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Allahabad High Court Directs Reinstatement of Disabled Teacher under Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016— ‘When an Employee Acquires Disability, the Employer Must Adjust or Create a Supernumerary Post’

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Court’s Decision

The Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench), through Justice Abdul Moin, directed the District Inspector of Schools, Barabanki, to identify and appoint the petitioner, a government school teacher who suffered a brain stroke, to an alternative post in the same pay scale and service benefits.

The Court held that under Section 20(4) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, no government establishment can dismiss or reduce in rank an employee who acquires a disability during service. If the employee is unable to perform the original duties, the employer must either shift them to an equivalent post or retain them on a supernumerary post until a suitable position becomes available or retirement, whichever occurs earlier.

Justice Moin emphasized:

“When an employee acquires a disability during service, the employer’s duty is not to dispense with the services but to explore suitable alternative posts or continue the employee on a supernumerary post. This is not an act of compassion but a statutory obligation rooted in constitutional discipline.”

Accordingly, the Court directed the District Inspector of Schools to act within four weeks to assign a suitable post and regularize the petitioner’s service period with all consequential benefits.


Facts

The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in a government school in 2013 under the Department of Secondary Education, Uttar Pradesh. In August 2016, he suffered a brain stroke that rendered him unable to speak or write. After years of medical treatment, he claimed partial recovery and submitted a joining application in August 2024.

However, the educational authorities refused to permit his rejoining, relying on a medical committee report dated 9 October 2024, which found him unfit for teaching duties. The report, prepared by a senior physician and district-level committee, concluded that the petitioner’s condition prevented him from performing teaching work.

Aggrieved by the refusal, the petitioner filed a writ petition seeking directions to sanction medical leave with pay, and to reinstate him in a suitable non-teaching post in terms of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, and its successor, the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.


Issues

  1. Whether the employer was justified in refusing to allow rejoining on the ground of disability.
  2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to protection under Section 20(4) of the 2016 Act, corresponding to Section 47 of the 1995 Act.
  3. Whether the District Inspector of Schools is bound to identify an equivalent or supernumerary post for the petitioner.

Petitioner’s Arguments

The petitioner’s counsel argued that after suffering a brain stroke, he became a person with disability within the meaning of the 2016 Act. Despite his condition, his employment could not be terminated under Section 20(4).

He relied heavily on the Supreme Court judgment in Ch. Joseph v. Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (2025 LiveLaw SC 763), where the apex court held that employers are legally bound to provide reasonable accommodation and cannot discharge an employee who acquires a disability during service.

He contended that since he could no longer perform teaching duties, the authorities were bound to consider him for an alternative post such as administrative, clerical, or supervisory work, with the same pay scale and service benefits.

Additionally, he sought sanction of medical leave for the period of his illness (since 2021) and payment of arrears of salary from October 2021 onward.


Respondent’s Arguments

The State authorities opposed the petition, arguing that the petitioner remained absent without leave since 1 October 2021 and made his rejoining request only in August 2024, after nearly three years. They contended that his long unauthorized absence justified the refusal to allow rejoining.

They relied on the medical committee’s report of 9 October 2024, which found him medically unfit for teaching, and submitted that since he could not perform classroom duties, reinstating him was administratively impractical.

The respondents further asserted that the committee’s evaluation was sufficient and that the petitioner’s condition did not necessitate forming a new medical board.


Analysis of the Law

The Court examined Section 20(4) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, which reads:

“No Government establishment shall dispense with or reduce in rank an employee who acquires a disability during his or her service:
Provided that, if the employee is not suitable for the post he was holding, he shall be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits.
Provided further that, if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.”

Justice Moin noted that this provision mirrors Section 47 of the 1995 Act and embodies the principle of reasonable accommodation—ensuring continued employment despite disability.

The Court observed that the authorities failed to comply with this statutory mandate, as they neither identified an alternative post nor considered the option of a supernumerary post. Instead, they simply relied on the medical report to deny rejoining, which violated the legislative intent to protect disabled employees from exclusion.


Precedent Analysis

The Court extensively referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ch. Joseph v. Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (2025 LiveLaw SC 763), which reiterated that:

“When a disability is acquired during service, the legal framework must respond not with exclusion but with adjustment. The duty of a public employer is not merely to discharge functionaries, but to preserve human potential where it continues to exist. The law does not permit severance of service by the stroke of a medical certificate without first exhausting the possibility of meaningful redeployment.”

It also cited Mohamed Ibrahim v. Chairman and Managing Director, TANGEDCO, where the Supreme Court emphasized the principle of reasonable accommodation even in cases where the disability did not fit within the statutory definitions.

Further reliance was placed on:

The High Court found that these principles equally applied to the petitioner’s case, compelling the employer to identify a role compatible with his residual ability.


Court’s Reasoning

Justice Moin observed that although the petitioner was found medically unfit for teaching, the authorities could not terminate or deny him employment. The committee’s report, which involved a senior physician, only established his inability to teach—it did not rule out his capacity to perform other non-teaching duties.

Therefore, as per Section 20(4), the District Inspector of Schools must:

  1. Identify a suitable post equivalent in pay and benefits, or
  2. Create a supernumerary post until a suitable position becomes available or the petitioner reaches superannuation.

The Court criticized the authorities for failing to constitute a formal medical board, which could have properly assessed the petitioner’s residual capacity. Nonetheless, it concluded that the committee report itself triggered the statutory duty under Section 20(4).


Conclusion

The High Court disposed of the writ petition with the following directions:

The Court concluded that this protection is not discretionary or benevolent, but a mandatory safeguard under the Disabilities Act.


Implications

This judgment reinforces the constitutional and statutory protection of employees acquiring disabilities during service, setting a strong precedent in service jurisprudence.

It establishes that:

The ruling promotes the principle of substantive equality and ensures that disability is treated not as incapacity but as a call for reasonable accommodation.

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