Court’s Decision
The Calcutta High Court dismissed an application under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking a judgment on admission in a suit for eviction, recovery of possession, and mesne profits. The Court held that the defendant’s plea of adverse possession, though lacking particulars, raised triable issues that went to the root of the case. It ruled that in the absence of a clear, unambiguous, and unconditional admission, the discretion to pass a judgment on admission could not be exercised.
Facts
The plaintiff filed a civil suit for eviction and possession of premises occupied by the defendants, asserting that they were illegal occupants with no jural relationship with the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were trespassers and had failed to vacate the premises despite several notices.
The defendants filed a written statement denying the plaintiff’s title and asserting ownership by adverse possession. While they admitted there was no jural relationship, they simultaneously claimed possessory rights, having allegedly perfected title through continuous and hostile occupation.
The plaintiff thereafter filed an interlocutory application seeking judgment on admission, arguing that the defendants’ own pleadings admitted the lack of any legal relationship and that they had no right to remain in possession.
Issues
- Whether the plea of adverse possession raised by the defendants constitutes a triable issue sufficient to defeat an application under Order XII Rule 6.
- Whether the absence of specific particulars supporting adverse possession could render the plea an evasive denial amounting to an admission.
- Whether documents not filed with the plaint or the defence (such as a letter allegedly admitting tenancy) can be relied upon at this stage to establish an admission.
- Whether the Court should exercise discretion to pass judgment on admission in a case where title is contested.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The plaintiff contended that there was no legal or contractual relationship between the parties. The defendants were in unauthorised occupation and had not produced any document to support their claim of title or right of possession. It was argued that the defence of adverse possession was vague and lacked the necessary factual basis, and therefore should be treated as a mere evasive denial rather than a legitimate defence.
The plaintiff relied heavily on a letter dated 15 November 2019, allegedly written by the first defendant, requesting the plaintiff to allow him to remain in possession as a tenant till his death on payment of rent. This letter, according to the plaintiff, was a clear admission that defeated the plea of adverse possession. The plaintiff argued that under Order XII Rule 6(1), admissions could be derived from “pleadings or otherwise” and that this letter fell within the scope of “otherwise.”
The plaintiff relied on the Supreme Court decisions in:
- Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan (2009) 16 SCC 517, and
- Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India (2004) 10 SCC 779,
to argue that a mere claim of adverse possession was insufficient unless backed by specific, cogent facts indicating uninterrupted, hostile possession.
Respondent’s Arguments
The defendants contended that they had denied the plaintiff’s title and claimed possession by way of adverse possession, which was a mixed question of law and fact that required adjudication at trial. The defendants argued that there was no admission in the written statement that would entitle the plaintiff to a decree at the interlocutory stage.
They further argued that the letter dated 15 November 2019 relied upon by the plaintiff was not part of the pleadings or the list of documents filed along with the plaint, and therefore could not be looked into for the purpose of determining whether there was an admission.
It was also contended that the matter involved contested claims regarding title, possession, and long-standing occupation, and therefore deserved to go to trial.
Analysis of the Law
The Court extensively analysed the scope of Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, which allows courts to pass a judgment on admissions “either in the pleadings or otherwise.” The Court cited multiple Supreme Court decisions including:
- Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India (2000) 7 SCC 120: which clarified that admissions must be clear, unambiguous, and unqualified. It also elaborated on the meaning of “or otherwise” to include admissions outside pleadings but emphasised that even such admissions must meet the threshold of certainty.
- Karam Kapahi v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust (2010) 4 SCC 753: where the scope and purpose of Order XII Rule 6 were further defined, and it was held that the rule enables, but does not mandate, courts to pronounce judgments when admissions are clear.
- Himani Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd. (2011) 15 SCC 273: reinforcing that judgment on admission should not be granted unless the admission is categorical and conscious.
- S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj (2015) 9 SCC 287: where the Court held that in cases involving complex questions of law and fact, the discretion to pass a judgment on admission should not be exercised.
Applying these principles, the Court concluded that in the present case the defendants had contested the plaintiff’s title and claimed adverse possession—a defence that required full-fledged adjudication and could not be brushed aside. While the Court noted that the written statement lacked detailed particulars required to establish adverse possession, it held that this omission could not be equated to an admission.
The Court also refused to consider the letter dated 15 November 2019, since it was not part of the documents filed with the plaint or defence and thus was inadmissible at this stage.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court held that the central issue in the suit was not merely absence of jural relationship but a contested claim to ownership and possession. It observed:
“Mere absence of jural relationship is not enough to pass the decree… When a rival title is pleaded, the same should be adjudicated upon before passing any decree.”
It further held:
“Absence of particulars [of adverse possession] cannot be construed as admission; it does not come within the ambit of the phrase ‘or otherwise.’”
The Court was cautious in exercising discretion under Order XII Rule 6 and concluded that doing so in a case involving rival claims to title would be inappropriate.
Conclusion
The Court dismissed the application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC and refused to pass a decree on admission. It directed the suit to proceed to trial and fixed a date for framing of issues. All pre-trial procedures, including discovery and affidavit of denial, were ordered to be completed in the interim.
Implications
This judgment serves as an important reaffirmation that a plea of adverse possession, even if not thoroughly articulated, is sufficient to defeat a summary judgment application. It underscores the judiciary’s caution in granting judgments on admission in suits involving serious disputes about title, possession, or proprietary rights. The ruling preserves the sanctity of a full trial in cases where factual and legal complexities exist and rejects over-reliance on procedural shortcuts.
FAQs
Q1. Can a judgment on admission be granted if the defendant claims adverse possession?
No. A plea of adverse possession raises factual disputes that must be adjudicated through a full trial, even if particulars are lacking.
Q2. Can the court rely on documents not filed with the plaint or written statement to find an admission?
No. The Court cannot consider documents that are extraneous to the suit or not part of the record when deciding a summary judgment on admission.
Q3. What are the key criteria for passing a judgment under Order XII Rule 6 CPC?
There must be a clear, unambiguous, and unconditional admission of fact. If the case involves contested rights or legal defences like adverse possession, the Court will not exercise discretion under this provision.
