Delhi High Court Dismisses Appeal, Holds Mere Issuance of Notice Insufficient to Constitute a 'Judgment' Under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent
Delhi High Court Dismisses Appeal, Holds Mere Issuance of Notice Insufficient to Constitute a 'Judgment' Under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent

Delhi High Court Dismisses Appeal, Holds Mere Issuance of Notice Insufficient to Constitute a ‘Judgment’ Under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent

Share this article

Court’s Decision:

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, comprising Justice C. Hari Shankar and Dr. Sudhir Kumar Jain, dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) on the grounds that the impugned order did not qualify as a “judgment” under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. The Court emphasized that the issuance of notice in the application was insufficient to constitute a judgment, making the appeal not maintainable.

Facts:

The appellant had filed a writ petition challenging two decisions of Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU)—the rejection of his representation for tenure extension as a Research Associate and a demand for ₹55,274 for overstaying in a university hostel. Despite the ongoing petition, the university evicted the appellant from his hostel room and locked it with his belongings inside. Consequently, the appellant filed an application seeking directions to allow him to vacate the room and retrieve his belongings.

On 27 September 2024, a Single Judge issued notice on this application, to which the appellant responded by filing the present LPA, questioning the maintainability of the notice.

Issues:

  • Whether the issuance of notice by the Single Judge on the appellant’s application qualifies as a “judgment” under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.

Petitioner’s Arguments:

The appellant’s counsel argued that the impugned order affects the appellant’s valuable rights, thereby constituting a judgment within the meaning of Clause 10. The counsel relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania to support the contention that any decision affecting valuable rights should be treated as a judgment.

Respondent’s Arguments:

The respondent contended that the issuance of notice is a procedural step and does not affect any substantial rights. It was argued that no judgment, as defined under Clause 10, was passed by the Single Judge.

Analysis of the Law:

Clause 10 of the Letters Patent allows an appeal only against a judgment. In the landmark judgment Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, the Supreme Court held that a judgment is one that determines the rights of the parties and has a decisive impact on the litigation.

The High Court further analyzed decisions that explored the scope of “judgment” under the Letters Patent, emphasizing that procedural orders like issuance of notice do not determine any rights or liabilities.

Precedent Analysis:

The Court referred to UOI v. Usha Sodhi and Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania, affirming that a judgment must resolve substantial questions or rights, which was not the case here. Interlocutory orders that merely issue notice cannot be treated as judgments for the purpose of appeal under Clause 10.

Court’s Reasoning:

The Court reasoned that the impugned order did not decide any issue or affect the rights of the parties in a significant manner. It only directed the issuance of notice and therefore did not satisfy the test for a “judgment” under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. The Court distinguished between decisions affecting rights and mere procedural steps like issuing notices.

Conclusion:

The Court concluded that the present LPA was not maintainable, as the impugned order did not qualify as a judgment. The appeal was dismissed without any orders as to costs.

Implications:

The decision reiterates that not all orders are appealable under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. It clarifies the threshold for determining whether an order constitutes a judgment, setting a precedent that mere procedural orders like the issuance of notice do not amount to judgments. This judgment reinforces the principle that appeals should be restricted to orders that conclusively determine rights and liabilities.

Also Read – Bombay High Court Rules Rental Income from Leasing Properties as “Income from Profits and Gains of Business,” Rejecting Tribunal’s Reliance on East India Housing

3 Comments

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *