Court’s Decision
The Bombay High Court dismissed a writ petition challenging the proceedings of an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) constituted under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act). The petitioner had alleged bias, procedural irregularity, and violation of principles of natural justice in the ICC’s inquiry process.
The Court upheld the ICC’s independence and validity, holding that “mere apprehension of bias without tangible evidence cannot vitiate institutional proceedings”, particularly when the committee was duly constituted under statutory provisions and included external members as required.
Justice [Name redacted in summary] observed:
“Courts cannot intervene in internal fact-finding proceedings at an interlocutory stage unless the process itself is demonstrably vitiated by mala fides or manifest illegality.”
Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed, reiterating that judicial review under Article 226 does not extend to reappreciating evidence or merits of ICC proceedings.
Facts
The petitioner, an employee of a reputed educational institution, filed the present writ petition challenging the ICC proceedings initiated on a complaint of sexual harassment. The petitioner contended that the ICC was biased, maliciously constituted, and had acted beyond its jurisdiction.
According to the petitioner, one of the ICC members had a professional association with the complainant, thereby creating a “reasonable apprehension of bias.” The petitioner also alleged that the inquiry was conducted without following due process, as key witnesses were examined in his absence and documents were not supplied to him on time.
The respondent institution submitted that the ICC was constituted strictly in accordance with the POSH Act and that the inquiry was at a preliminary stage when the writ petition was filed. It argued that the petition was premature, intended to stall the inquiry, and not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Issues
- Whether the High Court can interfere under Article 226 in ongoing ICC proceedings under the POSH Act.
- Whether mere allegations or apprehensions of bias are sufficient to vitiate proceedings of a duly constituted internal committee.
- Whether procedural deviations, if any, during inquiry, amount to violation of principles of natural justice warranting judicial intervention.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner contended that the constitution of the ICC was illegal and contrary to Section 4 of the POSH Act, as one member allegedly had a close professional association with the complainant. This, according to the petitioner, created a reasonable likelihood of bias, which rendered the entire process void ab initio.
It was argued that the inquiry violated principles of natural justice, as the petitioner was neither provided with adequate opportunity to cross-examine witnesses nor given access to relevant documents before submission of his response. The petitioner relied on the decisions in State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh (AIR 1958 SC 86) and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 to contend that a proceeding tainted with bias and procedural impropriety cannot stand the test of fairness mandated under Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
The petitioner further argued that the ICC’s internal communications and meeting minutes demonstrated a predetermined mind, and hence the writ petition was maintainable even before the final report was issued. He urged the Court to quash the proceedings and direct constitution of a fresh committee.
Respondent’s Arguments
The respondent institution, represented through senior counsel, submitted that the POSH Act provides a self-contained redressal mechanism, and the High Court’s interference at the stage of inquiry would undermine the statutory scheme. The institution maintained that the ICC was validly constituted with an independent external member, as required under Section 4(2)(c) of the Act.
It was argued that the petitioner had participated in the proceedings for several months without objection and only later raised allegations of bias, which demonstrated acquiescence and afterthought.
The respondent emphasized that no final order or report had been passed, and the writ petition was therefore premature and speculative. It relied on Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana (2006) 12 SCC 28, where the Supreme Court held that courts should not interfere in disciplinary or fact-finding inquiries at an interim stage unless there is clear mala fide or lack of jurisdiction.
The respondent concluded that natural justice does not mean an elaborate trial-like process, and that technical procedural objections cannot derail statutory proceedings intended to ensure workplace safety and accountability.
Analysis of the Law
The Court undertook an exhaustive analysis of the POSH Act, 2013, particularly Sections 4, 9, and 11, which govern constitution and functioning of ICCs. It observed that the legislative intent behind the Act was to create an internal, non-adversarial mechanism for resolving sensitive workplace grievances while ensuring procedural fairness.
Relying on judicial precedents, the Court emphasized that judicial review in ICC matters is limited to examining the decision-making process, not the merits of the complaint. The High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction cannot be invoked to pre-empt an inquiry merely because the employee perceives bias.
