Delhi High Court Upholds Acquittal in Repeated Rape Case; Holds DNA Proves Paternity, Not Absence of Consent, Amid Material Contradictions and Delayed Complaint
Delhi High Court Says Paternity DNA Does Not Establish Rape; Upholds Acquittal Where Prosecutrix’s Testimony Contained Material Improvements and Contradictions
Facts
The appeal was filed by the prosecutrix under Section 419 of the BNSS challenging the judgment dated 7 October 2024 by which the Additional Sessions Judge, Dwarka Courts acquitted the accused, Anoop, of offences under Sections 328, 376(2)(n), 377, 506 and 509 IPC.
The prosecutrix was married and living with her husband and adopted child. Her husband had suffered a fall in 2007 resulting in 75% disability and was stated to be incapable of fathering a biological child.
The prosecution alleged that from 2017 onwards, Anoop, who was known to the family, repeatedly established physical relations with the prosecutrix against her wishes through threats, inducements and, on one occasion, by administering an intoxicating substance. It was also alleged that the acts included unnatural intercourse and intimidation.
The prosecutrix became pregnant and gave birth to a child on 20 June 2019. DNA analysis later established that Anoop was the biological father of the child.
The FIR was, however, registered only on 17 March 2021. Her Section 164 CrPC statement followed on 18 March 2021.
During trial, the accused admitted having had physical relations with the prosecutrix but claimed that the relationship was consensual and was within the knowledge of her husband.
The Trial Court acquitted him of all charges after considering inconsistencies in the prosecutrix’s testimony, delay in reporting and the defence of consent.
Issues
The principal questions before the High Court were:
- Whether the acquittal suffered from perversity, patent illegality or misappreciation of material evidence.
- Whether the DNA report proving paternity was sufficient to establish rape or absence of consent.
- Whether the prosecutrix’s testimony was sufficiently reliable to sustain conviction by itself.
- Whether the presumption under Section 114A of the Evidence Act required reversal of the acquittal.
- Whether the inconsistencies identified by the Trial Court were merely minor discrepancies or went to the core of the prosecution case.
- Whether the appellate court could substitute another possible view for a reasonably possible acquittal view.
Appellant’s Arguments
The prosecutrix argued that the Trial Court had wrongly discarded her testimony despite it being cogent and trustworthy. She relied upon State of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar @ Sunny and Phool Singh v. State of M.P. for the principle that conviction can rest on the sole testimony of a credible prosecutrix.
She emphasized the DNA report showing that the accused was the biological father of the child and argued that this was powerful scientific corroboration of her case.
She further contended that the defence of consent was improbable, particularly because her husband denied knowledge of or consent to the relationship.
She also argued that delay in lodging the FIR and minor contradictions should not discredit a victim of sexual assault, relying on Phool Singh and State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh.
Finally, she invoked Section 114A of the Evidence Act, contending that once intercourse was proved and she denied consent, the burden shifted to the accused.
Respondent / State’s Position
The State supported the acquittal and argued that the Trial Court had properly appreciated the oral, documentary and forensic evidence.
It submitted that the judgment did not suffer from illegality, perversity or infirmity warranting appellate interference.
Analysis of the Law
1. Higher Threshold for Reversing an Acquittal
The High Court began by restating the settled rule that an acquittal cannot be reversed merely because another view of the evidence is possible.
Interference is justified only where the acquittal is:
- perverse;
- manifestly illegal;
- based on misreading or omission of material evidence; or
- so unreasonable that guilt is the only possible conclusion.
The Court relied upon Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, which reiterates that an appellate court should not disturb an acquittal where the Trial Court’s view is reasonably possible.
2. DNA Proved Intercourse and Paternity, Not Non-Consent
This was one of the judgment’s most important holdings.
The Court expressly accepted that the DNA report established that the accused was the biological father of the child.
However, it held that DNA evidence only established the fact of sexual intercourse and paternity.
