“Mere delay is not a ground to refuse an additional written statement where no prejudice is caused.”
This emphatic judicial reminder forms the core of the decision, where the Court analysed the interplay between the Commercial Courts Act and Order VIII Rule 9 CPC, ultimately holding that the power to permit an additional written statement remains directory, discretionary and extendable in exceptional circumstances.
COURT’S DECISION
The Court allowed the Interim Application seeking condonation of 684 days’ delay in filing an additional written statement in a commercial admiralty suit. The Court held that Order VIII Rule 9 CPC, unlike Order VIII Rule 1 in commercial matters, does not contain a statutory bar preventing extension beyond 30 days. The delay was held to be sufficiently explained, the circumstances were exceptional, the trial had not commenced, and no prejudice would be caused.
However, to deter laxity, the Court imposed costs of ₹1,00,000 and permitted filing of the additional written statement within three weeks.
FACTS
The Plaintiff filed an admiralty commercial suit concerning monetary claims. The Defendant had already filed an original written statement within 120 days. Later, the Plaintiff amended the plaint, increasing its claim by approximately ₹18.64 lakh. On 11 April 2023, the Court permitted the Defendants to file additional written statements within three weeks.
During the same period, the Plaintiff filed a summary judgment application under Order XIII-A CPC. The Defendant concentrated its efforts on resisting that application, which was finally dismissed in September 2024. In the process, the additional written statement remained unfiled.
When the matter thereafter came up for directions in January 2025, the Defendant requested time to file the additional written statement. A legal issue arose regarding whether Order VIII Rule 9 CPC imposes a rigid or flexible timeline in commercial suits. The Court asked the Applicant to file an affidavit/application explaining the delay. The Application to condone the 684-day delay was thereafter filed.
ISSUES
- Whether, in a commercial suit governed by the Commercial Courts Act, the 30-day period under Order VIII Rule 9 CPC for filing an additional written statement is mandatory or directory.
- Whether the Court retains discretion to condone long delays in filing such additional written statements.
- Whether the Defendant had shown “sufficient cause” justifying condonation of 684 days’ delay.
- Whether any prejudice would be caused to the Plaintiff if the delay is condoned.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS (APPLICANT / DEFENDANT)
The Applicant argued that Order VIII Rule 9 is qualitatively different from Order VIII Rule 1. While Rule 1 (for filing the first written statement) is subject to the strict, non-extendable 120-day embargo in commercial suits, Rule 9 is not. The legislative intent to impose rigidity is seen only in Rule 1, not Rule 9; therefore, the latter remains directory.
The Applicant contended that the Plaintiff themselves delayed amendment of the plaint for nearly 15 months after the cause arose. Further, during the period granted to file the additional written statement, the Defendant was vigorously contesting a summary judgment application under Order XIII-A, which required substantial preparation and effort. The dismissal of that application demonstrated bona fides.
The Defendant submitted that issues have not been framed; the trial has not begun; therefore, permitting the additional written statement would not prejudice the Plaintiff but would instead ensure complete and fair adjudication. The delay was inadvertent, not deliberate; the Applicant was willing to accept any terms, including costs.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS (PLAINTIFF)
The Plaintiff argued that in commercial suits the timelines are strict and non-extendable. Relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s ruling that Order VIII Rules 1 and 10 are mandatory for commercial suits, the Plaintiff contended that the same logic applies to Rule 9, and the Court has no power to extend the 30-day period for filing subsequent pleadings.
The Plaintiff disputed the sufficiency of the reasons for delay. According to the Plaintiff, nothing prevented the Defendant from filing the additional written statement even while contesting the summary judgment. Further, the Plaintiff argued that the application lacked proper particulars and verification and that if the Court were inclined to condone the delay, it should impose heavy costs to compensate for the inconvenience.
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
The Court undertook a detailed examination of Order VIII Rules 1, 9, and 10 CPC, as amended by the Commercial Courts Act. While Rule 1 contains an express proviso limiting time extension to 120 days—and Rule 10 contains a further prohibition on extending time beyond that—no such restrictive proviso exists for Rule 9, which deals with subsequent pleadings.
