Delhi High Court Acquits POCSO Convict; Holds Material Contradictions in Prosecutrix’s Statements Prevent Statutory Presumption and Entitle Accused to Benefit of Doubt
POCSO Presumption Cannot Arise Without Foundational Facts, Holds Delhi High Court While Acquitting Accused
Facts
The appellant, Vikash, challenged the judgment dated 6 October 2025 and the order on sentence dated 3 December 2025, whereby the Trial Court convicted him under Sections 366, 376(2)(n) and 506(II) IPC and Section 5(l) punishable under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act).
The prosecution case originated from a missing complaint lodged by the prosecutrix’s mother on 16 August 2023. The prosecutrix was recovered with the appellant from Ambala Railway Station on 23 August 2023.
In her Section 161 CrPC statement, the prosecutrix stated that she and the appellant were neighbours, had fallen in love, voluntarily travelled to Ambala, solemnised a temple marriage, and established physical relations with her consent. However, in her subsequent Section 164 CrPC statement and during trial, she alleged that the appellant had threatened her with a knife, forcibly took her to a factory, sexually assaulted her, and threatened to kill her family. These differing versions formed the central controversy before the High Court.
Issues
- Whether the conviction under the IPC and POCSO Act could be sustained when the prosecutrix gave materially inconsistent versions of the incident.
- Whether the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act automatically arose upon prosecution under the Act.
- Whether the prosecution established the foundational facts necessary to invoke the statutory presumption.
- Whether the investigative lapses and lack of corroborative evidence entitled the appellant to the benefit of doubt.
Appellant’s Arguments
The appellant contended that:
- the prosecutrix’s Section 161 CrPC statement clearly established that she voluntarily accompanied him, married him and entered into a consensual relationship;
- her subsequent Section 164 CrPC statement and deposition before the Trial Court introduced material improvements and contradictions regarding the alleged kidnapping and sexual assault;
- the Trial Court wrongly relied upon these improved versions without explaining why the earlier statement was discarded;
- the alleged place of occurrence was never properly investigated, no site plan was prepared, neither the factory owner nor another material witness was examined, and no call detail records or independent evidence corroborated the prosecution story;
- the prosecution therefore failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
Respondent’s Arguments
The State submitted that:
- the prosecutrix was admittedly about 17 years of age, making her a minor in law;
- consequently, her consent was legally immaterial;
- her age stood duly established through the school records, which had primacy for age determination;
- the conviction recorded by the Trial Court therefore warranted no interference.
Analysis of the Law
The Court examined:
- Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act;
- the legal principles governing the evidentiary value of the prosecutrix’s testimony;
- the doctrine relating to foundational facts before statutory presumptions become operative;
- the effect of material contradictions and investigative deficiencies in criminal trials.
The Court reiterated that while the minority of the prosecutrix renders consent legally irrelevant, it does not relieve the prosecution of its obligation to first prove the foundational facts constituting the alleged offences through reliable evidence. Only thereafter can the statutory presumption under Section 29 operate.
Precedent Analysis
The Court relied upon several important precedents:
- Debraj Dutta v. State of West Bengal (2026) — the presumption under Section 29 POCSO does not arise automatically merely because an accused faces trial; the prosecution must first establish foundational facts.
- Nirmal Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026:DHC:4028 — where the prosecutrix gives materially inconsistent versions and foundational facts are not proved, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.
- State of Uttarakhand v. Sanjay Ram Tamta, (2025) 3 SCC 433 — material omissions in statements under Section 161 CrPC that later emerge as improvements materially affect the credibility of the prosecution case.
- Alamelu v. State, (2011) 2 SCC 285 — conviction in sexual offences may rest solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix only if such testimony inspires confidence and is free from material infirmities.
Court’s Reasoning
The High Court found that the prosecutrix gave three materially different versions of the alleged occurrence.
Her Section 161 CrPC statement spoke of a consensual relationship, voluntary travel to Ambala, marriage at a temple and consensual physical relations. In contrast, her later statements alleged kidnapping, threats with a knife and repeated sexual assault.
The Court held that these were not minor discrepancies, but contradictions going to the very genesis of the prosecution case.
It further observed that the Trial Court had wrongly assumed that the statutory presumption under Section 29 POCSO automatically operated merely because the appellant was charged under the Act. Such an approach ignored the settled principle that the prosecution must first establish the foundational facts through cogent and reliable evidence.
The Court also noted several significant investigative lapses, including:
- failure to identify and prove the alleged place of occurrence;
- absence of a site plan prepared at the prosecutrix’s instance;
- non-examination of the factory owner and another material witness;
- absence of call detail records or other independent corroborative evidence.
Since the prosecution case rested substantially upon the testimony of the prosecutrix, these contradictions and deficiencies assumed considerable significance.
The High Court therefore held that the prosecution failed to establish the foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt, making it unsafe to sustain the conviction.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal and set aside both the conviction and the sentence.
The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the foundational facts necessary to invoke the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act. The prosecutrix’s materially inconsistent versions, coupled with significant investigative lapses and lack of corroborative evidence, created reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution case. Accordingly, the appellant was acquitted of all charges and directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.
Case Details
Case: Vikash v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
Court: Delhi High Court
Case Number: CRL.A. 348/2026
Judge: Justice Madhu Jain
Date: 4 August 2026
Result: Appeal allowed. The Delhi High Court set aside the conviction under Sections 366, 376(2)(n) and 506(II) IPC and Section 5(l) punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, acquitted the appellant by extending the benefit of doubt, and directed his immediate release if not required in any other case.
