Girl Was Over 16 on Date of Incident and Admitted Relationship; Delhi High Court Sets Aside Rape Conviction Based on Consent and Contradictory Testimony
Mother Found Stranger Inside Daughter’s Room at Night, but Daughter Followed Him Out; Delhi High Court Holds Relationship Was Consensual and Acquits Accused
Facts
The appellant, Dildar, challenged his conviction under Sections 376 and 457 IPC arising out of an incident that occurred during the intervening night of 1–2 September 2012.
According to the prosecution, the prosecutrix’s mother discovered the appellant inside their house around 2:00 a.m. Alarmed by the presence of a stranger, she confronted him, whereupon he fled. The prosecutrix immediately followed him, and both left together. A Daily Diary entry was recorded, leading to registration of an FIR under Sections 376 and 452 IPC, which later resulted in charges under Sections 457 and 376 IPC.
The investigation included:
- Medical examination of the prosecutrix;
- Production before the Child Welfare Committee (CWC);
- Statement under Section 164 CrPC;
- Forensic examination.
The trial court convicted the appellant for rape and lurking house-trespass by night, sentencing him to seven years’ simple imprisonment for rape and four years’ simple imprisonment for house-trespass, with both sentences running concurrently.
The appellant challenged the conviction before the Delhi High Court, contending that he and the prosecutrix were in a consensual relationship and that she herself had invited him to her house on the night of the incident.
Issues
The High Court considered:
- Whether the prosecutrix was above the age of consent under the law applicable on the date of the incident.
- Whether sexual intercourse between the parties was consensual.
- Whether the appellant’s entry into the prosecutrix’s house constituted lurking house-trespass under Section 457 IPC.
- Whether the prosecutrix’s statement under Section 164 CrPC could be relied upon while appreciating her trial testimony.
- Whether the medical and forensic evidence corroborated the prosecution case.
- Whether the conviction could be sustained despite inconsistent statements made by the prosecutrix.
Appellant’s Arguments
The appellant argued that:
- He and the prosecutrix had been in a romantic relationship for nearly three years.
- On the night of the incident, the prosecutrix herself invited him into her house.
- They had consensual sexual intercourse.
- When the prosecutrix’s mother discovered him, both of them voluntarily fled together.
- The FIR was lodged because the family opposed their relationship.
The appellant further relied upon:
- School records;
- Matriculation certificate;
to establish that the prosecutrix’s date of birth was 27 August 1996, making her 16 years and 6 days old on the date of the incident.
Since the incident occurred before the 2013 amendment to Section 375 IPC, the age of consent was 16 years. Therefore, according to the appellant, her consent was legally valid.
He also relied heavily upon the prosecutrix’s statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC, in which she substantially supported the defence version and admitted that she wanted to marry him.
State’s Arguments
The State supported the conviction.
It argued that:
- the prosecutrix had only recently crossed sixteen years of age;
- she had allegedly been in a relationship with the appellant for three years;
- during that earlier period she was below sixteen years of age;
- therefore, consent was immaterial.
The prosecution also relied upon the prosecutrix’s trial testimony and sought to sustain the conviction under Sections 376 and 457 IPC.
Analysis of the Law
Determination of Age
The High Court held that age determination must follow the principles laid down in:
- Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015;
- Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007.
Relying upon K.P. Kirankumar v. State, which followed Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, the Court reiterated that:
- matriculation certificates have the highest evidentiary value;
- where available, they conclusively determine age.
Although the prosecution had not formally proved the matriculation certificate during trial, it formed part of the judicial record.
Both:
- the school admission register; and
- the matriculation certificate
recorded the prosecutrix’s date of birth as 27 August 1996.
Accordingly, the High Court conclusively held that on 2 September 2012 she had already crossed 16 years of age.
Since the offence occurred before the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, the applicable age of consent under Section 375 IPC was sixteen years.
Therefore, unlike a case involving a child below sixteen, the prosecutrix’s consent was legally relevant.
Evidentiary Value of Section 164 Statement
A central issue before the Court was the contradiction between:
- the FIR statement;
- the Section 164 CrPC statement; and
- the testimony before the trial court.
The Court observed that although evidence before the trial court is ordinarily substantive evidence, a statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC cannot simply be ignored while searching for the truth.
The prosecutrix’s Section 164 statement was recorded almost immediately after registration of the FIR.
In that statement:
- she admitted calling the appellant to her house;
- she admitted having physical relations with him;
- she admitted wanting to marry him;
- she did not accuse him of forcing sexual intercourse.
The Court held that this statement presented a far more natural and truthful account than the subsequent inconsistent versions.
Relying upon P. Yuvaprakash v. State, the Court held that statements under Section 164 CrPC may legitimately assist the Court in ascertaining the real factual position where the trial testimony is inconsistent.
Conduct of the Prosecutrix
The Court attached considerable importance to the prosecutrix’s conduct.
It noted that:
- the appellant remained inside the house without disturbance until discovered;
- immediately after her mother confronted him, the prosecutrix herself ran away with him;
- thereafter both stayed together at different places.
