not show interference with any elector’s rights.
- Dummy candidates polled negligible votes, and confusion was unlikely given ballot design.
- Suppression of criminal case details was a typographical error, not a material suppression.
- Non-counting of votes at one booth was not shown to materially affect results.
Thus, the petition did not disclose a cause of action. The amendment application was rejected as it sought to fill lacunae, which is impermissible.
Conclusion
The High Court dismissed the election petition, holding it lacked material particulars required under Section 83 RP Act. It stressed that election results, reflecting the will of the people, cannot be disturbed lightly:
“Strict compliance with statutory requirements is mandatory; vague pleadings cannot be the basis for unseating a returned candidate.”
Implications
This ruling underscores the judiciary’s reluctance to unsettle electoral mandates without clear, specific, and material pleadings. It reinforces that allegations of corrupt practices must be detailed and cannot rest on inference. Future petitioners must ensure compliance with Sections 81–83 of the RP Act to withstand preliminary scrutiny. The case also clarifies the narrow scope for amendment in election petitions.
FAQs
1. Can an election petition be dismissed at the threshold for lack of details?
Yes. The Court held that absence of material particulars under Section 83 RP Act justifies rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
2. Does non-disclosure of a pending criminal case always void an election?
Not always. The Court held minor discrepancies or typographical errors do not constitute substantial suppression unless they materially affect the election.
3. Can amendment cure vague pleadings in an election petition?
No. Amendments cannot be used to fill fundamental gaps. Section 86(5) allows amplification of particulars, but not introduction of new allegations or curing of total absence of material facts.
