Court’s Decision
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition under Article 227 and set aside the trial court’s order that had condoned a 3023-day delay in filing an application to substitute legal heirs of a deceased plaintiff. The Court held that:
“Except for a vague averment that the counsel of respondent No. 1 gave him wrong advice… there is no justifiable reason to explain the delay of 3023 days.”
The Court found the trial court’s decision to be “perverse” and held that:
“The litigant also owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights… and cannot disown his advocate to seek relief.”
Facts
- A suit for specific performance of an agreement dated 07.12.1994 was filed in 1998 by two plaintiffs.
- A parallel suit was filed by the defendant seeking cancellation of the agreement.
- Both suits were consolidated, with the defendant’s suit treated as the leading case.
- The plaintiff in the leading suit, J.P. Gupta, died in 2011; his substitution was vitiated due to fraud and that suit was dismissed.
- The other suit continued; plaintiff No.2, Usha Rani Jain, died on 14.10.2015.
- An application for substitution of her legal heirs was filed only on 17.11.2023 — a delay of 3023 days.
- The trial court condoned the delay based on a “mutual family arrangement” and alleged legal advice that substitution was unnecessary.
Issues
- Whether the trial court erred in condoning the inordinate delay of 3023 days under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
- Whether the impugned order could be interfered with under Article 227 of the Constitution.
Petitioner’s Arguments
- The explanation offered was vague and unsupported by material.
- There was no “sufficient cause” to justify condonation under Section 5.
- Even the respondent admitted that no right to sue survived in favour of the deceased’s legal heirs.
- The conduct of plaintiff No.1 was casual, negligent, and marked by delay and misrepresentation.
Respondent’s Arguments
- The delay was due to a mistaken belief, based on legal advice, that substitution was unnecessary.
- Mutual family arrangements allowed plaintiff No.1 to continue the suit solely.
- No substantial progress occurred in the suit post-2012, partly due to lack of original records.
- Courts should adopt a liberal approach toward condonation to ensure justice.
- No prejudice would be caused to petitioners if substitution was allowed.
Analysis of the Law
The Court analyzed Order 22 Rules 3 and 9 CPC, which govern abatement and substitution, and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which allows condonation of delay on sufficient cause.
The Court reaffirmed that:
- Applications for substitution must be made within 90 days of death.
- Delay beyond 150 days (90+60) must be explained under Section 5.
It emphasized that the law on condonation requires a “liberal yet reasoned approach”, citing various Supreme Court judgments including:
- N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123
- Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee (2013) 12 SCC 649
- Pathapati Subba Reddy (2024 SCC OnLine SC 513)
Precedent Analysis
The Court relied on binding precedents that:
- Condonation is discretionary and must be backed by reasonable and sufficient cause.
- Courts must balance liberal interpretation with the principle of finality.
- A litigant cannot escape responsibility by blaming multiple advocates over years.
- Delay caused by negligence, carelessness, or lack of bona fides cannot be excused (P.K. Ramachandran, Balwant Singh, Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Co.).
Court’s Reasoning
The Court held that:
- Plaintiff No.1 was aware of the death of Plaintiff No.2 in 2015.
- The claim of “wrong legal advice” by multiple advocates across 8.5 years is implausible.
- Plaintiff failed to act diligently and blamed his lawyers without justification.
- Even assuming mistaken legal advice, the delay remains unexplained for nearly a decade.
- The High Court concluded that the trial court failed to apply the test of “sufficient cause” correctly.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court found the trial court’s condonation of 3023 days’ delay to be unsustainable, holding that:
“The order passed by the learned trial court is perverse as respondents failed to show any sufficient cause for delay.”
Accordingly, the petition was allowed, and the impugned order dated 13.09.2023 was set aside.
Implications
- The judgment reasserts that procedural timelines under the CPC and Limitation Act must be respected.
- Courts must not condone delay mechanically, especially where no bona fide explanation exists.
- It limits litigants’ ability to attribute their inaction to legal advice and shifts focus on their own conduct.
- Affirms that the power under Article 227 can be exercised to correct perverse or unjust trial court orders