Court’s Decision:
The Gujarat High Court quashed a preventive detention order dated 01.05.2025 issued under Section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA), declaring the detenue a “dangerous person.” The Court held that the detaining authority had failed to establish that the alleged criminal activities had any nexus with “public order” as defined in the Act. It ruled that “merely being a habitual offender is not sufficient unless the acts disturb the even tempo of life in the community.”
Facts:
The petitioner was preventively detained under PASA by the District Magistrate, Patan, for being a “dangerous person.” The detention order referred to four FIRs registered against the petitioner for various offences under IPC, the BNS, the Mining and Minerals Act, and the Gujarat Police Act. The petitioner challenged the order under Article 226, arguing that the offences were isolated and did not threaten public order.
Issues:
- Whether the petitioner’s conduct warranted preventive detention under PASA.
- Whether the criminal cases cited were sufficient to justify detention as a “dangerous person” affecting public order.
- Whether the distinction between “law and order” and “public order” was properly considered.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
The petitioner contended that the FIRs registered against him pertained to isolated incidents affecting only specific individuals and had no nexus to public disorder. He relied on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence distinguishing “law and order” from “public order,” arguing that his activities had not disrupted public peace or caused fear among the general public. It was further submitted that the detaining authority had wrongly exercised discretion without adequate material.
Respondent’s Arguments:
The State submitted that the petitioner was a habitual offender whose continued freedom posed a threat to society at large. It was argued that the detention order was passed based on the petitioner’s antecedents and with an intent to prevent him from disturbing public order in Patan. The detaining authority had formed a subjective satisfaction based on credible material, and the detention was preventive, not punitive.
Analysis of the Law:
The Court emphasised the requirement of a direct link between the activities of the detenue and the disturbance of public order. It reiterated that preventive detention cannot be invoked for every offence or pattern of offending. The Court relied on Section 3(4) of the PASA Act, which requires a demonstrable threat to public order, not merely recurring criminal behaviour.
Precedent Analysis:
- Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 322: Held that mere registration of FIRs or bootlegging is not enough unless it affects public order.
- Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 1 SCC 10: Drew a clear line between ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’. Public order must affect the community at large, not just individual victims.
The Court cited both cases to reinforce that detention must be grounded in acts that disturb societal peace, not merely result in individual altercations or criminal liability.
Court’s Reasoning:
The Court found that none of the four cases cited demonstrated a threat to public peace or security. Even if offences under mining laws or physical assault occurred, they did not disrupt the even tempo of community life. The Court noted that the detaining authority had conflated habitual criminality with threats to public order, which is legally unsustainable. The subjective satisfaction recorded lacked rational nexus with the statutory mandate under PASA.
Conclusion:
The Court allowed the petition, quashed the detention order dated 01.05.2025, and directed immediate release of the petitioner unless required in any other case. It held that “the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law.”
Implications:
This ruling reiterates constitutional safeguards against misuse of preventive detention laws. It draws a critical line between “law and order” violations and “public order” disruption. The judgment reinforces the judiciary’s role in ensuring that preventive detention is not used arbitrarily against habitual offenders unless societal peace is demonstrably threatened.
