Court’s decision
The Karnataka High Court dismissed the criminal petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashing of proceedings for offences under Sections 499 and 500 of the IPC and Sections 66C, 66D and 67A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The Court held that the allegations made by the Respondent, supported by sworn statements and preliminary evidence, disclosed a clear prima facie case of defamation, identity theft, impersonation, and sexually explicit representation of the Respondent on social media platforms.
The Court emphasised that the Petitioner’s attempts to portray the Respondent as a prostitute through fake accounts were inherently defamatory and capable of causing severe reputational harm. It held that creating such fake digital profiles constitutes identity theft under Section 66C and impersonation under Section 66D of the IT Act. Moreover, making sexually oriented representations of the Respondent through publicly accessible accounts attracted Section 67A of the IT Act.
The Court found no legal infirmity in the Trial Court’s decision to frame charges, noting that quashing at the pre-trial stage is impermissible when detailed allegations disclose the ingredients of the offences. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, allowing prosecution to continue.
Facts
The Respondent, the estranged sister-in-law of the Petitioner, lodged a private complaint alleging that the Petitioner, influenced by ongoing matrimonial disputes within the family, had been digitally harassing her. She alleged that the Petitioner created several fake social media accounts, including one impersonating her, portraying her as a “call girl” soliciting men. She also alleged the creation of other anonymous accounts carrying vulgar, abusive, and defamatory comments aimed at humiliating her and her family.
These accounts were accessible to the general public, causing widespread dissemination of defamatory content. After recording the Respondent’s sworn statement, the Trial Court took cognizance of offences under Sections 499 and 500 of the IPC, Sections 66C and 66D of the IT Act, and subsequently also included Section 67A. The Trial Court framed charges after considering the material presented. The Petitioner challenged this exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482.
Issues
The following issues arose for the Court’s consideration:
- Whether the allegations in the private complaint and preliminary evidence disclosed a prima facie case of defamation and IT Act offences.
- Whether creation of fake social media accounts impersonating the Respondent attracts liability under Sections 66C and 66D.
- Whether projecting the Respondent as a prostitute through digital impersonation amounts to uploading sexually explicit material under Section 67A.
- Whether the criminal proceedings were liable to be quashed under Section 482 at the pre-charge stage.
Petitioner’s arguments
The Petitioner argued that he was not responsible for creating any of the social media accounts referred to in the complaint. He contended that even assuming the existence of fake accounts, the allegations did not satisfy the statutory ingredients of the offences. He submitted that the Trial Court had mechanically framed charges without satisfying itself about intentional defamation or nexus between the Petitioner and the accounts.
The Petitioner asserted that the material relied upon by the Respondent did not constitute sufficient evidence and that the content posted did not amount to sexually explicit material under Section 67A. He also claimed that criminal prosecution was being misused to settle personal and matrimonial scores and therefore warranted interference.
Respondent’s arguments
The Respondent submitted that the allegations were based on actual posts created from fake accounts impersonating her identity. She argued that portraying her as a prostitute and soliciting men was not only defamatory but also caused severe mental distress and public humiliation.
She emphasised that the accounts were accessible to the entire public and were not restricted pages, thereby multiplying the harm caused by such posts. The Respondent contended that the Trial Court had verified her sworn statement, examined the accounts, and correctly concluded that a prima facie case existed. She submitted that quashing at this stage would defeat the very purpose of trial and investigation into the digital evidence.
Analysis of the law
The Court examined the scope of defamation under Sections 499 and 500 IPC, holding that imputations that harm a woman’s reputation by portraying her as a prostitute squarely fall within the statutory definition. The Court emphasised that broadcasting such imputations through social media gives them wide dissemination, thereby strengthening the element of harm.
Turning to the Information Technology Act, the Court noted that creation of a fake account in another person’s name constitutes identity theft under Section 66C, while using such an account to misrepresent, deceive, or cause wrongful harm amounts to impersonation under Section 66D. The Court also held that posting sexually oriented content or portrayals of a woman in a manner suggestive of prostitution is covered by Section 67A, which penalises publishing images or material containing sexually explicit acts or conduct.
The Court reiterated that at the stage of framing of charges, the test is whether allegations disclose the ingredients of the offences. Detailed scrutiny of evidence is reserved for trial.
Precedent analysis
Although the Court’s order does not explicitly cite judgments by name, its reasoning reflects established Supreme Court jurisprudence that quashing criminal proceedings under Section 482 is an exception, not the rule. Courts repeatedly hold that when allegations disclose a prima facie offence, quashing is impermissible. Further, precedents on digital harassment emphasise heightened responsibility in cases involving cyber-impersonation, especially where imputations attack a woman’s sexual character.
Court’s reasoning
After analysing the sworn statement and materials, the Court held that the allegations, if proved, would undeniably amount to defamation and cybercrime offences. The Court noted that portraying a woman as a prostitute is among the gravest forms of reputational assault and meets the statutory threshold for defamation.
The Court also found that creating or operating a fake account in the Respondent’s name satisfies the ingredients of Section 66C, while publishing derogatory content through such impersonation satisfies Section 66D. The explicit sexual insinuation underlying the portrayal justified the inclusion of Section 67A.
The Court concluded that the Trial Court had correctly appreciated the material and found no error in proceeding with charges. As the allegations disclosed the ingredients of the offences, the High Court refused to interfere under Section 482.
Conclusion
The High Court dismissed the criminal petition, upholding the Trial Court’s order framing charges for defamation and multiple offences under the IT Act. It held that the complaint and supporting material disclosed a prima facie case, and therefore, trial must proceed. The Court reiterated that Section 482 cannot be invoked to stifle legitimate prosecution based on well-founded allegations of cyber-impersonation and digital defamation.
Implications
This ruling strengthens jurisprudence on digital defamation and the misuse of social media platforms to attack a woman’s dignity and reputation. It sends a clear message that impersonation and sexualised portrayals through fake online accounts carry serious legal consequences under both IPC and the IT Act. The decision reaffirms that courts will not hesitate to allow prosecution when allegations involve cyber-harassment, identity theft, or targeted humiliation of women. It underscores the expanding scope of digital offences and the judicial commitment to protect victims of online abuse.
