Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court clarified the legal interpretation of the offence of threatening a witness to give false evidence under the statutory provision dealing with witness intimidation. The Court held that this offence is a cognizable offence, meaning the police may register a first information report and investigate without requiring a complaint from a court.
The Court rejected the view taken by the Kerala and Karnataka High Courts that such an offence required mandatory compliance with the restrictive procedure applicable to offences related to perjury and fabrication of evidence. It restored the cognizance taken by the Magistrate in one case, reversed the discharge ordered by the High Court in another, and cancelled the bail granted on the erroneous premise of procedural illegality, while permitting the accused to seek bail anew on other grounds.
The Court emphasised that while drafting flaws existed in the statutory framework, such imperfections did not allow judicial rewriting of legislation.
Facts
The dispute arose from multiple proceedings involving threats issued to individuals expected to depose in ongoing criminal cases. In one matter, the police registered an offence for threatening a witness who had turned approver, prompting the High Court to grant bail solely on the ground that the police lacked authority to register the case without a complaint from the concerned court.
In another set of matters involving a murder investigation transferred to a central agency, witnesses allegedly turned hostile due to threats issued by individuals connected to the accused. The Magistrate treated the agency’s report as a complaint and took cognizance. The High Court later set aside the cognizance order and discharged the accused on the ground that the complaint was not made by the court as required under the provision dealing with offences against public justice.
These rulings led to conflicting positions across High Courts on whether police could register and investigate cases involving threats to witnesses, especially when the threat related to testimony in ongoing proceedings. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis of the legislative framework to resolve the confusion.
Issues
- Whether threatening a witness to give false evidence is a cognizable offence enabling police to register an FIR and investigate.
- Whether the procedural bar under the provision dealing with offences committed in relation to proceedings of a court applies to the offence of witness intimidation.
- Whether the offence requires a complaint from the court under the statutory provision governing offences relating to false evidence and public justice.
- Whether procedural irregularity existed in the cases where cognizance was taken or bail was granted.
- How the statutory scheme harmonizes the offence of witness intimidation with other perjury-related offences.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The petitioners contended that the High Courts erred in holding that the offence of threatening a witness can only be prosecuted through a complaint by the Court concerned. They argued that the offence of witness intimidation, unlike perjury or fabrication of evidence, was classified as cognizable in the First Schedule, and thus fell within the investigative powers of the police.
They submitted that requiring a threatened witness to approach the court where the case is pending is impractical, dangerous, and contrary to the object of the law. They stressed that the statutory provision specifically allowed any witness or person to directly lodge a complaint before a Magistrate, showing legislative intent to create a dual avenue: police investigation or direct complaint. They urged restoration of the magistrate’s cognizance and reversal of the discharge orders.
Respondent’s Arguments
The respondents argued that the offence forms part of the broader statutory chapter on false evidence and must follow the same procedure as other offences in that chapter. They contended that the statute requires a written complaint by the court and prohibits police from investigating such offences unless authorised. They relied upon interpretations that considered the offence to fall within the domain of offences affecting public justice committed in connection with judicial proceedings.
They also emphasised alleged procedural lapses, arguing that the magistrate’s cognizance was invalid and that discharge or bail was justified on the premise that the wrong procedure was followed. The respondents maintained that the police lacked authority to initiate investigation absent a court complaint.
Analysis of the Law
The Court embarked on a detailed examination of the statutory scheme governing false evidence, perjury, and offences affecting public justice. It noted that traditional perjury provisions are non-cognizable, require complaints by courts, and involve procedural safeguards under the provision dealing with sanctions for prosecution and Section 340 of the procedural code.
In sharp contrast, the offence of threatening a witness is explicitly categorised as cognizable, empowering police officers to act immediately upon information received. The Court reasoned that a threat to a witness may occur long before the witness enters the courtroom, and requiring the witness to approach the trial court to initiate complaint proceedings would cripple the very purpose of the law.
The presence of a separate procedural provision explicitly allowing a witness or any person to file a private complaint confirms legislative intent to create an alternative mechanism rather than restrict the offence within the ambit of court-initiated complaints. The statute’s use of the word “may” shows that approaching a Magistrate is optional, not mandatory. The Court held that the investigative powers under Sections 154 and 156 of the procedural code fully apply to this offence.
Precedent Analysis
Cases Upholding the Police Power to Register FIR:
• Rahul Yadav (Delhi High Court) – Held that witness intimidation is cognizable and can be investigated by police without requiring court complaint.
• Abdul Razzak (Madhya Pradesh High Court) – Followed the Delhi view, affirming police authority.
• Homnath Niroula (Calcutta High Court) – Concluded that procedural restrictions under the provision governing perjury do not apply.
• Ramlal Dhakad (Madhya Pradesh) – Held that threats to witnesses are independent of actual false evidence being given.
Cases Taking the Opposite View:
• Neput Rajiyung (Gauhati High Court) – Held that only a Magistrate complaint is possible; FIR cannot be registered.
• Sazid (Madhya Pradesh) – Followed the Gauhati view.
Supreme Court’s Reference to Other Decisions:
• Maktool Singh – On importance of precision in legislative drafting.
• S.R. Bommai and Nathi Devi – On the doctrine of casus omissus and judicial restraint in adding words to statutes.
• Ashok Kumar Sharma – Distinguished as arising from a different statutory scheme.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court held that the offence of threatening a witness stands distinct from perjury-related offences. Its classification as cognizable reflects the urgent nature of threats that may jeopardize justice. The insertion of a dedicated procedural pathway enabling any witness to file a complaint further underscores legislative intent.
The Court refused to rewrite or split the provision artificially into two categories—one for court-related threats and another for external threats—holding that such interpretation would amount to judicial legislation. The Court harmonised the statutory provisions to hold that police may investigate on an FIR, while a complaint before a Magistrate remains an optional, parallel remedy.
The High Courts’ assumption that the restrictive perjury procedure applied was declared erroneous. The orders granting bail, setting aside cognizance, and discharging accused were reversed.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court held that threatening a person to give false evidence is a cognizable offence and can be prosecuted through:
- A police FIR under Section 154, OR
- A private complaint before a Magistrate under the dedicated procedural provision.
The restrictive procedure requiring a complaint by the court applies only to perjury-related offences, not to witness intimidation. All contrary High Court rulings were set aside, and the magistrate’s cognizance and earlier orders were restored. The accused whose bail was cancelled may reapply on other grounds.
Implications
• Confirms police authority to act swiftly against witness intimidation.
• Clarifies long-standing confusion across High Courts.
• Prevents procedural roadblocks that could endanger witness safety.
• Reinforces judicial restraint in statutory interpretation.
• Strengthens criminal justice by ensuring witnesses are protected before entering court.
