Bombay High Court Restores Buyers’ Tenancy Revisions; Holds Registered Agreement Holders Who Paid Full Consideration Have Locus to Challenge Section 32-G Land Orders
Bombay High Court Allows Agreement-for-Sale Buyers to Challenge Tenancy Orders; Holds Ownership Decree Not Necessary Where Their Existing Property Interest Is Prejudiced
Facts
The dispute concerned agricultural land bearing old Survey No. 16/4, now Gat No. 219/4, situated at Village Shirdhon, Taluka Panvel, District Raigad. The original landlord was Ganesh Sadashiv Oze. Certain respondents claimed tenancy rights through their predecessor, Gorya Posha Vajekar, who had initiated proceedings under Section 32-G of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. Those proceedings had earlier been postponed because the landlady was a widow.
The petitioners, Naresh Kesarimal Mehta and another, claimed rights in the property on the basis of a registered Agreement for Sale dated 29 May 2007 and related transactional documents. They asserted that the total consideration was ₹1.60 crore, of which ₹80 lakh was paid to Shardabai Ganesh Oze and ₹80 lakh to Wahid Hussain Shaikh as confirming party. They also relied upon a Power of Attorney and had instituted Special Civil Suit No. 329 of 2012 seeking enforcement of their contractual rights.
Meanwhile, on 22 February 2011, the Agricultural Lands Tribunal at Panvel conducted proceedings under Section 32-G and fixed the purchase price in favour of the alleged tenants. That order was upheld by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 24 May 2012.
The petitioners challenged those orders before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, contending that they had a substantial interest in the property and that the tenancy authorities had failed to examine several fundamental issues, including earlier proceedings, revenue entries, the authority of persons acting under Powers of Attorney and whether the alleged tenants were legally entitled to purchase the land.
The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal rejected the petitioners’ challenge, principally questioning their locus because they were not parties to the original tenancy proceedings and had not yet obtained title or a decree for specific performance.
The two writ petitions before the Bombay High Court challenged the relevant MRT, ALT, SDO and connected orders.
Issues
The principal issues were:
- Whether purchasers claiming under a registered Agreement for Sale, who had allegedly paid the entire consideration and instituted a suit for specific performance, possessed sufficient legal interest to challenge orders under Section 32-G of the Tenancy Act.
- Whether they could qualify as “persons aggrieved” despite not being parties to the original tenancy proceedings and despite not yet having acquired ownership.
- Whether a decree for specific performance was a condition precedent to their having locus in the tenancy proceedings.
- Whether Section 64 of the Tenancy Act deprived an agreement holder of locus to challenge Section 32-G orders.
- Whether the ALT and SDO had adequately considered the earlier tenancy proceedings, revenue records, authority of Power-of-Attorney holders, notices and the legal entitlement of the alleged tenants before determining purchase rights and fixing the purchase price.
- Whether the matter required fresh consideration by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal.
The High Court identified the first question as whether the petitioners had sufficient interest in the property to challenge the Section 32-G orders.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioners argued that they had paid the entire consideration under a registered Agreement for Sale and had acquired a substantial contractual interest in the property.
They submitted that the orders recognising tenancy purchase rights in favour of other persons directly prejudiced their rights in the same land. Their lack of perfected title could therefore not deprive them of locus.
They also pointed out that their civil suit for specific performance was pending and that the Civil Court had passed a status quo order concerning the property.
The petitioners further challenged the underlying tenancy proceedings on several grounds. They alleged irregularities regarding the authority of persons acting as Power-of-Attorney holders, revocation of such authority, earlier Section 32-G proceedings, revenue entries and failure to give them an effective opportunity of hearing.
In the connected petition, they also argued that an order under Section 32-G had earlier been stayed and that subsequent proceedings under Section 43 could not validly proceed during such stay.
Their core submission was that their contractual and pecuniary interest in the land made them persons genuinely prejudiced by the tenancy orders, irrespective of whether final title had already vested in them.
Respondent’s Arguments
The respondents argued that an Agreement for Sale does not create ownership or any vested interest in immovable property.
They relied upon Section 64 of the Tenancy Act, which regulates the sale of agricultural land and requires land intended for sale to first be offered in the prescribed manner to tenants in actual possession.
According to them, an agreement holder could not obtain locus merely because consideration had been paid. Until the petitioners obtained a decree for specific performance from the competent Civil Court, they could not be regarded as persons aggrieved by the Section 32-G orders.
The respondents therefore maintained that the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal had correctly declined to entertain the petitioners’ challenge.
Analysis of the Law
The High Court accepted that an Agreement for Sale does not itself make the purchaser the owner and does not confer all proprietary rights.
However, the Court held that ownership was not the correct test for deciding locus. The relevant question was whether the petitioners possessed a legally recognisable interest that was actually or potentially prejudiced by the impugned orders.
