Court’s Decision
The Bombay High Court, per Justice Ashwin D. Bhobe (with Justice Ravindra V. Ghuge concurring), dismissed a writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging disciplinary proceedings initiated against a medical officer employed with the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL).
The petitioner had sought to quash the Memorandum of Charges (14 December 2024), Inquiry Report (14 July 2025), and Notice (31 July 2025) issued by the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) constituted under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act).
The Court held that the constitution of the ICC was lawful and that none of the petitioner’s objections — including the Presiding Officer’s rank, absence of NGO representation, or alleged bias — had any legal merit. The Bench observed:
“There is no ambiguity in Section 4(2)(a) of the POSH Act. The Presiding Officer need not be senior to the delinquent officer; she must be a woman employed at a senior level at the workplace.”
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the validity of the ICC’s inquiry and affirming the right of the disciplinary authority to proceed under NPCIL’s internal rules.
Facts
The petitioner, a medical officer at NPCIL’s Tarapur site since 2005, faced a complaint of sexual harassment filed on 27 July 2024 by a scientific officer on behalf of his daughter (the aggrieved woman). The allegations, arising out of a medical examination, were investigated by an ICC constituted on 29 July 2024.
The ICC included six members, headed by Dr. Sugnya Sachin Patil as Presiding Officer, with representatives from HR, legal, and medical departments. After recording statements from the complainant, her parents, and several witnesses, the ICC submitted an Inquiry Report (14 July 2025) holding the charges proved.
Subsequently, NPCIL issued a notice on 31 July 2025 to the petitioner to submit his response before the Disciplinary Authority. Instead of replying, the petitioner approached the High Court seeking quashing of the proceedings on grounds of illegal constitution of the ICC and violation of natural justice.
Issues
- Whether the ICC’s constitution violated Section 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(c) of the POSH Act due to the Presiding Officer not being senior to the accused and the alleged absence of an external NGO member.
- Whether the ICC’s initial “preliminary report” exonerating the petitioner invalidated the later “final report.”
- Whether belated objections to the ICC’s constitution could be entertained after full participation in the inquiry.
- Whether the petitioner should have availed of the statutory appellate remedy under Section 18 of the POSH Act.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner, represented by counsel Dr. Uday Warunjikar, argued that the ICC’s constitution was contrary to law. He contended that the Presiding Officer was not senior in rank, violating Section 4(2)(a) of the POSH Act and the DoPT Office Memorandum dated 21 December 2022, which allegedly required an inquiry officer to be senior to the charged officer.
He further claimed that the external member, Dr. Jeeva Philip, was ineligible as she had a consultancy agreement with NPCIL and was therefore not an “independent person” as required by Section 4(2)(c). He also alleged bias, arguing that another member, Smt. Kalpana Devi, resided in the same building as the complainant’s father.
Additionally, he asserted that the ICC’s preliminary report (4 October 2024) had found “insufficient evidence,” and therefore, the final report (3 December 2024) finding him guilty was illegal. He relied on Punjab & Sind Bank v. Durgesh Kuwar (2020) and Dr. A. Manimekalan v. Registrar, Bharathiar University (Madras High Court, 2023) to contend that inquiries conducted by improperly constituted committees were void ab initio.
Respondent’s Arguments
NPCIL, represented by Mr. Vishal Talsania, countered that the petitioner had participated in the inquiry for nine months without objection and raised these allegations only after receiving an adverse finding, amounting to waiver and abuse of process.
It was argued that Section 4(2)(a) only required the Presiding Officer to be “a woman employed at a senior level,” not necessarily senior to the delinquent officer, as clarified by the DoPT Office Memorandum dated 9 September 2016, which remained applicable to POSH inquiries. The OM cited the Allahabad High Court ruling in Smt. Shobha Goswami v. State of U.P. (2015), holding that “seniority in rank to the accused” is not mandatory.
