Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court dismissed a special leave petition filed with a delay of 2,298 days, holding that the delay was wholly unexplained and that the petition had been filed without any desire on the part of the convicted person to seek Supreme Court intervention. The Court found that the petition had been filed solely because of directions issued by the national legal aid machinery and that such filing amounted to misuse of judicial process.
The Court recorded that the Superintendent of the concerned central jail submitted an affidavit confirming that the convict never approached the authorities seeking to file an SLP and, in fact, had expressed no willingness to pursue a challenge before the Supreme Court. The Court held that delay could not be condoned when the petitioner herself had not taken any steps to pursue legal remedy. All pending applications were closed.
Facts
The convicted individual was serving a sentence from a judgment of the High Court delivered several years prior. A special leave petition challenging the conviction was eventually filed before the Supreme Court, but with a massive delay of 2,298 days. The petition was filed through the legal aid system rather than by the petitioner’s direct request.
When the petition first came up for hearing, the Court noted the absence of any proper explanation for the long delay in approaching the Supreme Court. The petitioner’s counsel was asked to obtain further instructions and to file a better affidavit clarifying the timeline and showing cause for condonation.
In response, an affidavit sworn by the Superintendent of the jail was filed. It unequivocally stated that the petitioner herself never contacted jail authorities or legal aid officials regarding the filing of a petition before the Supreme Court. It was further stated that the petitioner did not desire to file such a petition at any stage. The affidavit clarified that the SLP had been filed only pursuant to the general directions of the national legal services authority requiring assistance to prisoners, not because the individual had expressed any grievance or desire to challenge the judgment.
Given these facts, the Supreme Court examined whether there was any sufficient cause to condone the lengthy delay and whether the filing itself was proper.
Issues
- Whether a delay of nearly 2,300 days in filing the special leave petition could be condoned.
- Whether a petition filed solely due to directions under a legal aid programme, without any desire or instructions from the convicted person, amounts to abuse or misuse of judicial process.
- Whether the affidavit filed by jail authorities established sufficient cause for condonation of delay.
Petitioner’s Arguments
Through legal aid counsel, it was initially argued that the delay could be condoned because the petitioner was in custody and may not have had proper access to legal assistance. When questioned by the Court, counsel sought time to obtain further factual clarification and filed an improved affidavit thereafter.
The later submissions were that the petition was filed under the bona fide belief that legal aid support must be extended to all prisoners, and that the legal services authority had directed that pending appeals or challenges be filed wherever possible to protect the rights of incarcerated individuals. The petitioner’s legal aid representatives contended that these circumstances justified filing the petition even at a belated stage.
Respondent’s Arguments
The State opposed the condonation, arguing that no explanation—let alone a satisfactory one—was furnished for the enormous delay. It highlighted that limitations are not empty formalities but safeguards ensuring timely invocation of appellate jurisdiction.
The State emphasized that the affidavit made clear the absence of any initiative from the convict, rendering the SLP wholly unauthorized in spirit. It argued that filing petitions without the applicant’s consent undermines the dignity of legal processes and clogs the system. The State submitted that such a petition was not maintainable and deserved outright dismissal.
Analysis of the Law
The Supreme Court analysed whether the delay could be condoned under the principles governing condonation. While courts exercise liberal discretion in criminal matters, especially where liberty is at stake, such discretion is not unfettered. Delay must always be shown to have been caused by factors beyond the petitioner’s control.
Here, the Court found the most critical circumstance: the petitioner never intended to approach the Supreme Court. The affidavit made clear that the petition was filed solely due to a system-generated legal aid directive and not because the petitioner invoked constitutional jurisdiction. This fact alone fatally undermined the plea for delay condonation.
The Court considered that legal aid exists to enable access to justice, not to manufacture litigation where the person concerned has expressed no desire to challenge a judgment. Condoning delay in such circumstances would transform legal aid into an instrument of mechanical filing, undermining its constitutional purpose.
The order reflects the legal principle that access to the Supreme Court is volitional—a litigant must express willingness to pursue a challenge. A legal services authority cannot usurp that volition.
Precedent Analysis
The Court did not cite any external precedent. Instead, the order turned entirely on facts and principles of delay condonation.
Precedents typically relied upon in delay condonation matters—such as those emphasising the need for “sufficient cause”—were not invoked by name. The absence of cited judgments underscores that the Court viewed the factual context as self-sufficient to dismiss the case without delving into deeper jurisprudence.
Thus, while the Court has relied on established principles, no judgments were expressly referenced. 10
Court’s Reasoning
The Court held that the petition was a clear case of misuse of judicial process, as it was filed mechanically and without the petitioner’s desire. The jail affidavit demonstrated conclusively that there was no application of mind or intent on the part of the petitioner.
Given this, there was no explanation for the delay, because the petitioner herself never attempted to file the petition at all. The Court reasoned that where the litigant does not even want to approach the Court, no cause—much less sufficient cause—can ever be said to exist.
Thus, non-condonation of delay was the only possible outcome. The Court dismissed the SLP and closed all pending applications.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition on the ground of gross delay, holding that the filing of the petition itself was inappropriate, unauthorized in spirit, and a misuse of the legal aid mechanism. The Court reiterated that delay cannot be condoned when the petitioner never intended to file a challenge. Legal aid is designed to ensure access to justice, not to create unnecessary or involuntary litigation. All pending applications were consequently dismissed.
Implications
• Reinforces that SLPs must reflect the petitioner’s own volition, not institutional compulsion.
• Clarifies the boundaries of legal aid and prevents mechanical filing of petitions.
• Emphasizes that delay cannot be condoned where the litigant never attempted to pursue a remedy.
• Alerts prison authorities and legal aid bodies to ensure informed consent before filing petitions.
• Reduces unwarranted docket burden caused by involuntary legal aid filings.
