Delhi High Court Denies Default Bail in Red Fort Blast Case; Holds UAPA’s 180-Day Investigation Extension Continues Despite CrPC’s Replacement by BNSS
Delhi High Court Holds Section 8 General Clauses Act Bridges CrPC-BNSS Transition Under UAPA; Rejects 90-Day Default Bail Claim
Facts
The case arose from an explosion on 10 November 2025 at Gate No. 4 of Lal Qila Metro Station, Delhi, allegedly involving a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device.
An FIR was initially registered at Police Station Kotwali and was subsequently re-registered by the NIA as RC-21/2025/NIA/DLI for offences under Sections 103(1), 109(1) and 61(2) BNS, Sections 16 and 18 UAPA, and Sections 3 and 4 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.
The appellant, Jasir Bilal Wani @ Danish, was arrested on 17 November 2025. He underwent periods of police and judicial custody.
On 10 February 2026, the NIA sought extension of the investigation and detention period beyond 90 days under Section 43D(2)(b) UAPA read with Section 187 BNSS.
On 13 February 2026, the Trial Court granted the first extension for 45 days, taking the permissible period to 135 days. The appellant thereafter applied for default bail under Section 187(3) BNSS.
The NIA subsequently obtained another 45-day extension on 27 March 2026, taking the total period to 180 days. On 30 March 2026, the Trial Court rejected the appellant’s default-bail application.
The appellant challenged both extension orders and the order refusing default bail before the Delhi High Court. Meanwhile, the NIA filed its charge-sheet on 14 May 2026.
Issues
The principal legal question was whether, after the CrPC was repealed and replaced by the BNSS, an accused under the UAPA becomes entitled to default bail after 90 days, or whether the special UAPA mechanism permitting extension of detention/investigation up to 180 days continues to operate.
The Court specifically considered:
- Whether the reference to Section 167 CrPC in Section 43D(2) UAPA must now be construed as a reference to Section 187 BNSS.
- Whether Section 43D(2) amounts to legislation by reference or legislation by incorporation.
- Whether Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act automatically substitutes the corresponding BNSS provision for the repealed CrPC provision.
- Whether the UAPA’s special 180-day extension mechanism survives the enactment of the BNSS.
- Whether the appellant’s belated challenge to the first extension order was barred by acquiescence.
- Whether non-supply of the Public Prosecutor’s report used for extending detention violated the appellant’s rights.
Petitioner/Appellant’s Arguments
The appellant argued that Section 43D(2) UAPA expressly refers to Section 167 CrPC, which has now been repealed.
According to him, Parliament did not amend Section 43D(2) to replace the reference to Section 167 CrPC with Section 187 BNSS. Therefore, the special extension mechanism could not simply be transplanted into the new statutory regime.
He emphasised that Section 167 CrPC and Section 187 BNSS are materially different. Under the old CrPC regime, police custody was ordinarily confined to the initial 15-day period, whereas the BNSS permits the 15 days of police custody to be taken in whole or in parts during the prescribed initial 40 or 60 days.
The appellant therefore argued that the two provisions were not simply interchangeable.
He further contended that Section 8 of the General Clauses Act could not automatically incorporate Section 187 BNSS into Section 43D(2) UAPA because the latter constituted legislation by incorporation, rather than mere legislation by reference.
Since the UAPA deals with personal liberty and contains stringent provisions, any ambiguity was argued to require interpretation in favour of the accused.
Accordingly, the appellant claimed an indefeasible right to default bail upon completion of 90 days.
He also challenged the extension proceedings because the Public Prosecutor’s report placed before the Trial Court was not supplied to him.
Respondent’s Arguments
The NIA contended that Section 187(3) BNSS is the corresponding successor provision to Section 167(2) CrPC and must therefore be read into Section 43D(2) UAPA.
It argued that the 90-day period and UAPA’s independent proviso permitting extension up to 180 days remain unaffected.
The reference to Section 167 CrPC in Section 43D(2), according to the NIA, was a case of legislation by reference, making the reference dynamic rather than frozen.
Therefore, by virtue of Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, the repealed Section 167 must now be understood as referring to its re-enacted counterpart, Section 187 BNSS.
The NIA relied heavily upon the Bombay High Court’s judgment in Nagani Akram Mohammad Shafi v. Union of India, which had examined the corresponding transition from IPC to BNS in the context of scheduled offences under the PMLA.
It further argued that the appellant had not promptly challenged the first extension order dated 13 February 2026 and therefore lost his subsequent default-bail claim by acquiescence.
Analysis of the Law
Section 43D(2) UAPA modifies the ordinary statutory custody regime.
Under the earlier CrPC framework, Section 167 ordinarily prescribed periods of 60 or 90 days. Section 43D(2), however, modifies these periods for UAPA offences and expressly permits the competent Court, upon being satisfied with the Public Prosecutor’s report showing progress of investigation and specific reasons for continued detention, to extend the period from 90 days up to 180 days.
The difficulty arose because the BNSS repealed the CrPC with effect from 1 July 2024, while Section 43D UAPA continued textually to refer to Section 167 CrPC.
