Court Clerk Accused of Taking ₹500 for Issuing a Warrant Acquitted by Bombay High Court After Serious Contradictions Emerged in the Prosecution’s Case
Bench Clerk Allegedly Took ₹500 to Issue a Warrant; Bombay High Court Finds Contradictory Trap Evidence and Grants Acquittal
Facts
The appeal was filed by Shailendra Manikrao Bakare, who was working as a Bench Clerk in the Court of a Judicial Magistrate First Class at Pune.
He challenged a judgment dated 19 August 2003 passed by the Special Judge, Pune, in Special Case No. 16 of 1998.
The Special Judge had convicted him under:
- Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; and
- Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act.
He was sentenced to one year’s rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹2,000 on each count.
The prosecution case arose from a private criminal complaint filed by Dr. Hemant Chikhalikar against certain persons for alleged defamation.
When the accused persons in that complaint failed to appear, the Magistrate directed issuance of a bailable warrant.
Dr. Chikhalikar approached the appellant, who was the Bench Clerk attached to that court, for processing the warrant.
According to the complainant, he deposited the process fee on 20 September 1997 and requested the appellant to take the necessary steps.
The appellant allegedly called him again on 22 September 1997.
The complainant claimed that when he approached the appellant on 26 September 1997 at about 2:30 p.m., the appellant demanded ₹500 for issuing the warrant.
The appellant allegedly asked him to return with the money at 5:00 p.m.
The complainant then approached the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Pune, and lodged a complaint.
Two panch witnesses were called.
Anthracene powder was applied to five currency notes of ₹100 each.
The complainant was instructed to hand over the amount only if the appellant repeated the demand.
At about 4:30 p.m., the trap party proceeded to the court premises.
The complainant and the shadow panch approached the appellant.
According to the prosecution, the appellant took out the concerned file, stated that the warrant would be issued on Monday and asked the complainant to fulfil his demand.
The complainant then handed over the tainted notes.
The appellant allegedly accepted the notes and kept them in the left pocket of his shirt.
The raiding team entered after receiving the predetermined signal.
The tainted notes were recovered from the appellant’s shirt pocket.
Bluish fluorescence was allegedly noticed on the notes, the fingers of his right hand and the shirt pocket under ultraviolet light.
The appellant was arrested and prosecuted.
During trial, the prosecution examined:
- Dr. Hemant Chikhalikar, the complainant;
- Rajendra Dabhade, the panch witness;
- Tulshidas Pawar, the investigating officer.
The appellant examined Madhukar Bakare as a defence witness.
The defence witness claimed that the complainant had become agitated over the delay in issuance of the warrant and had forcibly thrust currency notes into the appellant’s shirt pocket while the appellant was putting the file back in the cupboard.
The Special Judge rejected the defence and convicted the appellant.
The appellant then approached the Bombay High Court.
Issues
The High Court considered:
- Whether the prosecution proved a prior demand of illegal gratification.
- Whether the demand was independently verified before the trap.
- Whether the complainant’s version about the timing of the demand and complaint was believable.
- Whether the evidence of the complainant and shadow panch was consistent on the crucial conversation at the time of the trap.
- Whether recovery of tainted currency notes by itself proved voluntary acceptance of a bribe.
- Whether the statutory presumption under Section 20 could be invoked without proof of foundational facts.
- Whether the defence that the notes were thrust into the appellant’s pocket was reasonably probable.
- Whether the conviction was based on reliable legal evidence or on assumptions and conjecture.
Appellant’s Arguments
The appellant argued that the prosecution case contained serious and irreconcilable inconsistencies.
His counsel submitted that the complainant claimed the first demand was made at 2:30 p.m. on 26 September 1997.
However, the investigating officer admitted in cross-examination that the complainant had reached the ACB office between 10:00 and 10:30 a.m. on the same day.
Therefore, the complaint appeared to have been lodged several hours before the alleged demand.
The appellant argued that this contradiction struck at the root of the prosecution case.
He further submitted that the investigating officer admitted that no independent verification of demand was conducted before the trap.
Demand being an essential ingredient under Section 7, its absence made the prosecution unsustainable.
The appellant also pointed to contradictions between the complainant and the panch witness regarding the conversation at the time of the alleged acceptance.
According to the complainant, the appellant merely said that the work would be done on Monday and asked the complainant to do his work.
According to the panch witness, the appellant expressly stated that the warrant would be prepared only if the previously demanded amount was paid.
The appellant argued that these were materially different versions on the central issue of demand.
