Delhi High Court Upholds Darya Ganj Shop Eviction for Landlord’s Business Expansion; Holds Tenant Cannot Dictate Use of Other Floors or Alternative Commercial Premises
Delhi High Court Upholds Eviction From Darya Ganj Commercial Premises; Says No Perversity or Manifest Illegality Shown in ARC’s Bona Fide Need Findings
Facts
The Delhi High Court considered a revision petition filed by Kishore Lal and Sons & Anr. under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, challenging an eviction order dated 11 November 2025 passed by the Additional Rent Controller. The eviction concerned Shop No. 4328 and Kothri No. 4330/3, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi.
The eviction petition had been filed by Rajiv Gupta HUF under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the DRC Act on the ground of bona fide requirement. The landlord claimed that the existing space used by him and his wife for their printing and publishing businesses was inadequate because of large machines, equipment and employees. Paper stocks had to be stored on the first floor, creating inconvenience and additional cost. The tenanted premises were therefore required for expansion and more efficient operation of the existing business.
The tenants were granted leave to defend in December 2019. They initially disputed the landlord-tenant relationship, bona fide requirement and availability of alternative accommodation, though at final arguments they conceded the landlord-tenant relationship. The ARC ultimately allowed the eviction petition.
The tenants approached the High Court principally contending that the landlord had understated the space already available to him on the ground floor, had usable first-floor accommodation and had other properties which could satisfy his business requirement.
Issues
The principal issues before the High Court were:
- Whether the ARC’s finding of bona fide requirement suffered from perversity, manifest illegality or material irregularity warranting interference under Section 25B(8).
- Whether the landlord already possessed sufficient commercial space on the ground floor.
- Whether the first-floor portion constituted reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.
- Whether properties at Ghaziabad, Dayanand Vihar or elsewhere defeated the landlord’s bona fide requirement.
- Whether a landlord seeking additional accommodation for expansion of an existing business can obtain eviction under Section 14(1)(e).
- Whether alleged non-disclosure or inadequate pleading concerning alternative accommodation rendered the eviction petition defective.
- Whether prior permission under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 was required before instituting the eviction petition.
- Whether the High Court could reappreciate evidence merely because the tenant proposed a different factual conclusion from that reached by the ARC.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The tenants argued that the landlord had sufficient accommodation and therefore lacked a genuine requirement for the tenanted premises.
They contended that while the landlord had stated that he possessed approximately 400 sq. ft. on the ground floor, his cross-examination allegedly showed that the total ground-floor area was about 1,076 sq. ft. After deducting the portions occupied by the two tenants, the petitioners claimed that approximately 631 sq. ft. remained available, thereby undermining the asserted need for another 300 sq. ft.
They further relied upon the first-floor premises and questioned the landlord’s assertion that part of that floor was occupied by his nephew, Nitin Gupta.
The tenants argued that the ARC had mechanically invoked the proposition that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement without adequately examining whether other accommodation was actually suitable.
They also contended that the eviction petition lacked a specific foundational pleading that the landlord had no other reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.
According to them, this was not merely a case of concealment but a failure to plead an essential ingredient of Section 14(1)(e), which could not be cured merely because evidence was subsequently led.
Finally, they argued that because the property fell within a notified slum area and the landlord intended to integrate the shop with adjoining premises, prior permission from the competent Slum Authority was necessary.
Respondents’ Position
The respondents did not appear before the High Court at the revision stage, but the Court examined the ARC’s findings and the evidence forming the basis of the eviction order.
The landlord’s case before the ARC was that the tenanted shop was required as additional ground-floor commercial space for the ongoing printing and publishing business and that the other premises relied upon by the tenants were either unavailable or unsuitable.
Analysis of the Law
Revisional Jurisdiction Under Section 25B(8) Is Extremely Limited
The High Court first emphasised that jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) DRC Act is revisional and supervisory, not appellate.
Relying upon Sarla Ahuja, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, the Court held that it cannot undertake a fresh appreciation of evidence merely because another factual view is possible.
Interference is justified only in cases of:
- jurisdictional error;
- manifest illegality;
- material irregularity;
- perversity;
- wholly unreasonable findings;
- erroneous legal premises; or
- failure to consider a material plea.
