Court’s Decision
The Calcutta High Court declined to grant interim relief to a charitable foundation seeking protection of possession over a school property from which it was allegedly dispossessed by force. The Court held that interim injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 cannot be granted when the plaintiff is unable to prove lawful possession or a settled right. The Court emphasized that “interim protection is available to a party only when such party is in settled possession, and such possession is lawful or capable of legal protection.”
Facts
The plaintiff, a charitable foundation, approached the High Court under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking interim protection against alleged dispossession from a school premises. The plaintiff claimed that it had been managing and operating the school on the basis of a collaboration and lease agreement executed with the defendant society. However, the plaintiff alleged that despite the subsistence of the lease, it was forcibly dispossessed by the defendants without any legal recourse or arbitration being invoked.
The defendants denied the validity of the plaintiff’s claim and asserted that the plaintiff had no lawful possession and that the school was being run under their management as the true owners of the property. The plaintiff argued that the lease agreement and subsequent conduct established its legal and settled possession which had been wrongfully disturbed without due process of law.
Issues
- Whether the plaintiff was in settled and lawful possession of the school premises on the date of the alleged dispossession.
- Whether an interim injunction could be granted under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 or Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in the absence of lawful possession.
- Whether the lease agreement and correspondence between the parties constituted an enforceable right warranting interim protection.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioner contended that it had entered into a collaboration with the defendants and was in possession of the school premises pursuant to a valid lease agreement. It submitted that it had been conducting educational activities and managing the school, which amounted to settled possession. It argued that the alleged forcible dispossession without due process was illegal and in breach of the agreement. Relying on the lease document and related correspondence, the petitioner urged the court to grant interim protection by restraining the defendants from interfering with its possession pending the outcome of arbitration proceedings. The petitioner emphasized that irreparable injury would be caused if the status quo was not restored.
Respondent’s Arguments
The respondents denied the existence of any enforceable lease and contended that the petitioner was never in lawful possession of the premises. They asserted that the petitioner was at best a facilitator for certain operations, but had no ownership, tenancy, or settled rights over the property. They further argued that the school was being managed by the society as its rightful owner and that the petitioner’s presence on the property was not protected by any valid legal right. The respondents maintained that no interim protection could be granted under law to a party who was never in lawful possession and whose rights were disputed.
Analysis of the Law
The Court examined the scope of interim injunctions under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC and Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It reiterated the principle that interim protection can only be granted to a party who is either in settled possession or has a legally recognized interest in the property.
The Court emphasized that mere physical possession, especially when disputed and unaccompanied by legal rights, does not entitle a party to interim relief. It observed that:
“Possession must be lawful, peaceful and established by legal documents or conduct that creates enforceable rights.”
Referring to precedents, the Court drew a distinction between mere trespassers and persons in settled possession under a legitimate claim. In the present case, the Court found that the plaintiff’s reliance on the lease agreement and other documents did not conclusively establish lawful possession or any statutory or contractual right that could warrant interim protection.
Precedent Analysis
Several binding precedents were cited and relied upon by the Court:
- Krishna Ram Mahale v. Shobha Venkat Rao (1989): Recognized that even a person in possession without title is entitled to protection against forcible dispossession. However, this protection is conditional upon proving peaceful and settled possession.
- K.K. Verma v. Union of India (1954): Laid down that only lawful possession is entitled to interim protection under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2.
- Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) 3 SCC 1: Emphasized that legal enforceability of rights is a prerequisite for interim orders.
In applying these principles, the Court distinguished the present case by pointing out that the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove lawful or peaceful settled possession.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court noted that the plaintiff’s claim of lease and operational control was unsupported by adequate documentary evidence. The letter and collaboration agreement relied upon by the plaintiff were not conclusive proof of lease or tenancy. The Court observed:
“Where a person claims interim protection, he must show more than physical presence; he must demonstrate an enforceable right or settled possession under law.”
Since the petitioner failed to show any registered lease, valid tenancy, or statutory right over the property, the Court held that the petitioner’s possession was neither lawful nor capable of protection. It concluded that the matter involved disputed facts which could only be adjudicated in arbitration or trial, and interim relief could not be granted at this stage.
Conclusion
The Court dismissed the application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and declined to grant interim protection or restoration of possession. It ruled that the petitioner had failed to make out a prima facie case of settled and lawful possession, and therefore, was not entitled to relief under Order 39 or Section 9. The matter was left open to be resolved through arbitration or appropriate proceedings.
Implications
This ruling underscores the legal threshold for obtaining interim injunctions in possession-related disputes. Mere physical occupation without lawful entitlement or settled possession is insufficient. The judgment clarifies that courts will not grant interim protection unless the applicant establishes a clear legal or contractual right deserving of protection. Charitable organizations or other entities must ensure that their occupancy and operational claims are backed by legally enforceable documentation to avoid rejection at the interim stage.
Judgments Cited and Their Relevance
- Krishna Ram Mahale v. Shobha Venkat Rao: Cited for the principle that unlawful dispossession is impermissible, but distinguishable as the petitioner here lacked settled possession.
- K.K. Verma v. Union of India: Reinforced that only lawful possession merits interim protection.
- Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar: Emphasized the importance of legal enforceability when seeking judicial remedies.
These decisions helped the Court frame its approach on the necessity of legal entitlement in claims for interim protection.
FAQs
Q1. Can a person get interim protection without having legal title to the property?
Not necessarily. The Court will require proof of lawful, peaceful, and settled possession or a legally enforceable right before granting protection.
Q2. Is physical possession alone enough to claim interim injunction?
No. Courts require more than mere possession; the applicant must show legal right, tenancy, or contract to justify protection.
Q3. What if possession was peaceful but not legally documented?
Even in such cases, unless the possession is long-standing and undisputed, interim relief may not be granted without concrete proof of enforceable rights.