It did not establish:
- the circumstances in which intercourse occurred;
- whether coercion was used; or
- whether the relationship was consensual or non-consensual.
Accordingly, DNA evidence could not by itself prove the offence under Section 376(2)(n) IPC.
3. Section 114A Presumption Is Important but Not Conclusive of Credibility
The High Court acknowledged the statutory presumption under Section 114A where intercourse is established and the woman states that she did not consent.
However, the Court clarified that this presumption does not make the prosecutrix’s testimony immune from judicial scrutiny.
The Court must still examine:
- whether foundational facts are established;
- the reliability of the testimony;
- surrounding evidence; and
- whether the defence has rebutted the presumption.
4. Inconsistencies Regarding the Alleged Intoxicant Were Material
The Trial Court had noticed inconsistencies regarding administration of an intoxicating substance.
In her Section 164 statement, the prosecutrix said that the accused used to administer intoxicants before sexual relations.
That assertion was not consistently reflected in either her original complaint or her substantive testimony.
Even the manner in which the substance was allegedly placed in milk changed between versions.
The High Court held that these were relevant because intoxication formed a central part of the alleged first assault.
5. Her State of Consciousness Also Changed Across Versions
In one version, the prosecutrix stated she was drowsy but could see what was happening while being unable to move.
In another, she stated that she remembered nothing after being taken to the room until the next morning.
Only later, upon being confronted, did she revert to saying that she was conscious but unable to move.
The Court held that this inconsistency was material because it directly related to the alleged absence of consent during the first occurrence.
6. Contradictions Concerning Pregnancy and Husband’s Knowledge
There were also discrepancies about when the husband came to know of the pregnancy and whether he doubted the child’s paternity.
The prosecutrix said one thing in her Section 164 statement and another during trial, while her husband gave yet another account.
The Court treated this as relevant because the husband’s reaction was part of the prosecution narrative explaining disclosure and subsequent events.
7. Contradictory Accounts About the Police Call
The prosecutrix stated that her husband called the police after seeing her and the accused in a compromising position.
Her husband gave a different version of the circumstances leading to the 100-number call.
This inconsistency was considered cumulatively with the other contradictions.
8. Threatening Nude Photographs and Videos Were Never Recovered
The prosecutrix alleged that the accused had taken nude photographs and videos and threatened to circulate them.
However:
- she was uncertain during cross-examination;
- no such material was produced;
- forensic examination of the accused’s mobile phone did not recover the alleged photographs, videos or chats.
This weakened the prosecution case under Sections 506 and 509 IPC.
9. Surrounding Conduct Was Relevant but Not Judged Through Stereotypes
The Court expressly cautioned that a sexual assault complainant’s behaviour cannot be assessed through stereotypical notions of how a victim “ought” to act.
Nor can delay alone defeat a rape allegation.
However, surrounding conduct remains relevant when the Court must choose between competing versions regarding consent and credibility.
The Court noted that the prosecutrix admitted:
- frequent telephone conversations with the accused;
- that he sent her money for a mobile phone;
- that she was disturbed when he stopped calling; and
- that she disclosed the relationship after he allegedly refused to keep her.
These facts were not treated as conclusive but as part of the cumulative evidentiary assessment.
10. Sole Testimony Can Convict Only if It Inspires Confidence
The High Court reiterated that conviction can certainly be based solely on the prosecutrix’s testimony.
But the testimony must be trustworthy and inspire confidence.
It relied upon State (GNCT of Delhi) v. Vipin @ Lalla, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 78, to emphasise that material contradictions may prevent sole testimony from sustaining conviction.
11. Section 377 Charge Also Suffered From Improvements and Lack of Corroboration
The allegations of oral and anal sexual acts were not consistently stated with the same specificity in earlier versions.
There was also no medical or other corroboration regarding the alleged oral sexual acts.
The Court therefore held that the Trial Court’s acquittal under Section 377 was not perverse.