NPCIL also maintained that Dr. Jeeva Philip was not an employee but a visiting consultant, fulfilling the criteria under Section 4(2)(c). The allegation of bias against Smt. Kalpana Devi was speculative, unsupported by any proof. Finally, NPCIL argued that the petitioner could challenge the findings only through the statutory appeal mechanism under Section 18 of the POSH Act, not directly before the High Court.
Analysis of the Law
The Court analysed Sections 4, 11, and 18 of the POSH Act, the DoPT Office Memoranda (dated 9 September 2016 and 21 December 2022), and relevant judicial precedents. It applied the literal rule of interpretation, citing Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of U.P. (1973) 1 SCC 216 and B. Premanand v. Mohan Koikal (2011) 4 SCC 266, holding that courts must interpret statutes according to plain meaning unless ambiguity exists.
It held that Section 4(2)(a) required only that the Presiding Officer be “a woman employed at a senior level,” and did not require her to be senior to the accused officer. The legislative intent was clear from the text, and the petitioner’s argument effectively sought to rewrite the law.
The Court also clarified that the 2016 DoPT memorandum—which explicitly allows a junior Presiding Officer—prevails over the 2022 memorandum, which governs general disciplinary inquiries, not POSH proceedings.
Precedent Analysis
- Smt. Shobha Goswami v. State of U.P. (Allahabad HC, 2015) – Held that the Presiding Officer under Section 4(2)(a) need not be senior to the accused; “senior level” refers to grade or position, not comparative rank.
- G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow (1976) 3 SCC 585 – Established that a participant who does not object during inquiry cannot later challenge the committee’s composition on grounds of bias.
- P.D. Dinakaran v. Judges Inquiry Committee (2011) 8 SCC 380 – Held that belated objections against the composition of an inquiry body amount to tactics to delay proceedings.
- Madanlal v. State of J&K (1995) 3 SCC 486 – Reinforced that a party cannot challenge procedure after participation without protest.
- ABP Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2014) 3 SCC 327 – Participation without protest estops later challenge to the body’s composition.
- Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727 – Clarified that employees must be given opportunity to respond to the inquiry report before penalty is imposed.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court found the ICC constitution valid under the POSH Act and NPCIL rules. It held:
- The Presiding Officer met the “senior level” requirement; comparative seniority was irrelevant.
- The external member, Dr. Jeeva Philip, was qualified as an independent professional and not an employee.
- Allegations of bias were unsubstantiated.
- The petitioner’s participation without protest amounted to waiver and estoppel, following G. Sarana and Madanlal.
- The petitioner had an alternative statutory remedy under Section 18, which he failed to exhaust.
Justice Bhobe also rejected the contention that the preliminary report exonerated the petitioner, noting that it merely found “insufficient evidence” but recommended further action based on “preponderance of probability.”
The Bench reiterated:
“Participation without demur gives an impression of waiver of objection. Having received an unfavourable report, the petitioner cannot now question the ICC’s constitution.”
Conclusion
The High Court held that the ICC was lawfully constituted, the inquiry conducted in compliance with POSH Act provisions and NPCIL rules, and the petitioner’s belated challenge was untenable.
The Court dismissed the writ petition, discharged the rule, and upheld NPCIL’s authority to proceed with disciplinary action after allowing the petitioner to submit his representation.
“The right to defend includes the right to reply to the inquiry report, not to stall proceedings through belated technical objections.”
Implications
This judgment sets an important precedent on interpretation of Section 4(2)(a) of the POSH Act, affirming that:
- The Presiding Officer need not be senior to the accused, merely at a senior level.
- Delay in objecting to ICC composition amounts to waiver.
- DoPT 2016 guidelines continue to govern POSH inquiries in government and PSU workplaces.
- Judicial review will not interfere mid-inquiry when statutory remedies exist under Section 18.
It strengthens the enforceability of Internal Complaints Committees across public sector institutions and protects the integrity of workplace sexual harassment mechanisms.
