Court’s decision
The Delhi High Court dismissed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging a trial court order that refused permission to add two additional witnesses in a pending trademark suit.
Justice Tejas Karia held that while Order XVI Rule 1A of the Code of Civil Procedure permits production of witnesses without summons, it remains subject to Order XVI Rule 1(3). A party must demonstrate sufficient cause for omission from the earlier witness list. In the absence of documentary proof supporting the explanation offered, no interference was warranted .
Facts
The petitioner instituted a commercial suit alleging infringement of its trademark “Clariwash” against the respondents, claiming unauthorized manufacture and sale of face wash products under the same mark.
Issues were framed on 04.02.2025, and the petitioner initially filed a list of witnesses naming only its sole proprietor as PW-1. Subsequently, the trial court allowed addition of three further witnesses under Order XVI Rule 1.
Thereafter, the petitioner sought to add two more witnesses—proprietors of third-party establishments—through a fresh application under Order XVI Rule 1 read with Sections 30 and 151 CPC. The trial court dismissed this “Subject Application” by order dated 21.11.2025, leading to the present petition.
Issues
The High Court examined:
- Whether Order XVI Rule 1A CPC permits production of witnesses without prior court approval.
- Whether the petitioner had shown sufficient cause for omission of the additional witnesses from earlier lists.
- Whether the trial court’s refusal suffered from jurisdictional error warranting supervisory interference under Article 227.
Petitioner’s arguments
The petitioner argued that Order XVI Rule 1A CPC allows a party to produce its own witnesses without seeking summons or prior permission, provided court assistance is not required.
Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court’s decision in Mange Ram v. Brij Mohan (1983), which clarified that filing of witness lists primarily applies where court summons is sought.
The petitioner contended that evidence was still ongoing and had not been formally closed. It further submitted that one proposed witness had earlier been medically unfit to depose, while the other resided out of station and was unavailable due to work commitments.
Respondent’s arguments
The respondent contended that the suit was among the oldest pending matters before the trial court and that repeated applications for adding witnesses reflected dilatory tactics.
It was argued that no medical documents were placed on record to substantiate claims of ill health. Moreover, names of the proposed witnesses could have been included earlier even if their availability was uncertain.
Analysis of the law
The High Court reproduced Order XVI Rule 1 and Rule 1A CPC and undertook a detailed examination of the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Mange Ram v. Brij Mohan.
The Court clarified that Rule 1A operates in a distinct sphere but remains subject to Rule 1(3). Where omission from the witness list occurs, the party must demonstrate sufficient cause for such omission if later seeking the court’s intervention.
The supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is limited to correcting jurisdictional errors, perversity, or patent illegality—not to reappreciate procedural discretion exercised by trial courts.
Precedent analysis
The Court relied heavily on Mange Ram v. Brij Mohan (1983) 4 SCC 36, which distinguished between witnesses requiring court summons and those produced voluntarily.
However, the High Court emphasized that even under Rule 1A, omission must be justified if court assistance is ultimately required.
The decision underscores that enabling provisions are not absolute and procedural discipline in commercial litigation remains critical.
Court’s reasoning
The Court found that the petitioner had not substantiated its claims of deteriorating health or unavailability of the proposed witnesses with documentary evidence.
It held that even if witnesses were temporarily unavailable, their names could have been included in earlier lists. The petitioner had already been permitted to expand its witness list once—from one witness to four.
Given that the suit had been pending for nearly six years and was lingering at the stage of plaintiff’s evidence, the trial court’s concern regarding delay was justified.
The High Court concluded that no sufficient cause had been shown and no infirmity existed in the impugned order.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the trial court correctly exercised discretion in rejecting the additional witness application.
No jurisdictional error or perversity was found to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution .
Implications
This ruling reinforces procedural discipline in commercial litigation and clarifies the scope of Order XVI Rule 1A CPC.
Key takeaways include:
• Rule 1A does not override Rule 1(3); sufficient cause remains mandatory.
• Article 227 review is limited and does not substitute appellate discretion.
• Repeated expansion of witness lists may be viewed as dilatory.
• Commercial courts are expected to ensure expeditious trials.
The judgment serves as a caution against misuse of procedural flexibility to prolong proceedings.
Case law references
- Mange Ram v. Brij Mohan (1983) 4 SCC 36 – Clarified interplay between Order XVI Rule 1 and Rule 1A CPC; distinguished situations where court summons is required.
- Order XVI CPC jurisprudence – Reaffirmed that sufficient cause must be shown when names are omitted from witness lists.
FAQs
1. Can a party add witnesses at a later stage of trial?
Yes, but only if sufficient cause is shown for omission from the earlier witness list, especially where court assistance is required.
2. Does Order XVI Rule 1A allow unlimited addition of witnesses?
No. While it allows production without summons, it remains subject to judicial scrutiny and sufficient cause requirements.
3. When will the High Court interfere under Article 227?
Only in cases of jurisdictional error, perversity, or patent illegality—not to re-evaluate procedural discretion of trial courts.