12. Section 328 Charge Was Not Proved
For Section 328, the prosecution had to prove administration of a poison, stupefying, intoxicating or unwholesome substance with the requisite intention.
The alleged incident occurred years before the FIR, no substance was recovered or scientifically tested, and the prosecutrix’s own accounts were inconsistent.
The Trial Court’s acquittal under Section 328 therefore could not be called perverse.
13. Failure of Accused to Lead Defence Evidence Did Not Fill Prosecution Gaps
The Court rejected the argument that the accused’s failure to lead defence evidence strengthened the prosecution case.
The prosecution always carries the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Absence of defence evidence cannot convert weaknesses in the prosecution case into proof of guilt.
14. These Were Core Contradictions, Not Minor Discrepancies
The Court stressed that the discrepancies had to be considered cumulatively.
They concerned:
- administration of the intoxicant;
- consciousness during the first alleged assault;
- pregnancy and paternity suspicions;
- husband’s knowledge; and
- subsequent conduct.
These were integral elements of the prosecution narrative rather than peripheral inconsistencies.
15. Social Stigma Cannot Substitute for Proof
The argument that a married woman would not falsely implicate someone and expose herself to social stigma was rejected as an evidentiary substitute.
The Court held that criminal guilt must be determined on evidence, not assumptions about why a complainant would or would not make allegations.
Precedent Analysis
Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa v. State of Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89
Applied for the principle that appellate interference with an acquittal requires compelling reasons and that a reasonably possible acquittal view should not be disturbed merely because another view may also be possible.
State (GNCT of Delhi) v. Vipin @ Lalla, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 78
Applied to reinforce that although the prosecutrix’s testimony can independently sustain conviction, the testimony must inspire confidence and material contradictions cannot be ignored.
State of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar @ Sunny, (2017) 2 SCC 51
Relied upon by the appellant for the proposition that the sole credible testimony of the prosecutrix is sufficient for conviction.
The High Court held the principle correct but factually inapplicable because the prosecutrix’s testimony here contained material contradictions.
Phool Singh v. State of M.P., (2022) 2 SCC 74
Relied upon for the principles concerning sole testimony and delay in reporting sexual offences. The Court distinguished the case on the factual and evidentiary record before it.
State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384
Relied upon regarding delay and appreciation of a prosecutrix’s evidence. Again, the High Court held that the present case turned on cumulative material inconsistencies, not delay alone.
Court’s Reasoning
The High Court did not hold that the allegations were necessarily false.
Its narrower conclusion was that the Trial Court’s view that a consensual relationship could not be ruled out was reasonably possible on the evidence.
The DNA evidence conclusively established paternity, but not lack of consent.
The Trial Court had considered the prosecutrix’s testimony, husband’s testimony, forensic evidence, electronic evidence, delay, contradictions and surrounding circumstances.
Therefore, even if another view might have been possible, the appellate court could not reverse the acquittal unless the Trial Court’s view was perverse or wholly unreasonable.
The High Court further stressed that the seriousness of rape allegations cannot dilute the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court found no compelling reason to interfere with the acquittal.
It held that the Trial Court’s findings were based on a permissible appreciation of the evidence and were neither:
- perverse;
- manifestly illegal; nor
- wholly unreasonable.
Accordingly, the prosecutrix’s appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal of Anoop under Sections 376(2)(n), 377, 328, 506 and 509 IPC was upheld.
Case Details
Case: KXXXXX v. The State Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr.
Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Case Number: CRL.A. 320/2026 & CRL.M.A. 10175/2026
CNR No.: DLHC010132792026
Judge: Justice Madhu Jain
Reserved on: 25 August 2026
Date: 3 September 2026
Underlying Case: SC No. 151/2022 arising from FIR No. 138/2021, P.S. Dwarka North
Charges: Sections 328, 376(2)(n), 377, 506 and 509 IPC
Result: Appeal against acquittal dismissed; Trial Court’s judgment dated 7 October 2024 acquitting the accused of all charges upheld.
