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Supreme Court Restores Assam Election Petition Dismissed Over Attestation Defects; Holds Form-25 Defect Cannot Defeat Independent Grounds and Directs High Court to Examine Merits

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Supreme Court Sets Aside Dismissal of Assam Election Petition; Holds Signed True Copies Satisfy Section 81 and Form-25 Defect Affects Only Corrupt-Practice Allegations

Facts

The appeal before the Supreme Court arose from an order under Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, by which the High Court had rejected an election petition filed by Hafiz Rashid Ahmed Choudhury.

The election petition challenged the election of the successful candidate, Kripanath Mallah, from No. 7 Karimganj Parliamentary Constituency, Assam, in the 2024 Lok Sabha general elections.

Three principal objections had been raised before the High Court:

  1. The copy of the Form-25 affidavit served upon the returned candidate did not show that it had been notarised/attested as required under Rule 94A of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961.
  2. Pages 1–84 bore the stamp “attested to be true copy of the petition”, whereas pages 85–185 used “certified to be true copy”.
  3. Pages 11, 16, 21 and 22 were allegedly missing from the copy supplied to the returned candidate.

The High Court held that the attestation was improper and rejected the election petition. It did not decide the Form-25 notarisation issue and rejected the allegation concerning missing pages.

The election petitioner consequently approached the Supreme Court.

Issues

The principal issues were:

  1. Whether using different expressions—“attested to be true copy” and “certified to be true copy”—made the copies defective under Section 81(3) of the Representation of the People Act.
  2. Whether Section 81(3) prescribes any particular form or terminology for attesting copies of an election petition.
  3. Whether absence of notarisation or attestation on the copy of Form-25 supplied to the returned candidate constituted a fatal defect requiring dismissal of the entire election petition.
  4. Whether a defect concerning Form-25 under Section 83 could attract mandatory dismissal under Section 86.
  5. Whether defective compliance concerning allegations of corrupt practices requires striking out only those allegations while permitting independent grounds of election challenge to proceed.
  6. Whether Dr Shipra v. Shanti Lal Khoiwal had been overruled by T.M. Jacob v. C. Poulose or remained applicable in appropriate factual circumstances.
  7. Whether the later three-Judge Bench decision in T. Phungzathang v. Hangkhanlian correctly understood the Constitution Bench ruling in T.M. Jacob.
  8. What effect the earlier Constitution Bench judgment in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore had upon the controversy.

Petitioner/Appellant’s Arguments

The appellant argued that the High Court’s conclusion regarding defective attestation directly contradicted Supreme Court precedent.

Relying upon F.A. Sapa v. Singora, (1991) 3 SCC 375, it was submitted that Section 81(3) requires the petitioner to sign the copies and take responsibility for their being true copies, but does not prescribe any particular form of attestation.

Thus, whether the rubber stamp stated “attested to be true copy” or “certified to be true copy” was immaterial when every page had been signed by the election petitioner.

The appellant further argued that Section 86 mandates summary dismissal only for non-compliance with Sections 81, 82 or 117.

A defect concerning Form-25 arose under the proviso to Section 83 and therefore could not justify peremptory dismissal of the entire election petition.

On the Form-25 issue, the appellant relied upon the Constitution Bench decision in T.M. Jacob v. C. Poulose and the later judgment in T. Phungzathang v. Hangkhanlian, arguing for application of the principles of substantial compliance and curability.

Respondent’s Arguments

Kripanath Mallah argued that although the original affidavit filed before the High Court had been attested by the Commissioner of Affidavits, the copy supplied to him contained nothing indicating that the Form-25 affidavit had been duly affirmed or attested.

He relied upon Dr Shipra (Smt) v. Shanti Lal Khoiwal, (1996) 5 SCC 181, arguing that the defect was serious in the context of allegations of corrupt practices.

The respondent also argued that the words “certified true copy” could be accepted only where what was supplied was itself a formally certified copy and therefore sought to sustain the High Court’s order.

Analysis of the Law

No Prescribed Formula for Attesting Election Petition Copies

Section 81(3) requires an election petition to be accompanied by as many copies as there are respondents, with every copy attested by the election petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy.

The Supreme Court relied upon F.A. Sapa and held that the provision imposes two essential requirements:

  • sufficient copies for all respondents; and
  • attestation by the petitioner himself that each is a true copy.

No particular wording or formula for such attestation is prescribed.

Accordingly, the distinction between the two rubber stamps was legally immaterial.

The Supreme Court expressly reversed the High Court on this issue, holding that “attested to be true copy” and “certified to be true copy” conveyed the same meaning.

Form-25 Requires Affirmation Before Prescribed Authority

The Court treated the Form-25 issue differently.

Under the Conduct of Elections Rules, Form-25 must be signed by the election petitioner and affirmed before and attested by a First-Class Magistrate, Notary or Commissioner of Oaths.

The copies produced before the Supreme Court contained no semblance of notarisation—not even a printed affirmation, space for the prescribed authority’s signature or the date.

This required the Court to closely examine the effect of earlier Supreme Court precedents.