He further contended that:
- Mere recovery of tainted notes was insufficient;
- The prosecution had to prove voluntary acceptance pursuant to a demand;
- The trap was conducted in suspicious haste;
- The entire complaint, summoning of panch witnesses, verification and pre-trap formalities were allegedly completed within less than two hours;
- The defence witness consistently stated that the money was forcibly inserted into the appellant’s pocket;
- The appellant had immediately denied accepting any money when apprehended.
He therefore sought acquittal.
State’s Arguments
The State supported the conviction.
It argued that the evidence of the complainant, panch witness and investigating officer collectively established:
- Demand;
- Acceptance;
- Recovery.
The prosecution submitted that minor discrepancies regarding time should not destroy an otherwise credible trap case.
It relied upon the recovery of the tainted notes from the appellant’s pocket and the anthracene traces found on his fingers and clothing.
The State argued that the defence of thrusting was an afterthought and that the Special Judge had rightly rejected it.
It therefore sought dismissal of the appeal.
Analysis of the Law
Demand Is an Essential Ingredient
The High Court reiterated that proof of demand is indispensable for an offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
The prosecution must establish that the public servant demanded illegal gratification.
Recovery of money does not, by itself, establish that it was accepted as a bribe.
The prosecution must ordinarily prove the complete chain:
- Demand;
- Voluntary acceptance;
- Recovery.
If the initial demand is not proved, the remaining two elements cannot independently sustain the conviction.
Serious Contradiction About Timing
The complainant claimed that the bribe was first demanded at 2:30 p.m. on 26 September 1997.
He claimed that he thereafter immediately went to the ACB office.
However, the investigating officer admitted that the complainant had arrived at the ACB office between 10:00 and 10:30 a.m.
The Court held that this was not a minor discrepancy.
If the complainant was already at the ACB office in the morning, there could not have been a first demand at 2:30 p.m. later that day.
Conversely, if the demand was made at 2:30 p.m., the prosecution’s claimed timeline for completing all formalities before leaving for the trap at 4:30 p.m. became highly improbable.
The Court found it difficult to accept that within less than two hours:
- The complaint was written;
- Public servants were requisitioned as panch witnesses;
- They reached the ACB office;
- The complaint was explained and verified;
- Anthracene treatment was completed;
- Instructions were issued;
- The pre-trap panchnama was prepared;
- The team departed for the court.
The panch witness claimed to have reached the ACB office at 3:00 p.m., further reducing the available time.
The Court concluded that the investigating officer’s admission about the morning visit appeared more probable.
But at that time, even according to the complainant, no demand had been made.
No Independent Verification of Demand
The investigating officer expressly admitted that he had not verified the demand before arranging the trap.
The Court held that this omission substantially weakened the prosecution case.
Although lack of prior verification may not always be fatal, it assumed decisive importance because the complainant’s version was already doubtful and contradicted by the investigating officer.
There was therefore no reliable independent evidence of the alleged initial demand.
Contradictory Trap Conversation
The complainant and the panch witness gave materially different accounts of what the appellant said at the time of the trap.
The complainant’s version did not clearly establish a repeated demand.
The panch witness gave a more specific version linking preparation of the warrant with payment.
The Court held that this variance concerned the core ingredient of the offence and could not be dismissed as a natural or minor inconsistency.
Given the earlier contradiction regarding the complaint’s timing, it was unsafe to rely on these divergent versions.
Mere Recovery Was Insufficient
The Court accepted that:
- The appellant was a public servant;
- He was present at the spot;
- Tainted notes were recovered from his shirt pocket.
However, these facts did not conclusively prove bribery.
The Court reiterated that tainted currency passing into the accused’s possession does not automatically establish voluntary acceptance pursuant to an unlawful demand.
The prosecution still had to prove why and under what circumstances the money came into the accused’s possession.
Without reliable proof of demand, recovery alone was legally inadequate.
Section 20 Presumption Was Not Automatic
The Court held that the presumption under Section 20 arises only after foundational facts are proved.
The prosecution must first establish demand and acceptance.
Only then does the accused bear the evidentiary burden of explaining possession of the money.
Because demand was not proved, the statutory presumption could not be invoked against the appellant.
The Court also observed that the accused’s explanation only had to satisfy the standard of preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Defence of Thrusting Was Probable
The defence witness stated that the complainant forcibly inserted the notes into the appellant’s shirt pocket while the appellant was returning the file to the cupboard.
The High Court found that this testimony was not shaken in cross-examination.
