Court’s Decision
The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, comprising Justice M.S. Karnik and Justice N.R. Borkar, authoritatively held that the explanations (a) to (e) appended to Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 are illustrative and not exhaustive, thus broadening the circumstances under which a probate or letter of administration may be revoked.
The Court clarified that the phrase “just cause shall be deemed to exist” does not confine the Court’s jurisdiction to only the five enumerated explanations, but leaves it open for the judiciary to determine “just cause” depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.
“The jurisdiction of the Court to determine whether a ‘just cause’ exists cannot be stifled by giving a restrictive meaning to Section 263. The deeming fiction only applies to cases under clauses (a) to (e). There may be myriad situations where ‘just cause’ exists.”
The Division Bench thereby disagreed with earlier Single Bench rulings in George Anthony Harris v. Millicent Spencer and Sharad Shankarrao Mane v. Ashabai Shripati Mane, which had treated the explanations as exhaustive.
Facts
The dispute arose from a probate proceeding relating to the alleged Will of one Rajesh Chowdhary, who died in Ecuador under suspicious circumstances. The Will was purportedly executed in Ecuador but attested in India, leading to doubts about its validity under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act.
The petitioner (a relative of the deceased) had filed a caveat opposing the grant of probate but failed to remove procedural objections, causing its dismissal. Consequently, probate was granted in favour of the executor.
Subsequently, the petitioner sought revocation of the probate under Section 263, claiming that:
- The Will was defective in substance since attesting witnesses did not sign in the testator’s presence.
- The dismissal of the caveat resulted from advocate’s negligence, not deliberate default.
The respondent, representing the executor, opposed the revocation, arguing that the petitioner’s grounds were outside the scope of Section 263 explanations and hence not maintainable.
Issues
- Whether the explanations (a) to (e) under Section 263 are exhaustive or illustrative.
- Whether negligence of an advocate or procedural default could constitute “just cause” for revocation of probate.
- Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to consider grounds not enumerated under the explanations.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner, represented by Advocate Yashvi Panchal, argued that the explanations in Section 263 were merely illustrative, meant to guide interpretation of the term just cause.
She contended that the probate was defective in substance since the Will was not attested in the testator’s presence and that the petitioner was deprived of his right to contest due to advocate’s inadvertence.
She relied on a series of authorities including:
- Annoda Prosad Chatterjee v. Kali Krishna (1897 ILR 24 Cal 95)
- Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Sankarbai (ILR 26 Bom 792)
- Surendra Nath Pramanik v. Amrita Lal Pal (1919 ILR 47 Cal 115)
- T. Arumuga Mudaliar (AIR 1955 Mad 622)
- Sundaram Pillai v. Pattabiraman (1985 1 SCC 591)
She submitted that “just cause” cannot be rigidly limited to statutory explanations, as doing so would defeat the legislative intent of enabling equitable relief in deserving cases.
Respondent’s Arguments
Advocate Sonal, appearing for the executor, asserted that Section 263 is exhaustive, and only grounds enumerated in explanations (a) to (e) constitute valid “just cause.”
She relied on the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 1925 Act, which described it as a consolidating measure, not intended to alter the earlier law under Section 50 of the Probate and Administration Act, 1881 or Section 234 of the Indian Succession Act, 1865.
According to her, the word “deemed” in the explanation merely restates existing law and does not expand it. She warned that interpreting “just cause” broadly would open the floodgates to frivolous revocation petitions and delay estate distribution.
She cited:
- Lynette Fernandes v. Gertie Mathias (2018 1 SCC 271)
- Anil Behari Ghosh v. Latika Bala Dassi (AIR 1955 SC 566)
- George Anthony Harris v. Millicent Spencer (AIR 1932 Bom 156)
- Sharad Shankarrao Mane v. Ashabai Shripati Mane (AIR 1996 Bom 422)
Analysis of the Law
The Court undertook an extensive comparative study of Section 263 of the 1925 Act, Section 50 of the Probate and Administration Act, 1881, and Section 234 of the Indian Succession Act, 1865.
It noted that earlier laws used the phrase “just cause is”, whereas Section 263 employs “just cause shall be deemed to exist where…” — signifying a legislative shift toward a deeming fiction rather than an exhaustive definition.
Relying on interpretative principles from Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (2025) 1 SCC 695 and Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. State of Manipur (2025 SCC OnLine SC 875), the Bench emphasized that:
“An explanation is not a substantive provision; it clarifies, not confines. It neither expands nor restricts the meaning of the main section.”
The Court reiterated that statutory explanations serve as clarificatory aids, not exhaustive codes.
Precedent Analysis
- Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Sakwarbai (1902 ILR 26 Bom 792) – Treated the earlier provision under the Probate Act as exhaustive; however, the Division Bench clarified that the 1925 Act’s wording altered the position, making the earlier ratio inapplicable.
- Kali Krishna Chatterjee v. Annoda Prosad Chatterjee (1896 ILR 24 Cal 95) – Adopted a restrictive view under pre-1925 law; distinguished on same grounds.
- S. Sundaram Pillai v. Pattabiraman (1985) 1 SCC 591 – Cited for the principle that an Explanation cannot restrict or expand the scope of the main provision.
- Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (2025) 1 SCC 695) – Reinforced that Explanations merely elucidate ambiguities and cannot limit legislative intent.
Thus, the Bench concluded that earlier single-judge interpretations in Harris and Mane were incorrect.
Court’s Reasoning
Applying purposive construction, the Court held that the legislative change from “is” to “shall be deemed to exist where” indicated Parliament’s intention to expand judicial discretion rather than restrict it.
“The deeming fiction in clauses (a) to (e) identifies instances where ‘just cause’ shall be presumed to exist, but does not preclude courts from recognizing other circumstances that justify revocation.”
The Bench underscored that procedural negligence, advocate’s oversight, or substantive defects affecting the fairness of probate could also constitute “just cause.”
Further, the Court reaffirmed that Section 263 is remedial, intended to uphold fairness and prevent miscarriage of justice.
Conclusion
The Division Bench conclusively answered the reference as follows:
- The explanations (a) to (e) under Section 263 are illustrative and not exhaustive.
- Circumstances not covered therein may still constitute “just cause” for revocation, depending on the case.
- The judgments in George Anthony Harris and Sharad Shankarrao Mane do not lay down the correct law.
“The phrase ‘deemed to be just cause’ carves out situations where the Court must presume just cause to exist. It does not restrict the Court’s power to identify just cause in other fact situations.”
Implications
This ruling significantly expands the scope of judicial discretion in testamentary matters. Key takeaways include:
- Courts can now revoke probate even for non-enumerated causes, such as negligence, mistake, or procedural irregularity.
- The interpretation harmonizes Section 263 with principles of equity and justice.
- It resolves long-standing judicial ambiguity between restrictive and liberal readings of “just cause.”
The judgment ensures that procedural lapses or administrative errors do not unjustly validate a defective probate grant, thereby strengthening the integrity of succession law.