A revision petition cannot therefore function as a disguised first appeal.
Ground-Floor Space Argument Had Already Been Considered
The High Court rejected the argument that the ARC had ignored the alleged discrepancy concerning available ground-floor area.
The ARC had specifically examined the tenants’ claim that approximately 800 sq. ft. remained with the landlord.
However, the tenants’ counter-site plan was never properly tendered in evidence and contained no dimensions supporting their calculation.
The ARC therefore accepted the landlord’s site plan and found approximately 400 sq. ft. available to him.
The High Court held that the tenants were effectively asking it to reassess the same evidence and substitute a different conclusion—an exercise prohibited under Section 25B(8).
First-Floor Space Was Not Shown to Be Suitable Alternative Accommodation
The ARC had also considered the first-floor portion.
The landlord testified that the relevant portion had been occupied by his nephew Nitin Gupta since 1999, and previously by his sister.
Even assuming for argument that some first-floor space were vacant, the ARC held that the tenant could not compel the landlord to conduct his business from an upper floor instead of the ground floor.
The High Court found no perversity in that reasoning.
For a customer-facing commercial activity, particularly an existing printing and publishing business, the landlord is entitled to assess which portion is reasonably suitable.
Landlord Is Best Judge, But Principle Is Not Absolute
The High Court clarified that the ARC had not blindly applied the proposition that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement.
It had separately considered:
- Ghaziabad properties;
- the Dayanand Vihar property;
- the portion occupied by Nitin Gupta;
- ground-floor space; and
- the evidence regarding availability and suitability.
Only after that factual exercise did it apply the landlord-choice principle.
Thus, the Court did not hold that any property chosen by a landlord must automatically be accepted as suitable.
Rather, once bona fide need is established and the alleged alternatives are not proved to be both available and reasonably suitable, the tenant cannot dictate how or where the landlord should run his business.
Tenant Bears Burden to Show Suitable Alternative Accommodation
The ARC had relied upon Abid-Ul-Islam for the proposition that Section 14(1)(e) creates a rebuttable presumption in favour of the landlord’s bona fide need.
The tenant must produce substantive material showing that another accommodation is:
- actually available; and
- reasonably suitable for the projected need.
Mere assertions about other properties are insufficient.
The tenants failed to discharge that burden.
Properties Outside the Existing Business Hub Need Not Be Treated as Suitable
A significant aspect of the Court’s reasoning concerned the location of the landlord’s business.
The landlord’s printing and publishing operations were situated in Darya Ganj, an area described in the pleadings as a publishing hub containing the bulk of his clients.
The tenants sought to rely upon alternative properties in other locations and effectively suggested that the landlord shift his business elsewhere.
The High Court rejected that approach.
It held that the pleadings implicitly disclosed that the landlord needed space in the area where his existing business and client base were concentrated. The tenant could not require him to relocate merely because some other property existed elsewhere.
Additional Accommodation Can Constitute Bona Fide Requirement
The fact that the landlord already possessed some business space did not make the eviction claim artificial.
The underlying requirement was for expansion and more efficient operation of an existing business.
The ARC had held that an additional-accommodation case may justify granting leave to defend at an earlier stage, but that does not mean the eviction petition must ultimately fail after evidence.
Once the landlord proves genuine need for expansion, the tenant cannot dictate that the landlord must adjust within smaller existing premises.
Pleading Objection Did Not Warrant Interference
The tenants argued that the eviction petition should fail because it did not expressly plead the absence of any reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.
The High Court acknowledged the general principle that an essential pleading cannot ordinarily be substituted by evidence.
However, it found that this case did not warrant interference on that basis.
The question of alternative accommodation was never foreign to the case. It was:
- specifically raised by the tenant;
- disputed by the landlord;
- made the subject of evidence;
- tested through cross-examination; and
- expressly adjudicated by the ARC.
No prejudice was shown to have resulted from the manner in which the issue was tried.
The revision therefore could not succeed by repackaging a fully tried factual issue as a pure question of pleading.
Concealment Is Not Always Irrelevant After Trial
The High Court nevertheless added an important qualification.
