Supreme Court Restores Mother-in-Law’s Acquittal In Daughter-in-Law’s Burning Death Case, Rejects Murder Conviction Based On Contradictory Dying Declarations And Missing Witness
Supreme Court Rules Sole Accused Cannot Be Convicted Of Uncharged Section 302 Offence After Co-Accused Are Acquitted Under Section 302/34, Reiterates Prosecution’s Burden Under Section 106 Evidence Act
Facts
Sunitabai, married to Shamkant Patil, allegedly suffered cruelty over dowry demands and childlessness at her matrimonial home. On 10 April 2005, she sustained severe burns and died of septicaemia due to thermal burns on 15 April. The prosecution accused her husband (A1), father-in-law Waman (A2), mother-in-law Kamalbai (A3) and brother-in-law Jeejabrao (A4) of acting with common intention to burn her. Three statements, treated as dying declarations, were recorded in the hospital: the medico-legal case history (Exhibit 56) attributed both pouring kerosene and setting the fire to Kamalbai; the police-recorded and Special Executive Magistrate-recorded declarations (Exhibits 44 and 48) alleged that A1 and A4 tied Sunitabai, Kamalbai poured kerosene and A2 ignited it. The Sessions Court acquitted all four accused. On the State’s appeal, the Bombay High Court sustained the other acquittals but convicted Kamalbai alone under Section 302 IPC, sentencing her to life imprisonment and a ₹25,000 fine.
Issues
Whether an acquitted accused could be convicted of murder under Section 302 IPC simpliciter when the sole murder charge framed was under Section 302 read with Section 34 and her alleged collaborators had been acquitted; whether one of three materially inconsistent dying declarations could independently justify reversal of acquittal; whether Section 106 of the Evidence Act shifted the burden merely because Kamalbai was allegedly the only person at home with the deceased; and whether the appellate court had followed the procedural safeguards governing conviction and sentence.
Appellant’s Arguments
Kamalbai submitted that the High Court improperly displaced a reasoned acquittal despite mutually contradictory dying declarations and infirmities in the prosecution evidence. The initial medical record could not safely be singled out as conclusive while the two later declarations and statements to relatives were discarded. The first rescuer and person who brought Sunitabai to hospital, Vishwas Desle (also referred to as Vishwas Patil), was not examined, depriving the defence and the court of important corroboration. The conviction of one person for an offence never separately charged, after acquittal of the remaining alleged participants, caused substantial prejudice. Reliance was placed, inter alia, on State of Punjab v. Parveen Kumar.
Respondent’s Arguments
The State maintained that Exhibit 56, recorded by medical officer Dr. Prashant Shinde, was voluntary and reliable. It argued that the victim’s initial account, together with material seized during investigation and the chemical-analysis evidence, sufficiently established Kamalbai’s role. The defence position that she alone was present inside the house when the fire occurred was said to support the High Court’s inference of guilt. The State cited Jagbir Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Rajendra s/o Ramdas Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra on assessing dying declarations.
Analysis of the Law
The distinction between Sections 302 and 302/34 IPC was central. Section 34 fixes joint liability where an offence is committed in furtherance of common intention, but the prosecution had charged only a jointly committed murder by four specifically named persons. There was no independent Section 302 charge against Kamalbai. Once the other three accused stood acquitted, converting the case into murder committed by Kamalbai alone departed from the case she had been called upon to meet and, on these facts, caused prejudice. Separately, the Supreme Court reiterated that Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 concerns facts especially within an accused’s knowledge but does not dilute the prosecution’s primary burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Under Section 386(a) CrPC, an appellate court reversing an acquittal and imposing sentence must hear the accused on sentence.
Precedent Analysis
Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra (1962 INSC 19) prohibits sustaining a common-intention conviction of a lone accused where the charged associates are acquitted and no other participants are established. Abhishek Sharma v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2023 INSC 924), read with Jagbir Singh and Rajendra Kolhe, requires careful separate scrutiny of multiple dying declarations; material inconsistencies make corroboration and the surrounding circumstances important. Anees v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2024 INSC 368) confirms that Section 106 cannot cure a failure to establish a prima facie prosecution case. Ramkrushna Prahllad Dongardive v. State of Maharashtra (2026 INSC 1099) was referred to regarding the accused’s right to be heard on sentencing after an acquittal is reversed.
Court’s Reasoning
The Supreme Court found the Sessions Court’s view plausible, not perverse. Exhibit 56, favoured by the High Court, accused Kamalbai of both pouring kerosene and setting the victim alight; Exhibits 44 and 48 instead said that A2 started the fire. The High Court had rejected the latter accounts and the related oral versions, yet accepted Exhibit 56 without adequate independent corroboration. Vishwas Desle/Patil, who first attended the scene, reportedly extinguished the flames, brought Sunitabai to hospital and was present when the medical history was taken, had not been examined despite being a material witness. The allegation that ropes were used also remained inadequately substantiated. Mere presence of Kamalbai at the home could not prove the act of murder or activate Section 106 before the prosecution discharged its initial burden. The absence of a separately framed Section 302 charge, and the High Court’s failure to hear her on sentence, were further defects.
Conclusion
Allowing Criminal Appeal No. 118 of 2018, the Supreme Court quashed the Bombay High Court’s judgment dated 28 September 2017 in Criminal Appeal No. 63 of 2008 and acquitted Kamalbai of the offence under Section 302 IPC. It directed her immediate release if she was not required in any other case. The judgment underscores that appellate interference with acquittal demands a compelling evidentiary and legal basis; inconsistent dying declarations cannot be selectively relied on without testing credibility and corroboration, and the accused’s failure to explain matters within her knowledge is not a substitute for proof of the prosecution case.
Case: Sau. Kamalbai Waman Patil v. State of Maharashtra
Court: Supreme Court of India, Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction
Case Number: 2026 INSC 1196; Criminal Appeal No. 118 of 2018
Bench: Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar (judgment by Chandurkar, J.)
Date: 5 November 2026
Result: Appeal allowed; murder conviction and life sentence set aside; acquittal restored; release directed.
