Child With Intellectual Disability Alleges Sexual Assault; Supreme Court Acquits Accused as Identification Fails, Crucial Teacher Goes Unexamined and Prosecution Evidence Raises Serious Doubt
Uncle Sentenced to Ten Years Under POCSO; Supreme Court Orders Immediate Release After Key Witnesses Fail to Identify Accused and Effective Medical Cross-Examination Is Denied
Facts
The case arose from an allegation that on 28 May 2015, an 11-year-old girl with a certified 40% intellectual disability was sexually assaulted at her home in East Jaintia Hills, Meghalaya. Her mother alleged that the appellant, Charming Rupon, was in the garden near the house shortly before the incident. The child stayed with her cousin that night; the cousin was said to have informed the mother the next morning. The matter was reported to police on 8 June 2015, around ten days after the alleged incident, following a further disclosure said to have been made to the child’s teacher.
The appellant was tried under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO). On 7 December 2021, the Special POCSO Court convicted him and sentenced him to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment, a fine of ₹1 lakh and five months’ simple imprisonment in default. The Meghalaya High Court dismissed his appeal on 29 March 2022. The appellant approached the Supreme Court, challenging the evidentiary basis of his conviction.
Issues
Whether the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was the perpetrator; whether the victim’s and cousin’s inability to identify him in court could be reconciled with earlier statements; and whether the delayed FIR, omissions in the earliest account, and non-examination of a crucial schoolteacher materially affected the prosecution case.
The Court also examined whether medical testimony could properly be relied upon when effective cross-examination had been denied; whether the appellant’s presence near the garden shifted the burden under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; and whether the courts below had adequately assessed the defence evidence supporting an alibi.
Appellant’s Arguments
The appellant argued that the nearly ten-day delay in registering the FIR was insufficiently explained, especially because the cousin had allegedly informed the mother immediately. The prosecution failed to examine the schoolteacher whose report supposedly prompted the complaint. Both the child and cousin were unable to identify the appellant in court and said that the mother had supplied his name; the child also acknowledged receiving instructions from the prosecutor about what to say.
The defence highlighted inconsistencies regarding the appellant’s relationship with the family, the absence of scientific evidence linking him to the alleged assault, and the limited relevance of medical findings to identifying a particular offender. The appellant further relied on oral and documentary evidence of an alibi which, he argued, the courts below had improperly discounted.
Respondent’s Arguments
The State of Meghalaya maintained that the trial and appellate courts had correctly relied on the victim’s and cousin’s statements recorded under Section 164 CrPC and that later variations should not defeat their earlier accounts. It submitted that the victim’s intellectual disability and the passage of nearly two years before her court testimony explained her inability to identify the appellant.
The State further argued that the appellant’s presence in the adjoining garden before the alleged incident supported an inference of his knowledge that the child was alone, attracting Section 106 of the Evidence Act and requiring him to explain the incriminating circumstances.
Analysis of the Law
A conviction under Section 6 POCSO must rest on proof of the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court accepted the need for sensitivity and latitude when assessing testimony given by a child with an intellectual disability, but held that this did not dispense with proof of the offender’s identity. The inability of both material witnesses to identify the accused, their statements attributing his name to the mother, and the suggestion of prosecutorial coaching were not peripheral contradictions.
The Court distinguished injuries suggesting sexual assault from evidence establishing that this appellant committed it. Neither medical witness had been subjected to an effective defence cross-examination: the trial court proceeded with one doctor despite counsel’s absence and failed to offer cross-examination for the other. The Court held that their testimony could not be read in evidence in those circumstances.
Section 106 of the Evidence Act did not shift the prosecution’s foundational burden. The mother’s account placed the appellant in a garden; it did not establish that he and the child were last seen together. The Court also emphasised that while an FIR need not contain every detail, omission of a foundational incriminating circumstance, especially from a delayed FIR, may materially affect reliability. Unexplained non-examination of a witness central to the origin of the complaint can justify an adverse inference.
Precedent Analysis
Amar Nath Jha v. Nand Kishore Singh, (2018) 9 SCC 137: the Court referred to this decision on the significance of omission from an FIR of facts central to the prosecution’s identification of an offender, while recognising that an FIR is not an exhaustive account.
Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P., AIR 1975 SC 1026: relied upon for the proposition that omissions of important facts in the earliest report may bear on the probability and credibility of the later prosecution version.
Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing, (2001) 6 SCC 145: the Court applied the distinction between merely cumulative witnesses and witnesses needed to explain a material gap in the prosecution case. Since the unexamined teacher allegedly received the disclosure that set the complaint in motion, her unexplained absence supported an adverse inference.
Court’s Reasoning
The Supreme Court found substantial doubt in the cumulative evidence. The cousin withdrew her earlier identification, said she did not know the accused’s face and explained that the mother had provided his name. The child likewise could not identify the offender in court, stated that her mother had told her his name, and admitted having been told by the Special Public Prosecutor what to say. The accounts also conflicted over how the appellant was related to the family.
The mother’s version contained significant omissions and later improvements: the original FIR did not mention seeing the appellant in the garden or receiving a disclosure from the cousin the following day. The teacher who allegedly prompted the FIR was not called. The late report meant there was no scientific corroboration identifying the appellant, and medical testimony had not been properly tested. The asserted “last seen” circumstance failed because seeing the appellant in the garden did not place him with the child.
Separately, the appellant examined himself and three other defence witnesses and produced documentary support for a plea that he had travelled to another village for a property transaction. The Supreme Court considered that the trial court and High Court had dismissed that evidence without adequate justification. Read together, the deficiencies made it unsafe to maintain the conviction.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court allowed the criminal appeal and set aside both the Special POCSO Court’s conviction and sentence dated 7 December 2021 and the Meghalaya High Court’s judgment dated 29 March 2022. It acquitted Charming Rupon by granting the benefit of doubt and directed that he be released forthwith if not required in any other case. The decision turns on failures of identification and proof in the particular evidentiary record; it does not declare that a delay in reporting or an intellectual disability, by itself, discredits an allegation of sexual assault.
Case Details
Case: Charming Rupon v. State of Meghalaya
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Criminal Appeal of 2026 (arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 11881 of 2022); 2026 INSC 1102
Judges: Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta
Date: 9 October 2026
Result: Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; appellant acquitted and ordered to be released forthwith, unless wanted in another case.
