Court’s Decision
The Karnataka High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by X Corp (formerly Twitter Inc.) challenging the blocking orders issued by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009.
The Court held that the State’s power to block online content is constitutionally valid and necessary to preserve sovereignty, integrity, and public order, provided it is exercised within procedural safeguards. Justice M. Nagaprasanna observed:
“Freedom of speech is a cornerstone of democracy, but it cannot be weaponised to justify defiance of the law. Platforms must operate within the statutory framework.”
The Court found that Twitter had failed to comply with the blocking orders despite multiple opportunities and that its petition lacked bona fides, being an “afterthought filed only after punitive action was threatened.”
Facts
Between 2021 and 2022, MeitY issued several blocking orders directing Twitter to remove or restrict access to specific accounts and tweets. These included content alleged to spread misinformation, provoke communal unrest, or threaten national security.
Twitter initially complied with some directions but delayed or refused to act on several others. MeitY subsequently issued show-cause notices under Section 69A and Rule 14 of the Blocking Rules, warning of possible criminal action for non-compliance.
Instead of complying, Twitter filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking quashing of the blocking orders and a declaration that they were unconstitutional and disproportionate. Twitter argued that the orders violated the right to free speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) and that MeitY had exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 69A.
Issues
- Whether the blocking orders issued under Section 69A and the 2009 Rules violated Articles 14 and 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
- Whether the Government had followed the mandatory procedure and safeguards prescribed by law before issuing the orders.
- Whether Twitter, as an intermediary, could challenge blocking orders on behalf of content originators or users.
- Whether non-compliance with blocking orders could justify penal consequences.
Petitioner’s Arguments (X Corp / Twitter)
Twitter contended that the impugned blocking orders were arbitrary, overbroad, and disproportionate, and failed to disclose specific reasons as required by Rule 8(1) of the 2009 Rules. It argued that vague and general references to “public order” or “national security” did not satisfy the narrow restrictions permitted under Article 19(2).
It was further submitted that the orders failed to notify or hear affected users, violating principles of natural justice. Twitter claimed it had standing to challenge the orders on behalf of its users, as it was compelled to act as an intermediary enforcing State censorship.
The petitioner relied heavily on Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), where the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act but upheld Section 69A, emphasising that the Government’s power to block content must be exercised with transparency and procedural fairness. Twitter argued that the blocking orders in the present case did not meet the standards laid down in Shreya Singhal.
It also invoked Kunal Kamra v. Union of India (2022) and Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950) to assert that freedom of expression cannot be curtailed without a clear and immediate danger to public order.
Respondent’s Arguments (Union of India)
The Union of India opposed the petition, asserting that the blocking orders were issued strictly in accordance with Section 69A and the 2009 Rules, after due consideration by the designated committee. The State argued that the affected users were given an opportunity to be heard where practicable, but in cases involving threats to national security or communal harmony, immediate action was justified.
It contended that Twitter, being a commercial intermediary, had no locus standi to invoke fundamental rights or challenge sovereign functions of the State. Its role was purely facilitative—to comply with lawful orders and assist in maintaining cyber integrity.
The Government emphasised that several accounts and tweets incited violence, propagated misinformation, or attempted to disrupt public order. The blocking orders were therefore preventive, not punitive, and fell squarely within the reasonable restrictions permitted under Article 19(2).
Relying on Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (2017), the Government argued that the principle of proportionality was satisfied, as blocking was the least restrictive means available in the digital context to prevent harm to national security.
Analysis of the Law
The Court examined Section 69A of the IT Act, which empowers the Central Government to direct intermediaries to block access to information “in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order.”
Justice Nagaprasanna observed that this power is not absolute, but its exercise is controlled by the procedural safeguards in the 2009 Rules. Rule 8(1) requires written reasons for blocking, approval by the designated committee, and a hearing for the content originator whenever feasible.
The Court noted that in the present case, the committee had recorded detailed reasons in writing, satisfying the statutory requirements. Moreover, the orders were classified and confidential, as disclosure could compromise ongoing investigations.
The Court rejected Twitter’s claim of user representation, holding that “an intermediary is not a custodian of free speech but a facilitator of communication within the bounds of law.”
It clarified that intermediaries are obligated under Rule 3(1)(d) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 to observe due diligence and comply with all lawful directions.
Precedent Analysis
- Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 – Upheld the constitutionality of Section 69A, holding that blocking powers are valid if exercised with due safeguards. Relied upon to sustain the present orders.
- Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950 SCR 594) – Established that freedom of speech is subject only to Article 19(2); cited but distinguished, as this case concerned direct censorship, not intermediary regulation.
- Kunal Kamra v. Union of India (2022) – Affirmed that free speech does not extend to deliberate misinformation or speech that disrupts public order. Applied to justify restrictions on inflammatory content.
- Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) – Laid down the four-fold proportionality test; applied to find that the blocking orders were narrowly tailored and proportionate.
- Shreya Singhal (follow-up observation) – Cited to reaffirm that intermediaries cannot act as judges of free speech, as the discretion lies with the State within constitutional limits.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court concluded that MeitY had complied with the procedural safeguards under the 2009 Rules and that each order recorded reasons consistent with Article 19(2). The orders were preventive in nature and issued to avert harm to public order, national security, and integrity.
The Court found that Twitter’s refusal to comply with lawful orders amounted to deliberate defiance of statutory duty. It held that the petitioner’s invocation of free speech was misplaced:
“Freedom of speech cannot be a shield against accountability. Intermediaries cannot arrogate to themselves the authority to decide which State orders to obey.”
The Court further observed that judicial review of blocking orders is limited. Courts can intervene only where malice, lack of jurisdiction, or procedural illegality is established, none of which was shown in the present case.
Conclusion
The Karnataka High Court dismissed the petition, upholding the validity of the blocking orders under Section 69A. The Court held that the State’s power to regulate digital speech in the interest of national security and public order is constitutional when exercised with procedural safeguards.
The Court imposed costs on Twitter for its non-compliance and directed it to implement all pending blocking orders forthwith. It reiterated that intermediaries must adhere to Indian law and cannot claim immunity under the guise of corporate autonomy or user rights.
Implications
- Reinforces the binding nature of government blocking orders under Section 69A IT Act.
- Clarifies that intermediaries like Twitter cannot claim fundamental rights or act as proxies for users.
- Establishes that freedom of speech is subject to reasonable restrictions and cannot override national security concerns.
- Strengthens the jurisprudence of platform accountability and compliance within India’s digital governance framework.