Section 83 Defect Does Not Automatically Trigger Section 86

The Supreme Court ultimately held that even a defect concerning Form-25 does not necessarily justify dismissal of the entire election petition.

Where the defect affects the statutory affidavit supporting allegations of corrupt practices, the consequence may be that those allegations cannot be pursued, while other independent grounds challenging the election must still be adjudicated on merits.

This distinction became decisive in restoring the election petition.

Precedent Analysis

F.A. Sapa v. Singora, (1991) 3 SCC 375

This authority governed the Section 81(3) attestation issue.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed that all Section 81(3) requires is that the petitioner certify under his own signature that the copy supplied is a true copy.

No particular form of attestation is prescribed.

Consequently, the High Court erred in treating the difference between “attested” and “certified” true-copy stamps as fatal.

Dr Shipra (Smt) v. Shanti Lal Khoiwal, (1996) 5 SCC 181

Dr Shipra concerned a materially similar situation where the copy of the affidavit supplied to the returned candidate did not contain the prescribed notarial verification.

The Court noted that corrupt-practice allegations carry grave consequences, including potential disqualification for up to six years, and therefore compliance with statutory requirements assumes importance.

Crucially, the present Bench clarified that Dr Shipra had never been overruled.

T.M. Jacob v. C. Poulose, (1999) 4 SCC 274

The Constitution Bench in T.M. Jacob did not overrule Dr Shipra; it distinguished it on facts.

In T.M. Jacob, the copy supplied to the returned candidate contained an endorsement showing that the affidavit had been duly affirmed, signed and verified before a Notary, including the words “sd/- Notary”.

Only the Notary’s name, address, stamp and seal were absent.

That defect was materially different because the document still demonstrated that notarisation had actually occurred.

T. Phungzathang v. Hangkhanlian, (2001) 8 SCC 358

This is an important part of the judgment.

The Supreme Court disagreed with T. Phungzathang insofar as it understood Dr Shipra as having effectively ceased to be good law after T.M. Jacob.

The present Bench held that T. Phungzathang had misunderstood the Constitution Bench decision and reiterated that Dr Shipra was never overruled.

Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 129

The Court then relied upon this earlier Constitution Bench authority.

Murarka held that a defect in verification under Section 83 is not necessarily fatal to maintainability.

It also explained that a “true copy” under Section 81(3) need not be an absolutely exact reproduction.

The relevant test is whether the variation is such that it could mislead an ordinary person.

Importantly, where the original affidavit had been properly affirmed before the prescribed authority but the copy omitted the endorsement, such omission did not necessarily mislead the returned candidate. The Court could verify the original affidavit on its record.

National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680

The Supreme Court invoked Pranay Sethi on the doctrine of precedent.

Since Murarka was a Constitution Bench decision, it continued to bind the Court, and contrary propositions in subsequent smaller-Bench decisions could not prevail over it.

Court’s Reasoning

The Supreme Court separated the case into two distinct procedural defects.

First, the difference in rubber-stamp terminology was not a genuine defect at all.

Both “attested to be true copy” and “certified to be true copy” communicated that the copy was true, and every relevant page had been signed by the election petitioner. Since Section 81(3) prescribes no particular formula, the High Court’s contrary conclusion was unsustainable.

Second, the Form-25 issue was more substantial because the copy served on the returned candidate contained no visible indication of notarisation or affirmation.

However, that did not automatically justify dismissal of the entire election petition.

The Court emphasised that defects under Section 83 are not included among the statutory grounds for mandatory dismissal under Section 86 in the same manner as non-compliance with Sections 81, 82 and 117.

Moreover, the original Form-25 was stated to have been affirmed before a Commissioner of Affidavits. The appropriate course was therefore for the High Court to verify the original.

If the original contains proper attestation of affirmation on oath, the High Court must proceed with the election petition on merits.

If the original does not contain proper attestation, the consequence is not dismissal of the entire petition. Instead, the election petitioner cannot pursue the allegations of corrupt practices, while any other independently pleaded grounds must still be considered on their merits.

The Supreme Court therefore found no legal basis to sustain the High Court’s outright dismissal.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed Hafiz Rashid Ahmed Choudhury’s appeal, reversed the High Court’s order and restored the election petition.

The High Court was directed to verify the original Form-25 affidavit:

  • If properly affirmed and attested: proceed with the election petition on merits, including the relevant allegations.
  • If proper attestation is absent: do not permit the election petitioner to pursue allegations of corrupt practices, but proceed to decide other independently pleaded grounds on merits.

Thus, the Supreme Court rejected the approach of terminating the entire election challenge because of technical attestation defects and restored the matter for adjudication according to the nature and effect of each defect.

Case Details

Case: Hafiz Rashid Ahmed Choudhury v. Kripanath Mallah & Ors.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 7474 of 2025; 2026 INSC 915

Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. Vinod Chandran

Date: 24 August 2026

Result: Appeal Allowed; High Court order set aside; election petition restored for verification of Form-25 and adjudication on merits in accordance with the Supreme Court’s directions.

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