The High Court applied Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. That provision ensures continuity where an enactment is repealed and re-enacted: references in other enactments to the repealed provision are ordinarily construed as references to the corresponding re-enacted provision, unless a contrary legislative intention appears.
The Court therefore held that the continuing textual reference to Section 167 CrPC did not render Section 43D(2) ineffective after enactment of the BNSS.
Instead, Section 167 CrPC must now be construed as referring to Section 187 BNSS.
At the same time, the UAPA remains the special enactment, whereas BNSS constitutes the general criminal procedural law. Consequently, the special UAPA provision permitting extension up to 180 days prevails over the general 90-day framework.
Precedent Analysis
Nagani Akram Mohammad Shafi v. Union of India
The Court extensively considered the Bombay High Court’s distinction between legislation by reference and legislation by incorporation.
Legislation by reference is dynamic: where one statute merely refers to another statutory provision, subsequent amendments or re-enactment ordinarily travel into the referring statute.
Legislation by incorporation, by contrast, involves bodily lifting the provision into another enactment, effectively creating a static statutory snapshot unaffected by subsequent changes to the original enactment.
The Bombay High Court had applied Section 8 of the General Clauses Act to hold that corresponding BNS offences continued to constitute scheduled offences under the PMLA despite the Schedule still referring to IPC provisions.
Significantly, the Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the SLP while expressly recording agreement with the High Court on the question of law. The Delhi High Court treated this as an endorsement of the Bombay High Court’s approach.
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India
The Court considered Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCC 529, while analysing Section 8 of the General Clauses Act and the doctrinal distinction between incorporation and reference.
The principle supported statutory continuity where the legislature refers to another enactment rather than permanently incorporating a frozen version of its provisions.
Syed Shahid Yousuf v. NIA
The Delhi High Court also referred to Syed Shahid Yousuf v. National Investigation Agency, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 9329.
That decision recognised that under Section 43D UAPA, detention can validly be extended beyond 90 days up to 180 days where the Public Prosecutor’s report demonstrates the progress of investigation and gives specific reasons why continued detention is necessary.
State of Uttarakhand v. Javed Siddiqui
This precedent became independently important on the appellant’s belated challenge.
The Supreme Court had held that where an accused fails to promptly challenge orders extending the investigation period and approaches the appellate court only later, particularly after investigation has progressed or the charge-sheet has been filed, the right to claim default bail may be lost by acquiescence.
The Delhi High Court applied this principle to the appellant.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court rejected the proposition that enactment of the BNSS automatically reduced the permissible investigation period in UAPA cases to 90 days.
The mere fact that Section 43D(2) still mentions Section 167 CrPC did not mean that the UAPA’s 180-day mechanism became ineffective.
By operation of Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, the reference to the repealed Section 167 CrPC must be construed as referring to the corresponding Section 187 BNSS.
More importantly, the UAPA is a special statute. Its specific provision permitting investigation and detention to be extended up to 180 days continues to prevail over the general procedural framework of the BNSS.
The Court accordingly held in categorical terms that an accused is not entitled to default bail after 90 days merely because Section 43D(2) UAPA has not been textually amended to substitute Section 187 BNSS for Section 167 CrPC.
There was also an independent obstacle to the appellant’s claim.
The first extension had been granted on 13 February 2026, but the appellant did not challenge it at that stage. He challenged it only after the second extension and rejection of his default-bail application.
Following Javed Siddiqui, the Court held that the first extension had attained finality and the appellant had, by acquiescence, lost his right to subsequently attack that extension as a basis for claiming default bail.
The Court also rejected the argument that the Public Prosecutor’s report had to be supplied to the accused. It held that such a report need not be furnished at the extension stage because it is based upon ongoing investigative material. However, the accused must be heard on the extension request, and the Special Court must independently assess the progress of investigation and reasons for continued detention.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court settled the principal issue by holding that the enactment of BNSS does not reduce the special UAPA default-bail framework from an extendable 180 days to 90 days.
Section 167 CrPC appearing in Section 43D(2) UAPA must, by operation of Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, be construed as a reference to Section 187 BNSS.
The special UAPA provision permitting extension of investigation and detention up to 180 days continues to operate.
The appellant was additionally disentitled to challenge the first extension belatedly because he had allowed it to attain finality.
By the time the appeal was considered, the NIA had also filed its charge-sheet on 14 May 2026. The Court therefore observed that the appellant’s attempt to claim default bail after 90 days could no longer succeed and dismissed the appeal, while leaving him free to pursue other remedies available in law.
Case Details
Case: Jasir Bilal Wani @ Danish v. National Investigation Agency
Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Case Number: CRL.A. 444/2026; CNR No. DLHC010190742026
Judge: Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Vikas Mahajan
Date: 18 August 2026; reserved on 23 July 2026
Result: Appeal dismissed; default bail refused. Section 43D(2) UAPA continues to permit extension up to 180 days despite replacement of CrPC by BNSS; Section 167 CrPC is to be read as Section 187 BNSS under Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act.