Nothing significant was elicited to discredit the witness.
The investigating officer also admitted that immediately after being apprehended, the appellant denied accepting money or committing any wrongdoing.
This contemporaneous explanation supported the defence version.
The Court therefore found that the defence was reasonably probable.
Precedent Analysis
State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede
The Supreme Court held that demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non for corruption offences.
Before Section 20 can operate, the prosecution must establish foundational facts.
The accused’s explanation is tested on preponderance of probabilities.
The Bombay High Court applied this principle and held that the prosecution had failed at the foundational stage.
P. Somaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh
The Supreme Court reiterated that the statutory presumption under Section 20 is not automatic.
It arises only after proof of demand and acceptance.
Mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute an offence under Section 7 unless the prosecution proves voluntary acceptance knowing the amount to be a bribe.
The High Court treated this as directly applicable.
Rajesh Gupta v. State Through CBI
This case reaffirmed that demand is indispensable and that proof of acceptance follows only after proof of demand.
The judgment also stressed the need for independent corroboration where the prosecution relies heavily on an interested complainant.
The contradictions in the present matter made such corroboration especially necessary.
Panna Damodar Rathi v. State of Maharashtra and Ayyasami v. State of Tamil Nadu
These precedents were relied upon for the principle that the complainant’s testimony, being that of an interested witness, should not ordinarily be accepted without dependable independent corroboration.
The High Court found that the panch witness did not provide consistent corroboration on the alleged demand.
Union of India v. Purnandu Biswas, T. Subramanian v. State of Tamil Nadu and Om Prakash v. State of Haryana
These decisions support the rule that Section 20 cannot be invoked where demand has not been proved.
The Court relied on this line of authority to reject the prosecution’s attempt to rely on recovery and possession alone.
Court’s Reasoning
The High Court held that the trial court had failed to properly assess the contradictions and improbabilities in the prosecution case.
The trial court attempted to explain the complainant’s morning visit to the ACB office by suggesting that he may have suspected that the appellant expected gratification and had gone there only for advice.
The High Court held that this was a speculative explanation unsupported by evidence.
The trial court also brushed aside the contradictions between the complainant and panch witness as natural.
The High Court found that approach legally unsustainable because the contradiction related to the very demand of bribe.
The Court concluded that:
- The complaint timing was irreconcilable with the alleged first demand;
- The pre-trap sequence appeared improbable;
- No verification of demand was conducted;
- The complainant and panch witness contradicted each other;
- Recovery alone did not prove bribery;
- The defence of thrusting was reasonably probable;
- Section 20 could not be invoked.
The conviction was therefore held to be based on assumptions, surmises and conjectures rather than reliable legal evidence.
Conclusion
The Bombay High Court allowed the criminal appeal.
It set aside the judgment dated 19 August 2003 passed by the Special Judge, Pune.
Shailendra Manikrao Bakare was acquitted of offences under:
- Section 7; and
- Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2)
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
The Court directed that:
- The fine deposited by the appellant be refunded;
- His bail bond be cancelled;
- The surety be discharged;
- The record and proceedings be returned to the Special Court.
The judgment reinforces that even where tainted money is recovered from a public servant, conviction cannot follow unless the prosecution proves a clear and reliable demand and voluntary acceptance of illegal gratification.
Key Takeaways
- Demand is the foundational requirement in a bribery case.
- Mere recovery of tainted notes does not prove illegal gratification.
- Section 20 presumption arises only after demand and acceptance are proved.
- A major contradiction regarding when the complaint was filed may destroy the prosecution’s chronology.
- Failure to independently verify demand becomes significant where the complainant’s testimony is doubtful.
- Contradictions between the complainant and shadow panch on the actual demand cannot be treated casually.
- The accused’s immediate explanation is relevant.
- Defence evidence carries the same evidentiary value as prosecution evidence.
- The accused need only establish a probable defence, not prove it beyond reasonable doubt.
- Courts cannot sustain corruption convictions on conjecture merely because tainted currency was recovered.
Case Details
Case: Shailendra Manikrao Bakare v. State of Maharashtra
Court: Bombay High Court
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 1115 of 2003
Trial Case: Special Case No. 16 of 1998 arising from CR No. 333 of 1997, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Pune
Judge: Justice N. J. Jamadar
Reserved On: 9 July 2026
Date: 23 July 2026
Result: Appeal allowed. Conviction and sentence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act were set aside. The appellant was acquitted, and the deposited fine was directed to be refunded