The Court further clarified that a “reasonable apprehension of bias” must be founded on cogent material, not speculative or inferential claims. Mere professional acquaintance or institutional proximity is insufficient unless it shows direct interest or demonstrated prejudice.
It reiterated that the remedy of judicial review becomes available only after the ICC report is finalized, and even then, interference is justified only if there is a jurisdictional error, mala fides, or patent procedural violation.
Precedent Analysis
- Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana (2006) 12 SCC 28 – The Supreme Court held that writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to challenge a show cause notice or disciplinary inquiry unless there is clear mala fide. This principle guided the Court to reject premature interference.
- Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241 – Recognized the right to a safe workplace as part of Article 21 and laid the foundation for the POSH Act. Cited to reaffirm the statutory character and autonomy of ICCs.
- B.L. Wadhera v. Union of India (2002) 6 SCC 562 – Cited to reinforce that judicial review should not micromanage administrative discretion.
- Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 – Quoted to affirm that fairness is the cornerstone of all administrative action, though procedural deviations must be substantial to vitiate proceedings.
- State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh (AIR 1958 SC 86) – Referred to explain that judicial interference is warranted only when a process is “so flagrantly illegal as to render it null.”
The Court concluded that none of these principles were violated in the present case.
Court’s Reasoning
The Bench reasoned that the POSH Act envisions self-regulation, and courts should exercise restraint in interfering with ongoing internal proceedings. Intervening prematurely would frustrate the very purpose of internal redressal mechanisms established by Parliament.
The Court found that the petitioner’s allegations of bias were unsupported by evidence and that the professional association cited did not establish personal interest or animosity. It observed that ICC members, by the nature of their role, may belong to the same institution, but that alone cannot disqualify them unless proven prejudice exists.
The Court noted that the petitioner had actively participated in several sittings, filed written responses, and cross-examined witnesses without objection, thereby waiving his right to challenge the committee’s composition later.
It further observed that the inquiry was at an intermediate stage, and that judicial interference would set an undesirable precedent encouraging accused persons to stall internal investigations.
Accordingly, the Court held that no violation of natural justice or statutory mandate had occurred and dismissed the petition.
Conclusion
The Bombay High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the ICC proceedings were valid, impartial, and consistent with the POSH framework. It reaffirmed that judicial review in internal disciplinary or grievance inquiries must remain narrow and procedural, and courts should not function as appellate authorities over internal findings.
The Court emphasized that allegations of bias or irregularity must be supported by concrete material evidence, failing which they amount to an abuse of process.
In conclusion, the judgment underscores the judiciary’s faith in institutional mechanisms for ensuring workplace fairness while balancing the rights of both complainant and respondent.
Implications
This ruling strengthens the autonomy and credibility of Internal Complaints Committees under the POSH Act, signalling that courts will not entertain premature challenges intended to stall inquiries.
It also clarifies the scope of judicial review, limiting it to cases of proven mala fides or jurisdictional error. Importantly, the judgment reinforces that institutional mechanisms are central to the enforcement of gender justice and workplace safety.
Judgments Cited and Their Relevance
| Case Name | Legal Principle | Application in Present Case |
| Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) | Recognized right to safe workplace. | Reaffirmed statutory foundation of ICC. |
| Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana (2006) | Writ not maintainable against preliminary inquiry. | Applied to dismiss premature challenge. |
| Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) | Fairness as essence of justice. | Applied to test natural justice compliance. |
| State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh (1958) | Judicial interference only in extreme illegality. | Used to define limits of judicial review. |
| B.L. Wadhera v. Union of India (2002) | Restraint in administrative oversight. | Cited to uphold institutional autonomy. |
FAQs
1. Can an employee challenge an ICC inquiry midway?
No. The High Court clarified that courts will not interfere in pending ICC proceedings unless there is evidence of clear mala fide or lack of jurisdiction.
2. What constitutes bias in an ICC proceeding?
Bias must be established by demonstrable personal interest or prejudice; mere professional acquaintance or institutional proximity is insufficient.
3. When can the High Court quash ICC proceedings?
Only when the committee is illegally constituted or there is gross violation of natural justice, not for procedural irregularities or perceived unfairness.
