Court’s decision
The Delhi High Court dismissed an appeal challenging the rejection of applications for setting aside an ex parte decree and for condonation of delay, holding that even assuming the personal hardships pleaded by the defendant, the failure to explain the delay after acquiring knowledge of the decree is fatal. The Court underscored that limitation under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure begins from the date of knowledge where service is disputed, and courts cannot condone unexplained delay beyond the statutory period. Finding no infirmity in the trial court’s reasoning, the appeal was dismissed as devoid of merit .
Facts
The litigation originated from a civil suit in which an ex parte decree dated 18 August 2020 was passed against the defendant. The defendant later moved two applications before the trial court: one under Order IX Rule 13 CPC seeking to set aside the ex parte decree, and another under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in filing the Order IX Rule 13 application.
In support, the defendant pleaded a sequence of personal adversities. It was asserted that although counsel had been engaged, the defendant was allegedly not informed about hearing dates or procedural requirements. The defendant claimed to have met with a road accident while travelling from Delhi to Chandigarh, necessitating bed rest for six months. It was further stated that the defendant’s mother was hospitalised in January–February 2019, followed by another road accident on 17 May 2019 causing grievous injuries and bed rest for approximately one-and-a-half years. The defendant also relied on the death of his father on 25 December 2020 during the COVID period as a contributing circumstance preventing court appearances.
According to the defendant, he became aware of the ex parte decree only upon receipt of summons in execution proceedings on 11 January 2023, whereafter the applications were filed. The plaintiff opposed the applications, asserting that sufficient opportunities had been afforded and that the defendant had failed to demonstrate either “sufficient cause” or a legally tenable explanation for delay. The trial court dismissed both applications by order dated 17 July 2025, prompting the present appeal.
Issues
The High Court was required to determine whether the defendant had shown sufficient cause to justify setting aside the ex parte decree and whether the delay in filing the Order IX Rule 13 application after knowledge of the decree merited condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. A connected issue was whether documentary material and personal hardships pleaded could override the statutory limitation framework governing ex parte decrees.
Appellant’s arguments
The appellant-defendant contended that the reasons advanced—multiple accidents, prolonged medical treatment, family illness, bereavement during the COVID period, and alleged lapses by previous counsel—constituted genuine impediments preventing appearance before the trial court. It was urged that documentary evidence substantiating medical treatment had been produced, but the trial court failed to appreciate the same. The appellant argued that the trial court’s insistence on specificity, particularly the absence of exact dates for certain events, elevated technicalities over substantive justice.
Reliance was placed on Supreme Court authority emphasising that procedural rules should not thwart justice and that courts ought to adopt a liberal approach while considering applications to set aside ex parte decrees, especially where denial would result in irreparable prejudice.
Respondent’s arguments
The respondent-plaintiff supported the impugned order, contending that the defendant’s narrative was vague, inconsistent, and unsupported by reliable particulars. It was argued that even on the defendant’s own showing, the crucial requirement—explaining delay after knowledge of the decree—was completely absent. The respondent stressed that the applications were filed well beyond the permissible period after 11 January 2023, without any explanation whatsoever for this interregnum, disentitling the defendant to equitable relief.
Analysis of the law
The Court revisited the settled framework under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, which permits setting aside an ex parte decree if the defendant shows that summons were not duly served or that sufficient cause prevented appearance when the suit was called for hearing. Where service is disputed or knowledge is pleaded later, limitation runs from the date of knowledge, and the defendant must act with reasonable promptitude.
Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the burden lies on the applicant to explain the delay to the Court’s satisfaction. While courts may adopt a liberal approach, there must be a cogent explanation covering the entire period of delay, particularly after the applicant becomes aware of the adverse order. Sympathy or equitable considerations cannot override express statutory timelines.
Precedent analysis
The appellant relied on recent Supreme Court dicta advocating a justice-oriented approach to procedural defaults. The High Court, however, distinguished such authorities on facts, observing that they do not dispense with the requirement of explaining delay after knowledge of the decree. The jurisprudence consistently holds that courts cannot condone delay in the absence of any explanation, and that equitable discretion operates within, not outside, the statutory scheme.
Court’s reasoning
The High Court scrutinised the pleadings and found material deficiencies. First, while the defendant alleged an accident in January 2019, no specific date was pleaded, and counsel could not point to any document recording such date. Secondly, the alleged accident of 17 May 2019 was not supported by documents substantiating grievous injuries or prolonged incapacity. Even assuming that these adversities occurred, the Court held they did not explain the decisive lapse.
Crucially, the Court accepted the defendant’s own assertion that knowledge of the ex parte decree was acquired on 11 January 2023 upon receipt of execution summons. From that date, the defendant was required to move under Order IX Rule 13 within 30 days. However, the applications were filed only on 7 May 2023, long after the limitation period, and no explanation whatsoever was offered for this delay. The Court held that this omission was fatal.
The Court further noted that allegations against previous counsel, without particulars or contemporaneous steps taken to remedy the situation, cannot constitute sufficient cause. The absence of any explanation covering the post-knowledge delay meant that the statutory bar operated with full force, leaving no scope for interference with the trial court’s order.
Conclusion
Finding no infirmity in the trial court’s dismissal of the applications, the Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal. The Court held that the appeal lacked merit, as the defendant failed to satisfy the threshold requirement of explaining delay after knowledge of the decree. All pending applications stood closed accordingly .
Implications
The ruling reinforces a clear message for civil litigants: prompt action after knowledge of an adverse decree is indispensable. While courts may show latitude in appropriate cases, unexplained delay—particularly after admitted knowledge—will defeat attempts to reopen concluded proceedings. The judgment also cautions against vague pleadings and underscores that allegations of counsel negligence or personal hardship must be precise and contemporaneously supported to attract equitable relief.
Case law references
- Order IX Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Governs setting aside of ex parte decrees, with limitation commencing from service or date of knowledge. - Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963
Requires a satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay; equitable discretion is bounded by statutory timelines. - Dwarika Prasad (D) v. Prithvi Raj Singh
Relied upon by the appellant to urge a liberal approach; distinguished on facts where delay post-knowledge remained unexplained.
FAQs
1. When does limitation start for setting aside an ex parte decree?
If service is disputed, limitation begins from the date the defendant acquires knowledge of the decree.
2. Can courts condone delay without explanation after knowledge?
No. The applicant must explain the entire period of delay, especially after acquiring knowledge of the decree.
3. Do personal hardships automatically justify condonation?
No. Hardships must be specifically pleaded, supported by evidence, and must explain the delay within the statutory framework.