It did not endorse an absolute proposition that once leave to defend is granted and parties go to trial, concealment or suppression always becomes immaterial.
The Court noted that the effect of non-disclosure depends on whether the allegedly concealed property was actually available and reasonably suitable for the pleaded requirement.
Here, however, the ARC had substantively examined the alleged alternative properties and found them unavailable or unsuitable. Therefore, the concealment argument did not alter the outcome.
No Slum Authority Permission Required
The tenant’s Slum Act objection was also rejected.
The Court relied upon Shafait Ali v. Shiva Mal, which in turn considered Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Rattan Lal Bhargava.
It held that proceedings under Section 14(1)(e) read with the special procedure under Chapter IIIA of the DRC Act override inconsistent provisions of the Slum Areas Act.
Accordingly, prior permission under Section 19(1)(a) of the Slum Areas Act is not required before filing a bona fide requirement eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e).
The landlord’s proposed integration of the shop with adjoining premises did not change that legal position.
The ARC had also recorded that no substantive structural alteration was required beyond opening a door in a partition wall.
Precedent Analysis
Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
This Supreme Court decision was relied upon to define the narrow scope of revisional interference in rent-control matters.
The High Court is not entitled to reassess evidence as though sitting in first appeal.
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh
The precedent reinforced that revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and designed to correct illegality, impropriety or perversity rather than substitute one factual conclusion for another.
Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua
This authority was central on two propositions.
First, Section 25B(8) confers extremely restricted revisional power and prohibits a roving appellate re-examination.
Second, the landlord’s bona fide requirement enjoys a rebuttable presumption, and the tenant must produce cogent material establishing availability and suitability of alternative premises.
M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma
The Court recognised that the landlord’s choice is not completely unfettered. The existence of another vacant property may matter if it is actually suitable for the same requirement.
However, mere existence of another premises does not defeat eviction if that premises is unsuitable.
Uday Shankar Upadhyay v. Naveen Maheshwari
The ARC relied upon this Supreme Court judgment to hold that a tenant cannot compel a landlord to shift a commercial activity to the first floor or another less suitable floor where ground-floor accommodation is genuinely required.
Nalini Kant Gupta v. Lajja Gupta
This decision supported the proposition that where a tenant has been granted leave to defend, parties have fully tried the issue of alternative accommodation and no prejudice results, an eviction petition does not automatically fail merely because of alleged suppression.
Durga Devi Jain v. Dr. Harish Chander Banga
The High Court clarified, however, that Nalini Kant Gupta does not make concealment irrelevant in every case.
The real inquiry remains whether the allegedly concealed premises were actually available and reasonably suitable.
Shafait Ali v. Shiva Mal
This Supreme Court precedent governed the Slum Act objection.
It establishes that prior Slum Authority permission is unnecessary for an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) because the special DRC procedure overrides the inconsistent Slum Act requirement.
Court’s Reasoning
The High Court found that the ARC had undertaken a detailed factual and legal examination rather than mechanically accepting the landlord’s assertions.
The ARC had considered each of the major objections concerning:
- ground-floor area;
- first-floor accommodation;
- alternative properties;
- additional space for business expansion;
- alleged concealment;
- defective pleadings; and
- the Slum Act.
The tenant had enjoyed a full trial after obtaining leave to defend and had the opportunity to cross-examine the landlord and lead evidence.
The revision largely sought a fresh reappraisal of those same facts, which the High Court held was impermissible.
The Court found no jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, perversity or failure to consider any material contention.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court held that the ARC had duly adjudicated the tenants’ objections and had reached its conclusions on the material before it.
No error apparent on the face of the record or infirmity in the decision-making process was established.
The Court accordingly refused to interfere with the eviction judgment dated 11 November 2025.
The revision petition and pending applications were dismissed and disposed of.
Case Details
Case: Kishore Lal and Sons & Anr. v. Rajiv Gupta HUF & Ors.
Court: Delhi High Court
Case Number: RC.REV. 78/2026 & CM APPL. 17302/2026
Judge: Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar
Date: 14 August 2026
Result: Revision petition dismissed; ARC’s eviction order based on bona fide requirement for expansion of the landlord’s printing and publishing business upheld.