The Court found this conduct inconsistent with the allegation that the appellant had committed forcible rape shortly before.
Instead, her conduct strongly corroborated her Section 164 statement that she had voluntarily called him and wished to remain with him.
House-Trespass
The High Court held that Section 457 IPC requires unlawful entry with criminal intent.
Here, the evidence showed:
- the appellant had been called by the prosecutrix;
- his presence inside the house was facilitated by her;
- therefore the essential ingredient of criminal trespass was absent.
The Court observed that entry into a house with the consent of one of its occupants cannot ordinarily constitute lurking house-trespass.
Accordingly, conviction under Section 457 IPC could not be sustained.
Reliability of the Prosecutrix
The High Court reiterated the settled principle that conviction can rest solely upon the testimony of the prosecutrix if her evidence is of “sterling quality.”
However, the Court found that standard absent in the present case.
It identified several inconsistencies:
- FIR alleging force;
- Section 164 statement admitting consensual relations;
- deposition before court wavering between the two versions.
During cross-examination and in answer to court questions, the prosecutrix expressly admitted that:
- the appellant had not forcibly had sexual intercourse with her on 2 September 2012.
The Court considered this admission extremely significant and destructive of the prosecution case.
It concluded that her testimony was inconsistent, uncertain and therefore incapable of sustaining conviction without strong corroboration.
Medical and Forensic Evidence
The Court found no meaningful corroboration from scientific evidence.
The medical evidence revealed:
- no injuries on the prosecutrix;
- no useful gynaecological record supporting forcible assault.
The forensic report also failed to assist the prosecution.
No semen was detected on the exhibits.
Consequently:
- DNA analysis was never conducted.
The Court further noticed deficiencies relating to the sexual assault evidence collection kit and hospital records.
Accordingly, the scientific evidence neither corroborated the allegation of rape nor connected the appellant to any forcible sexual assault.
Precedent Analysis
K.P. Kirankumar @ Kiran v. State
The Supreme Court reiterated that Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice Rules governs age determination even for victims.
The Delhi High Court applied this principle and relied primarily upon school and matriculation records to determine that the prosecutrix had crossed sixteen years of age.
Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana
This decision established the hierarchy of documents for age determination.
The Court followed it while treating the matriculation certificate as conclusive evidence of age.
P. Yuvaprakash v. State
The Supreme Court recognised that a truthful statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC can assist the Court in discovering the real facts where later testimony becomes inconsistent.
The Delhi High Court relied heavily upon this principle.
State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh
The Supreme Court held that conviction can rest solely on the prosecutrix’s testimony if it is of sterling quality.
The Delhi High Court distinguished that principle, holding that the prosecutrix’s testimony in this case was inconsistent and therefore did not satisfy that standard.
Nirmal Premkumar v. State
The Court relied upon this decision to emphasise that where the prosecutrix’s testimony is unreliable, corroborative evidence assumes greater significance.
Since neither medical nor forensic evidence supported the prosecution, conviction could not be sustained.
Court’s Reasoning
The High Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
Its reasoning included:
- the prosecutrix was above sixteen years of age under the law applicable in September 2012;
- her Section 164 statement substantially supported the defence;
- her conduct was inconsistent with allegations of forcible rape;
- she herself admitted during cross-examination that the appellant had not forcibly had sexual intercourse with her;
- medical evidence disclosed no injuries;
- forensic evidence yielded no incriminating material;
- the appellant’s entry into the house occurred with the prosecutrix’s consent.
The Court therefore found that:
- the allegation of lurking house-trespass was not established;
- the allegation of rape was unsupported by reliable evidence.
The trial court’s conviction was consequently held to be unsustainable.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court allowed the criminal appeal.
It set aside the conviction under Sections 376 and 457 IPC.
The Court acquitted the appellant of all charges, holding that:
- the prosecutrix had crossed the age of consent under the then applicable law;
- the evidence indicated a consensual relationship;
- her statements were materially inconsistent;
- medical and forensic evidence failed to corroborate the prosecution case;
- the prosecution had failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellant’s bail bonds were discharged, and the trial court’s judgment was set aside.
Key Takeaways
- Under the pre-2013 law, the age of consent under Section 375 IPC was sixteen years.
- School and matriculation records constitute the primary evidence for determining age.
- A statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC may assist courts in discovering the true factual position where later testimony becomes inconsistent.
- Conviction solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix is possible only when her evidence is of sterling quality.
- Scientific and forensic evidence assumes greater significance where the prosecutrix’s testimony is inconsistent.
- Entry into a house at the invitation of an occupant ordinarily does not constitute lurking house-trespass.
- Courts must assess the entire conduct of the parties before drawing conclusions regarding consent.
Case Details
Case: Dildar v. State
Court: Delhi High Court
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 1450 of 2014
Judge: Justice Vimal Kumar Yadav
Reserved On: 13 July 2026
Date of Decision: 24 July 2026
Result: Appeal allowed. Conviction under Sections 376 and 457 IPC set aside. The appellant was acquitted of all charges.
