1. Court’s decision
The Delhi High Court has stayed and ultimately set aside an order by the Principal District & Sessions Judge that had transferred a commercial suit on allegations of judicial bias. The Court held that the transfer order suffered from serious procedural irregularities, including failure to obtain comments from the concerned judicial officer and failure to comply with binding guidelines laid down by a coordinate bench. The Court found that the allegations raised against the trial judge—including claims that he allegedly logged into a High Court virtual hearing—were extraordinary and should have been handled with utmost caution. After the respondent consented to restoration of the suit, the Court allowed the petition and directed the matter back to the original commercial court.
2. Facts
A commercial suit was filed on 15.11.2025. On 17.11.2025, the commercial court judge recused. Soon after, the defendant filed a transfer petition before the High Court, which was later withdrawn. The defendant subsequently filed a writ petition under Articles 226/227, but no stay was granted. On 27.11.2025, the Principal District Judge dismissed the defendant’s transfer request under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code but directed the commercial court to decide the Order VII Rule 10 application before or alongside the injunction application. That same afternoon, the commercial court heard the matter partly and extended a status quo order until the next hearing. The following day, the defendant once again moved a fresh transfer application under Section 24, which—unlike the earlier dismissal—was allowed, resulting in transfer of the suit. This second transfer order was challenged in the present petition.
3. Issues
The Court considered several important procedural issues:
(1) Whether the Principal District Judge could transfer a suit based on allegations of bias without first obtaining comments from the judicial officer concerned.
(2) Whether directing a trial court on how to sequence hearing of applications exceeded jurisdiction under Section 24 CPC.
(3) Whether a simple status quo order passed at the end of a busy court day could create a reasonable apprehension of bias.
(4) Whether allegations that the judicial officer joined a High Court virtual hearing could be relied upon without immediate verification.
(5) Whether the transfer order had a demoralising impact on the judiciary and undermined judicial independence.
(6) Whether the case should be remanded back to the original commercial court.
4. Petitioner’s arguments
The petitioner argued that the defendant was employing every procedural device to delay adjudication of the suit, including filing multiple transfer petitions and writ proceedings. It was contended that the Principal District Judge acted contrary to binding guidelines requiring that allegations of bias against a judicial officer must be examined only after seeking the officer’s comments. Counsel referred to a detailed decision of a coordinate bench that laid down mandatory safeguards to prevent frivolous allegations from undermining judicial morale. They submitted that the transfer order relied on unfounded assertions—such as the claim that the commercial court judge had joined a High Court virtual hearing on 21.11.2025—which were never verified. They also argued that a status quo direction is a routine protective measure and cannot by itself suggest prejudice.
5. Respondent’s arguments
Initially, the respondent argued that the commercial court judge’s conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias, especially because the interim status quo order was passed the same day the Principal District Judge had issued directions on sequencing of applications. They submitted that the judge’s alleged entry into a High Court virtual hearing further justified transfer. However, during the hearing before the High Court, the respondent’s counsel stated that the briefing counsel who had filed the transfer petition expressed remorse and no longer wished to pursue the allegations. The respondent ultimately consented to setting aside the impugned transfer order and sending the matter back to the original commercial court.
6. Analysis of the law
Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code empowers superintendence over subordinate courts but does not authorise a supervisory judge to dictate how a trial court should hear or prioritise particular applications. The Court reiterated that transfer of a case on allegations of bias is an extraordinary remedy requiring compliance with strict procedural safeguards. A judge cannot be condemned unheard; principles of natural justice require that his or her version be recorded before any conclusion is drawn. The decision further emphasised that routine judicial orders—such as status quo directions—are part of the trial court’s discretion and do not establish bias. Allegations that a judicial officer accessed another court’s virtual proceedings, if true, would be serious misconduct requiring immediate reporting and verification; absent such steps, reliance on such claims was considered improper.
7. Precedent analysis
A coordinate bench decision in Directorate of Enforcement v. Ajay S. Mittal, 2024:DHC:4419 was expressly invoked. That decision laid down mandatory guidelines for handling transfer petitions alleging bias, including the requirement to obtain comments from the judge concerned and to avoid demoralising subordinate judiciary. The High Court held that these guidelines were clearly violated in the present case. Although no other judgments were directly cited, the Court’s analysis reflects longstanding jurisprudence that allegations of bias must meet a high threshold and cannot be based merely on dissatisfaction with judicial orders. The Court reaffirmed that supervisory jurisdiction cannot be used to control the merits of judicial discretion.
8. Court’s reasoning
The Court identified multiple flaws in the impugned transfer order. First, no comments were sought from the commercial court judge before concluding that he was biased. Second, the mere passing of a status quo order, especially in a matter repeatedly passed over due to counsel availability issues, could not justify transfer. Third, the allegation that the judge joined a High Court video hearing was serious and “shocking,” yet no contemporaneous complaint was made to the High Court judge presiding over that hearing. Fourth, the Court expressed concern that such unverified allegations could demoralise judicial officers. Ultimately, after the respondent consented to restoration, the Court found no reason to sustain the impugned order and remanded the suit back to the original court for hearing.
9. Conclusion
The High Court restored the integrity of the judicial process by setting aside the transfer order and remanding the suit to the original commercial court. It reiterated that allegations of bias cannot be casually accepted and must be handled with procedural rigor. The Court also clarified that the interim stay granted earlier would not prevent either party from complying with directions of the Division Bench in related appellate proceedings. By allowing the petition and disposing of pending applications, the Court ensured continuity of adjudication and reaffirmed its commitment to judicial independence and protection of subordinate judiciary from unfair accusations.
10. Implications
This judgment has significant implications for judicial administration. It reinforces that Section 24 CPC cannot be used as a tool to pressure trial courts or manipulate forum selection. It also strengthens the institutional safeguards protecting judicial officers from unfounded allegations of bias. The ruling reaffirms that orders like status quo directions are routine and do not justify transfer unless supported by compelling evidence. Furthermore, the judgment will guide Principal District Judges on mandatory adherence to the Ajay S. Mittal guidelines when entertaining transfer petitions alleging bias. The decision thus preserves confidence in judicial independence and curtails tactical litigation strategies designed to delay commercial suits.
CASE LAW REFERENCES
1. Directorate of Enforcement v. Ajay S. Mittal, 2024:DHC:4419
Holding: Mandatory guidelines for handling transfer petitions alleging judicial bias; comments of the judicial officer must be obtained.
Applied: High Court held these guidelines were violated by the transfer order.
No additional cases were cited in the judgment; reasoning is purely factual and procedural.
SEO-FRIENDLY FAQs
1. Why did the Delhi High Court set aside the transfer of the commercial suit?
Because the Principal District Judge transferred the suit without seeking comments from the concerned judicial officer and without following mandatory guidelines governing bias allegations.
2. Can a status quo order passed by a trial court indicate judicial bias?
No. The Court held that a routine status quo order—especially at the end of the day—cannot create a reasonable apprehension of bias.
3. What happens when allegations are made that a judicial officer joined a higher court’s VC hearing?
Such allegations are serious and must be immediately reported and verified. Failure to do so makes reliance on them improper at the transfer stage.
