Court’s Decision
The Gujarat High Court quashed a preventive detention order passed under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA), holding that the material placed on record failed to establish that the alleged activities of the detenue were prejudicial to the maintenance of “public order” as required under the statute. The Court held:
“We are of the considered opinion that the material on record is not sufficient for holding that the alleged activities of the detenue have either affected adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order.”
Accordingly, the Court directed that the detenue be released forthwith if not required in any other case.
Facts
The petitioner was preventively detained by an order dated 28.04.2025 issued by the Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad City, under Section 3 of the Gujarat PASA Act, classifying him as a “dangerous person” under Section 2(c). The detention was based on three prior FIRs registered with Ramol Police Station in 2023 and 2025 under various sections of the Indian Penal Code, the Gujarat Police Act, and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.
The petitioner, through counsel, challenged the legality of the detention order, arguing that his alleged conduct, though possibly in violation of law and order, did not rise to the level of disturbing “public order,” a necessary threshold under the PASA.
Issues
- Whether the alleged activities of the detenue amounted to a threat to “public order” under PASA, warranting preventive detention?
- Whether registration of multiple criminal cases is sufficient to detain a person preventively as a “dangerous person”?
- Whether the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was valid in the absence of community-level disruption?
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner contended that the FIRs referenced in the detention order pertained to individual altercations or localised incidents, and did not involve any threat or disruption to public order. Counsel argued that merely being involved in multiple criminal cases or being labelled a habitual offender is not sufficient for preventive detention under the PASA unless such acts demonstrably affect the “even tempo of community life.” The petitioner emphasized that all offences cited resulted in bail, and none justified a presumption of threat to the community at large.
Respondent’s Arguments
The State, opposing the plea, argued that the detenue was a habitual offender and a menace to society. It was submitted that his repeated offences had created an atmosphere of fear and insecurity, particularly in the Ramol area of Ahmedabad. The Detaining Authority had considered his criminal antecedents and found that preventive detention was necessary to avert further danger to public peace and order.
Analysis of the Law
The Court examined Section 3(4) of PASA which distinguishes “law and order” from “public order,” requiring that preventive detention be grounded not merely in breaches of the law, but in conduct that disturbs the societal equilibrium or affects the community as a whole.
The Court reiterated that subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority must have a rational basis rooted in material that shows such conduct is likely to affect public order.
Precedent Analysis
- Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 1 SCC 10
This decision established that not all infractions of law amount to public disorder. For preventive detention, the act must be of such gravity that it disturbs the community at large, and not just individual victims. - Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 322
Held that mere registration of criminal cases does not automatically justify preventive detention unless the acts significantly disrupt public order.
Both cases were cited by the High Court to reinforce that individual acts of violence or illegality, unless impacting public tranquillity at a broader level, cannot be used to justify preventive detention.
Court’s Reasoning
The High Court found that the criminal cases cited in the detention order involved bailable offences and lacked sufficient gravity or community-level impact to sustain the conclusion that the petitioner’s conduct was “prejudicial to public order.” It was noted that:
“The said offences do not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order… The allegations cannot be said to have created any feeling of insecurity or panic or terror among the public.”
The Court emphasised that while the petitioner could be prosecuted under regular criminal law, the extraordinary remedy of preventive detention must be reserved for exceptional cases that meet statutory requirements.
Conclusion
The High Court quashed the detention order dated 28.04.2025, declaring it illegal and unsustainable in law. The petitioner was ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. The Court reiterated that preventive detention must be grounded in concrete material demonstrating a real and proximate threat to public order, not merely law and order.
Implications
- Preventive detention laws must be applied strictly and sparingly, only in cases where public order is demonstrably at risk.
- Being a habitual offender or facing multiple FIRs does not automatically qualify one for preventive detention.
- Detaining authorities must base their decisions on evidence of wider community impact and not on routine criminality.
Cases Referred and Their Relevance
- Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal – Clarified the essential distinction between law and order vs public order; applied to reject the contention that localised offences qualified for preventive detention.
- Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad – Reinforced that bootlegging or minor offences, unless impacting community peace, cannot justify preventive detention.
FAQs
Q1. What is the difference between ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ in preventive detention?
Law and order relates to individual incidents of crime, while public order involves disturbances that affect the community or disrupt social harmony.
Q2. Can preventive detention be based solely on registration of FIRs?
No. FIRs alone are insufficient. The acts must pose a real threat to public order, not merely violate criminal law.
Q3. What legal safeguards exist against arbitrary preventive detention?
Courts routinely scrutinise the material to ensure the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is based on substantial grounds affecting public order.