The Court emphasized that an agreement holder who has allegedly paid the entire consideration, relies upon a registered transaction and has filed a pending suit for specific performance cannot automatically be treated as a stranger to the property.
If Section 32-G proceedings result in other persons being declared purchasers of the same land, that determination plainly affects the contractual rights asserted by the agreement holders.
Effect of Section 64
The High Court rejected the contention that Section 64 itself deprived the petitioners of standing.
Section 64 governs the manner in which agricultural land may be sold and the consequences of a transaction undertaken contrary to its requirements. But whether the petitioners’ Agreement for Sale was ultimately valid or enforceable was a separate question from whether they were sufficiently prejudiced to challenge tenancy proceedings affecting the same property.
The Court held that Section 64 could not be used to say that persons claiming under a registered Agreement for Sale, who allegedly paid full consideration and had instituted a civil suit, had no interest whatsoever in the property.
Precedent Analysis
Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, (1970) 2 SCC 484
The Supreme Court had explained that a person is generally “aggrieved” where an order operates to his detriment, whether pecuniary or otherwise, or causes him some real prejudice.
The Bombay High Court applied this principle to hold that the focus is on actual prejudice, not formal ownership alone.
Baldev Singh v. Surinder Mohan Sharma, (2003) 1 SCC 34
This decision was relied upon for the proposition that a person aggrieved is one whose right is affected by the order sought to be challenged.
The High Court clarified that this does not mean that only an absolute owner can challenge an order concerning property. What matters is the nature of the asserted right and the effect of the impugned order upon it.
A. Subash Babu v. State of A.P., (2011) 7 SCC 616
The Supreme Court had described the expression “aggrieved person” as elastic and incapable of rigid definition. Its content depends upon the statutory context, the nature and extent of the person’s interest and the prejudice suffered.
The High Court applied this broader approach while examining the petitioners’ registered agreement, consideration paid, pending civil suit and the direct impact of the tenancy proceedings on the same property.
Smt. Jatan Kumar Golcha v. Golcha Properties Pvt. Ltd., (1970) 3 SCC 573
The Court also referred to the principle that even a person who was not a party to the original proceedings may, in an appropriate case, challenge an order where that person’s interest is prejudicially affected.
The combined effect of these authorities was that locus depends upon substantive prejudice, not merely formal status as owner or original party.
Court’s Reasoning
The High Court found that the registered Agreement for Sale, alleged payment of the full consideration, Power of Attorney, pending civil suit and existing status quo order, when considered together, established an existing and substantial interest of the petitioners in the property.
The Section 32-G orders concerning the same land were capable of prejudicing that interest. The petitioners therefore had locus to challenge those orders.
The Court then examined the quality of the underlying tenancy adjudication and found that substantial questions had not been properly addressed. These included:
- earlier Section 32-G proceedings;
- relevant revenue entries;
- the authority of persons representing the concerned parties;
- alleged revocation of Powers of Attorney;
- notices issued during the proceedings; and
- the legal entitlement of the persons claiming statutory purchase rights.
The High Court stressed that the mere filing of a Section 32-G application does not itself establish entitlement to purchase the land. The tenancy authority must first determine the claimant’s legal entitlement and only thereafter proceed in accordance with law.
The Court accordingly found that the ALT and SDO orders could not stand without proper consideration of these material questions.
Importantly, however, the High Court expressly refrained from deciding whether the petitioners were the owners, whether the Agreement for Sale was legally enforceable or whether they were entitled to specific performance. Those questions were left entirely open for determination by the Civil Court.
Conclusion
The Bombay High Court allowed both writ petitions.
It quashed the impugned orders dated 29 March 2016 and 7 March 2017 passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and consequently set aside the relevant orders of the ALT, Panvel and the Sub-Divisional Officer.
Revision Application Nos. 147 and 223 of 2014 were restored to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal for fresh consideration after providing an effective hearing to the petitioners and all necessary parties.
The Tribunal was directed to endeavour to decide the restored revisions within six months, with all merits kept open except the High Court’s finding that the petitioners possessed locus to challenge the tenancy orders.
The Court clarified that it had not adjudicated title, validity or enforceability of the Agreement for Sale, or the petitioners’ entitlement to specific performance. Both writ petitions were disposed of with no order as to costs.
Case Details
Case: Naresh Kesarimal Mehta & Anr. v. Shardabai Ganesh Oze (Since Deceased Through LRs.) & Ors.
Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Case Number: Writ Petition No. 12947 of 2016 with Writ Petition No. 6409 of 2018
Judge: Justice Amit Borkar
Date: 31 August 2026
Result: Both writ petitions allowed; MRT, ALT and SDO orders set aside; Revision Application Nos. 147 and 223 of 2014 restored to MRT for fresh adjudication; petitioners held to have locus; title and specific-performance issues left open.
