1. Court’s decision
The Delhi High Court has overturned the conviction of a Junior Engineer of the development authority who had been sentenced under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Court held that the prosecution failed to discharge its foundational burden of proving demand for illegal gratification, which is the sine qua non for offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d). The complainant’s testimony stood uncorroborated, the shadow witness turned partially hostile and contradicted himself, and the recovery witness never identified the accused. Inconsistencies relating to “antedated” possession documents and the unexplained need for early possession created further doubt. Consequently, the Court acquitted the appellant, granting benefit of doubt.
2. Facts
In July 1994, the complainant’s wife was allotted a residential flat. On 27 July 1994, he approached the local office seeking possession for his physically challenged wife. The prosecution alleged that the engineer demanded a bribe of ₹2,000 for early possession. The complainant approached the investigating agency the same day, leading to a trap. During the operation, the accused allegedly accepted ₹1,000 and kept it in a drawer, after which he was apprehended.
The trial, however, was unusual: the prosecution initially produced no witnesses, resulting in an acquittal in 1999. On appeal, the High Court remanded the case for fresh evidence. Eventually, seven prosecution witnesses and one defence witness were examined. The trial court convicted the accused in 2002. This appeal challenged that conviction.
3. Issues
The Court considered:
- Whether the prosecution proved demand, acceptance, and recovery of illegal gratification.
- Whether the testimony of the complainant required corroboration in light of the hostile shadow witness.
- Whether contradictions regarding possession dates undermined the prosecution case.
- Whether the statutory presumption under Section 20 could apply when demand itself was doubtful.
- Whether granting benefit of doubt was justified in the absence of consistent evidence.
4. Appellant’s arguments
The appellant argued that the complainant was an interested witness whose sole testimony could not sustain conviction. The shadow witness failed to identify the accused, contradicted himself, and ultimately denied hearing any demand. The complainant’s wife, a crucial witness present at the scene, was not examined without explanation. The appellant further pointed to anomalies: although possession had already been authorised by a 20 July 1994 communication, the agency alleged that the engineer “antedated” entries from 27 July to 20 July. Additionally, a possession slip and inventory checklist already existed dated 17 July 1994, raising the question of why “early possession” was needed. These inconsistencies, counsel argued, compromised the case beyond repair.
5. Respondent’s arguments
The prosecution contended that the complainant consistently affirmed the demand and acceptance of the bribe. Although the shadow witness did not fully support the case, parts of his testimony corroborated key elements—specifically, the handing over of money and the statement that “apka kaam ho gaya hai.” Relying on Supreme Court precedents allowing reliance on hostile witnesses to the extent they support the prosecution, the State argued that the essential ingredients were proved. The prosecution maintained that acceptance and recovery of tainted money attracted the mandatory presumption of guilt under Section 20 of the Act.
6. Analysis of the law
The Court emphasised the well-settled principle that demand is indispensable for conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d). It relied heavily on B. Jayaraj (2014), which held that mere recovery of tainted currency is insufficient absent proof of demand. The Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta (2023) reaffirmed this, clarifying that demand and acceptance are facts in issue requiring proof either through direct or circumstantial evidence; presumptions under Section 20 arise only after demand is proved.
Applying these principles, the Court noted that the complainant’s testimony, though affirmative, required corroboration given his interest and the surrounding anomalies. The shadow witness did not support the prosecution on the crucial element of demand, instead retracting his earlier statement during cross-examination and re-examination. The recovery witness was inexplicably never asked to identify the accused.
In corruption prosecutions, the Court stated, corroboration becomes essential when the sole witness is interested and procedural inconsistencies exist.
7. Precedent analysis
The Court closely examined and applied:
B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2014) 13 SCC 55
Held that recovery without proof of demand cannot sustain conviction.
Applied: Found that the prosecution failed to prove demand beyond reasonable doubt.
Neeraj Dutta v. State (2023) 4 SCC 731 (Constitution Bench)
Demand must be proved as a fact in issue; presumption under Section 20 arises only thereafter.
Applied: Since demand was doubtful, presumption could not be invoked.
A. Subair v. State of Kerala (2009) 6 SCC 587
Absence of proof of demand renders Section 13(1)(d) inapplicable.
C.K. Damodaran Nair v. Govt. of India (1997) 9 SCC 477
Explained “obtainment” and necessity of demand originating from the public servant.
These precedents formed the backbone of the Court’s reasoning.
8. Court’s reasoning
The Court found multiple deficiencies fatal to the prosecution:
1. Shadow witness contradicted himself — he initially stated a JE demanded money but later said he could not remember hearing any such demand. In re-examination he confirmed the latter version.
2. Non-identification of the accused — neither the shadow witness nor the recovery witness identified the JE in court.
3. Non-examination of complainant’s wife — present throughout the event, her testimony was crucial yet withheld.
4. Inexplicable possession documents — possession slip dated 17 July 1994 and inventory list already signed by the allottee negated the prosecution’s theory of “early possession,” raising serious doubts.
5. Lack of explanation from investigating agency — the prosecution could not explain why documents bore earlier dates if no early possession was sought.
Given these contradictions, the Court held that corroboration of the complainant was essential, and none existed. Benefit of doubt therefore accrued to the accused.
9. Conclusion
The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant of all charges. The Court directed cancellation of bail bonds and discharge of sureties, directing that the judgment be communicated to the concerned authorities. The prosecution having failed to prove demand, the appellant was entitled to acquittal.
10. Implications
This judgment reinforces the judiciary’s strict insistence that demand must be proved beyond reasonable doubt before convicting under the PC Act. It clarifies that when material witnesses contradict themselves, when identification is missing, and when documentary inconsistencies remain unexplained, courts must lean towards acquittal. It underscores that Section 20’s presumption cannot fill evidentiary gaps where demand is unproved. The ruling strengthens safeguards against wrongful conviction in corruption cases while reaffirming prosecutorial responsibility to present coherent, corroborated evidence.
CASE LAW REFERENCES
1. B. Jayaraj (2014) 13 SCC 55
Recovery alone insufficient; demand must be proved.
2. Neeraj Dutta (2023) 4 SCC 731
Constitution Bench: demand and acceptance are facts in issue.
3. A. Subair (2009) 6 SCC 587
Absence of demand negates offences under Section 13(1)(d).
4. C.K. Damodaran Nair (1997) 9 SCC 477
Explained “obtainment” and necessity of demand.
FAQs
1. Why did the Delhi High Court acquit the accused in this corruption case?
Because demand for bribe was not proved, and hostile and missing witnesses created reasonable doubt.
2. Does recovery of tainted money automatically lead to conviction?
No. Courts repeatedly hold that recovery without proof of demand cannot sustain conviction.
3. What weakened the prosecution case the most?
Non-identification of the accused, contradictions of the shadow witness, missing testimony of the allottee, and unexplained possession documents.
