Supreme Court Holds Two-Judge Bench Could Not Override Larger Bench on Haryana Remission Policy
Supreme Court Holds Haryana’s 2002 Remission Policy Under Article 161 Cannot Be Superseded by the Statutory 2008 Policy
Facts
The appellant, Parveen Kumar alias Parveen Chauhan, was convicted on 3 January 2009 for the murder of a 12-year-old child in connection with FIR No. 670 of 2007 registered at Police Station City, Gurgaon.
He was sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, five years’ imprisonment under Section 365 IPC and two years’ imprisonment under Section 201 IPC. On 16 July 2013, the Punjab and Haryana High Court partly allowed his appeal and set aside his conviction under Section 365 IPC. The Supreme Court subsequently dismissed his challenge on 15 September 2015, making the conviction final.
On 26 May 2022, after completing approximately 14 years of actual imprisonment, the appellant sought premature release under Haryana’s 2002 remission policy. When no decision was taken, he approached the High Court, which directed the prison authorities to decide his representation.
The State rejected his request on 20 October 2022 on the ground that the 2008 remission policy, and not the 2002 policy, governed his case. Under the 2008 policy, the State found that he had not completed the required 20 years of actual imprisonment and 25 years of total sentence.
The appellant challenged the rejection before the High Court, relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Haryana v. Jagdish. The High Court dismissed his writ petition on 27 January 2025, leading to the present appeal.
Issues
- Whether the appellant’s application for remission was governed by Haryana’s 2002 Policy or the subsequent 2008 Policy.
- Whether the 2002 Policy was issued in exercise of the Governor’s constitutional power under Article 161 or merely under the statutory powers contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
- Whether the 2008 statutory policy could supersede or override the 2002 policy framed under Article 161.
- Whether the decision in State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar, treating the 2002 Policy as statutory, was contrary to the larger Bench decision in State of Haryana v. Jagdish.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The appellant argued that the 2002 Policy was framed in exercise of the Governor’s constitutional power under Article 161 of the Constitution.
He submitted that the 2008 Policy was expressly issued under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore operated only within the statutory field. A policy based on statutory powers could not override or extinguish the Governor’s independent constitutional power under Article 161.
The appellant further contended that where a more beneficial or liberal remission policy was available, the convict should receive its benefit.
Reliance was placed on State of Haryana v. Jagdish, in which a three-judge Bench held that a remission policy framed under Article 161 could not be overridden by a later policy issued under the CrPC.
The appellant also argued that State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar, which treated both the 2002 and 2008 Policies as statutory, did not constitute a binding precedent because it was inconsistent with the larger Bench decision in Jagdish.
Respondent’s Arguments
The State of Haryana contended that the 2008 Policy had expressly superseded the 2002 Policy and was the policy in force on the date of the appellant’s conviction.
It argued that the 2002 Policy was also traceable to the statutory provisions of the CrPC and could not be placed on a higher footing merely because remission cases under it were ultimately placed before the Governor.
The State relied upon State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar, in which the Supreme Court had held that the 2002 and 2008 Policies were both statutory in nature and that the later policy superseded the earlier one.
Accordingly, the State submitted that the appellant had to satisfy the eligibility requirements under the 2008 Policy and could not claim premature release under the more favourable 2002 Policy.
Analysis of the Law
The Supreme Court examined Haryana’s remission policies issued over several decades and distinguished between policies framed under constitutional power and those framed under statutory power.
The Court noted that the 2000 and 2002 Policies specifically required eligible cases to be placed before the Governor for orders under Article 161 of the Constitution. In contrast, the 2008 Policy required cases to be placed before the Chief Minister for orders under Section 432 CrPC.
This distinction, according to the Court, demonstrated that the 2002 Policy operated within the constitutional domain of Article 161, whereas the 2008 Policy operated under statutory provisions.
