Court’s Decision
The Patna High Court, through Justice Harish Kumar, allowed the criminal writ petition seeking quashing of the order of cognizance passed by the Special Judge, Vigilance, in a corruption case against a government officer. The Court ruled that the prosecution had been initiated without valid sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, thereby rendering the entire proceedings void ab initio.
Emphasizing the mandatory nature of prior sanction before prosecuting a public servant, the Court observed:
“The protection of sanction is not a privilege of the public servant but a safeguard for ensuring that prosecution is not launched on frivolous, vindictive, or technical grounds. Any trial without such sanction is a nullity in law.”
Accordingly, the Court quashed the cognizance order and all consequential proceedings, holding that the Vigilance authorities had overstepped their jurisdiction by prosecuting a public servant without requisite approval from the competent authority.
Facts
The petitioner was a government officer in a state public works department, serving as an Executive Engineer during the relevant period. An FIR was lodged by the Vigilance Investigation Bureau, alleging that he had demanded and accepted illegal gratification in connection with official work, thus committing offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
After investigation, the charge-sheet was filed before the Special Judge, Vigilance, who took cognizance of the offences. The petitioner challenged the cognizance order before the High Court, contending that no prior sanction had been obtained from the competent authority as required under Section 19 of the PC Act.
The petitioner also pointed out that at the time of cognizance, he was a serving government officer, protected by the requirement of sanction, and that the Vigilance authorities had wrongly assumed that sanction was unnecessary, thus violating the statutory mandate.
Issues
- Whether cognizance taken by the Vigilance Court without prior sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is valid in law.
- Whether subsequent sanction or curative approval could validate the initial procedural defect.
- Whether the continuation of prosecution without sanction amounts to abuse of the process of the court.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner contended that Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act provides a statutory safeguard for public servants against arbitrary prosecution, and that the absence of prior sanction vitiates the entire proceedings. He argued that the object of requiring sanction is not to shield guilty officers but to prevent harassment of honest ones.
It was submitted that the Vigilance authorities filed the charge-sheet without obtaining approval from the State Government, which was the competent authority to accord sanction. Since the petitioner was still in active service when cognizance was taken, the trial court could not have assumed jurisdiction.
The petitioner relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Paras Nath Singh (2009) 6 SCC 372, which held that taking cognizance without sanction is a jurisdictional error, and the proceedings are void ab initio.
He also placed reliance on Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka (2015) 14 SCC 186, where the Apex Court held that want of valid sanction renders the entire trial non est, and that such defect cannot be cured retrospectively.
The petitioner further argued that subsequent approval or ratification by the government cannot cure the defect because the trial itself cannot be founded on an illegality.
Respondent’s Arguments
The learned Special Public Prosecutor for the Vigilance Department argued that the sanction was in process, and mere delay in its formal issuance would not invalidate the prosecution. He contended that the FIR and charge-sheet were filed after a thorough investigation and that the petitioner’s conduct warranted prosecution.
It was further argued that the absence of sanction at the stage of cognizance was only a procedural irregularity, not a jurisdictional defect, and could be cured later during trial when formal sanction was received.
The State placed reliance on Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab (2007) 1 SCC 1, to submit that want of sanction does not automatically result in acquittal, particularly where there is substantial evidence of corruption. The prosecution maintained that the gravity of the allegations warranted a full trial and that the High Court should not exercise its inherent powers to quash the proceedings at a preliminary stage.
Analysis of the Law
The Court carefully examined Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which mandates that no court shall take cognizance of offences under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13, and 15 against a public servant without previous sanction from the competent authority.
It reiterated that the provision is not a mere procedural formality but a substantive safeguard protecting public servants from frivolous or vindictive prosecution.
The Court referred to the principles laid down in Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1979) 4 SCC 172, where the Supreme Court held that sanction is a “weapon to ensure objective decision-making by the competent authority before the machinery of criminal law is set in motion against a public servant.”
It also relied on Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka (2015) 14 SCC 186, where it was held that a trial conducted without sanction is void ab initio and cannot be validated by subsequent approval, as the defect is one of jurisdiction, not form.
The High Court noted that Section 19(3) provides limited protection for procedural errors in sanction, but it does not apply when sanction is entirely absent at the time of cognizance.
Precedent Analysis
- State of Uttar Pradesh v. Paras Nath Singh (2009) 6 SCC 372 – Held that the court cannot take cognizance of offences under the PC Act against a public servant without valid sanction; such cognizance is a nullity. Applied here to quash cognizance taken without sanction.
- Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka (2015) 14 SCC 186 – Held that absence of sanction at the time of cognizance is fatal to prosecution, and later sanction cannot cure the defect. Relied upon as the controlling authority.
- Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1979) 4 SCC 172 – Explained that sanction is not an empty ritual but a solemn decision ensuring that prosecution is justified. Used to reinforce the constitutional purpose of prior sanction.
- State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nishant Sareen (2010) 14 SCC 527 – Clarified that a subsequent sanction cannot retrospectively validate cognizance; only fresh proceedings may be initiated after valid sanction. Followed to hold that current prosecution was void.
Court’s Reasoning
Justice Harish Kumar found that the sanction for prosecution was neither obtained nor produced before the Vigilance Court when cognizance was taken. The government’s subsequent explanation that “approval was under process” did not satisfy the mandatory statutory requirement.
The Court held that the competent authority must apply its mind to the material before according sanction, and such sanction must precede the cognizance order, not follow it. Failure to do so strikes at the root of jurisdiction of the trial court.
The Court observed:
“The want of sanction is not a mere irregularity; it goes to the very foundation of the court’s competence to take cognizance. Any proceedings undertaken without such sanction stand vitiated.”
The Court also rejected the State’s argument that the defect could be cured later, holding that retrospective validation is impermissible under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Conclusion
The Patna High Court quashed the order of cognizance passed by the Special Judge, Vigilance, and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom. It held that the entire prosecution was void due to the absence of prior sanction from the competent authority as required under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
The Court concluded:
“Before setting the criminal law in motion against a public servant, the State must demonstrate bona fides by obtaining prior sanction. The rule of law cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative expediency.”
Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed, and the petitioner was discharged from all criminal proceedings arising out of the impugned vigilance case.
Implications
This judgment reiterates the indispensable nature of prior sanction in corruption cases involving public servants. It reinforces judicial safeguards preventing misuse of the Prevention of Corruption Act as a tool of harassment.
The decision also clarifies that subsequent or post-facto sanction cannot cure the defect of jurisdiction, ensuring that prosecutions are initiated only after due authorization and application of mind by the competent authority.
By quashing the proceedings, the Court reasserted the fundamental principle that procedural compliance is the foundation of substantive justice.
FAQs
1. Why is prior sanction required before prosecuting a public servant?
It ensures that only genuine cases proceed to trial, protecting honest officers from vexatious or politically motivated complaints.
2. Can later approval by the government cure the absence of prior sanction?
No. As held in Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka, the absence of sanction at the time of cognizance is a jurisdictional defect that cannot be retrospectively validated.
3. What happens to a case if sanction is missing?
The entire proceeding, including the order of cognizance, becomes void and is liable to be quashed.