The Court emphasised that legislative silence is intentional. When Parliament amended Rules 1 and 10 to introduce strict timelines but left Rule 9 untouched, it indicated that Rule 9 remains flexible. Thus, even in commercial suits, courts retain discretion to permit additional written statements beyond 30 days, provided the circumstances are exceptional.
Drawing parallels with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Order VIII Rule 1 in ordinary suits (before the Commercial Courts Act), the Court observed that where a timeline is prescribed without a strict embargo, it must be treated as directory, not mandatory.
PRECEDENT ANALYSIS
The judgment relies on the following cases:
1. SCG Contracts v. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure
Held that for commercial suits, filing of the first written statement beyond 120 days is impermissible and the right is forfeited.
Relevance here: Used to distinguish Rule 1 (strict) from Rule 9 (flexible), because the Supreme Court did not extend the embargo to Rule 9.
2. Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India
Clarified the scope and object of CPC amendments.
Relevance: Reinforced the principle that procedural timelines can be directory in absence of express prohibition.
3. Olympic Industries v. Mulla Hussainy Bhai
Held that delay alone cannot bar an additional written statement unless prejudice is shown.
Relevance: Direct authority that mere delay is insufficient for rejecting an additional written statement.
4. Shobha Tadas v. Namdeo Tadas
Recognised wide discretion for courts under Rule 9.
Relevance: Affirmed that subsequent pleadings can be allowed if required for justice.
5. Kailash v. Nanhku
Declared Order VIII Rule 1 directory in ordinary suits.
Relevance: The principle of “exceptional circumstances” and avoidance of injustice was applied to Rule 9.
COURT’S REASONING
The Court reasoned that the Applicant had shown “sufficient cause.” Although three weeks were granted earlier, the Defendant was engaged in defending the summary judgment application under Order XIII-A, which was eventually rejected after detailed hearing. The Court acknowledged that the Defendant had substantially assisted the Court in the summary judgment proceedings.
Further, the trial had not begun; issues were unframed; no prejudice would be caused. The Plaintiff themselves had amended the plaint belatedly, which weakened their objection.
The Court stressed that Rule 9 is directory, and in exceptional situations, time can be extended. Here, refusing extension would cause grave injustice because the amended claim enhanced the monetary demand by more than ₹18 lakh. The Defendant deserved an opportunity to contest new allegations.
To balance fairness and deterrence, the Court imposed ₹1,00,000 costs.
CONCLUSION
The Court condoned the 684-day delay, subject to payment of ₹1,00,000 to the Plaintiff within three weeks. The Defendant was permitted to file an additional written statement within three weeks thereafter. The Interim Application was allowed.
IMPLICATIONS
- Order VIII Rule 9 CPC remains directory even in commercial suits. This opens relief for litigants facing genuine difficulties.
- Commercial Courts Act’s strictness applies only to the first written statement (Rule 1), not subsequent pleadings.
- “Delay-alone” rejections are discouraged, especially where trials have not begun.
- Courts retain wide discretionary power to ensure substantive justice outweighs procedural rigidity.
CASES REFERRED
- SCG Contracts – Strict bar on filing written statements beyond 120 days in commercial suits; used to contrast Rule 1 and Rule 9.
- Olympic Industries – Mere delay not a bar; additional written statement cannot be refused if no prejudice is shown.
- Salem Bar Association – CPC amendments must be harmonised to avoid injustice.
- Shobha Tadas – Courts can permit additional written statements liberally in appropriate cases.
- Kailash v. Nanhku – Procedural rules are directory; extensions allowed in exceptional conditions.
FAQs
1. Can courts condone long delays in filing additional written statements in commercial suits?
Yes. The Bombay High Court held that Order VIII Rule 9 CPC remains directory for commercial suits and courts may condone long delays in exceptional circumstances.
2. Is the 30-day limit for filing subsequent pleadings mandatory?
No. Unlike Rule 1, Rule 9 does not contain a statutory prohibition. Courts retain discretion to extend time.
3. Does delay alone justify rejecting an additional written statement?
No. Delay alone is insufficient unless prejudice is shown. Justice must not be sacrificed at the altar of technicalities.