The Court reiterated that the Governor’s power under Article 161 is distinct, independent and constitutional in character. It cannot be overridden, restricted or superseded by an executive policy issued under Sections 432 and 433 CrPC.
Although the 2008 Policy purported to supersede the 2002 Policy, such a clause could not legally extinguish a policy resting upon the Governor’s constitutional clemency powers.
The Court also considered the doctrine of precedent and the circumstances in which a judgment may be regarded as per incuriam. It observed that a decision rendered by a Bench of larger strength binds Benches of equal or lesser strength.
Where a later decision reaches a conclusion inconsistent with an earlier larger Bench ruling, the earlier larger Bench decision must prevail.
Precedent Analysis
State of Haryana v. Jagdish
A three-judge Bench had examined Haryana’s remission policies and held that the 1993 Policy was issued under Article 161, whereas the 2008 Policy was issued under Sections 432, 433 and 433-A CrPC.
The Court in Jagdish held that a statutory policy could not override a constitutional policy. It also observed that where a more liberal policy was in force when the remission claim was considered, the convict should receive its benefit.
The present Bench found that the 2002 Policy was materially identical to the 1993 Policy because both required the remission cases to be placed before the Governor for orders under Article 161.
State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar
In Raj Kumar, a two-judge Bench held that both the 2002 and 2008 Policies were statutory in nature. It reasoned that the 2002 Policy was traceable to the CrPC, notwithstanding the requirement of obtaining the Governor’s approval.
The present Court found that this conclusion conflicted with the reasoning of the three-judge Bench in Jagdish. Since the 1993 and 2002 Policies were identical in respect of their source of power and decision-making authority, they could not be treated differently.
The Court therefore held that Raj Kumar, to the extent it treated the 2002 Policy as statutory, was rendered per incuriam.
Principles Governing Per Incuriam
The Court referred to:
- Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra
- Shah Faesal v. Union of India
- Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik
- Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra
- Trimurthi Fragrances (P) Ltd. v. State (NCT of Delhi)
From these decisions, the Court reiterated that the doctrine of per incuriam is an exception to stare decisis and must be applied sparingly. A decision may be treated as per incuriam where its ratio is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment of a Bench of equal or greater strength.
The determinative factor is the strength of the Bench rendering the precedent, not merely the number of judges who may subsequently have expressed a different view.
Court’s Reasoning
The Supreme Court found that the language and structure of the 2002 Policy clearly indicated that remission decisions were to be placed before the Governor for orders under Article 161.
The 2008 Policy, on the other hand, expressly identified Sections 432 and 433 CrPC as its source and vested the decision-making process in the State Government through the Chief Minister.
The Court held that the 2002 Policy was therefore constitutional in origin, whereas the 2008 Policy was statutory.
Since statutory powers cannot override constitutional powers, the 2008 Policy could not extinguish or supersede the operation of the 2002 Policy.
The Court further held that the ruling in Jagdish was the controlling precedent because it had been delivered by a three-judge Bench. The contrary conclusion in Raj Kumar, rendered by a two-judge Bench, could not prevail.
Accordingly, the appellant was entitled to have his remission application considered under the more beneficial 2002 Policy, which prescribed a lesser period of imprisonment for eligibility.
The Court, however, clarified that its ruling would operate prospectively and would not reopen remission applications that had already been finally decided.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court held that Haryana’s 2002 remission policy was framed under Article 161 of the Constitution and could not be superseded by the 2008 policy issued under Sections 432 and 433 CrPC.
The Court held that the appellant was entitled to have his application for premature release considered under the 2002 Policy.
The State of Haryana was directed to take a fresh decision on the appellant’s remission application in accordance with the judgment within four weeks.
The appeal was accordingly allowed.
Case: Parveen Kumar alias Parveen Chauhan v. State of Haryana and Others
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: 2026 INSC 667; Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9920 of 2026
Judge: Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
Date: 1 July 2026
Result: Appeal allowed; State directed to reconsider the appellant’s remission application under the 2002 Policy within four weeks.
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