Supreme Court Quashes One-Year Externment Based on Fresh Criminal Cases; Holds District Magistrate Cannot Reopen Closed Proceedings Without Power, Notice or Hearing
Supreme Court Quashes Externment Based on Fresh FIRs; Says Criminal Cases Alone Cannot Justify Banishment Without Objective Material and Proper Hearing
Facts
The appellant, Vijay Kumar Rajpoot alias Vijju, challenged an ex parte externment order dated 4 November 2025 passed by the District Magistrate, Raigarh, directing him to leave Raigarh district and adjoining districts for one year. The Chhattisgarh High Court dismissed his writ petition and relegated him to the statutory appeal under Section 9 of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990.
The externment proceedings had originally commenced in 2019 on the Superintendent of Police’s report referring to the appellant’s alleged involvement in ten criminal cases between 2009 and 2019. However, on 6 October 2025, the District Magistrate closed those proceedings after noting that the appellant had been acquitted in those cases and that no fresh police report had been submitted after 2019. He was merely warned against future criminal activity.
Two subsequent criminal cases became relevant. Crime No. 117/2023 concerned alleged unauthorised colony development, while Crime No. 483/2025 arose from allegations that the appellant recorded and circulated a social-media video containing abusive remarks against Baba Guru Ghasidas, a revered figure of the Satnami community. He was arrested in the latter case.
Following a fresh police report dated 3 November 2025, the District Magistrate effectively reopened the closed proceedings and passed the externment order without issuing fresh notice or giving the appellant a hearing, even though he was then in judicial custody.
Significantly, Crime No. 117/2023 had already been quashed by the High Court, while the appellant was subsequently granted bail in Crime No. 483/2025.
Issues
The principal issues were:
- Whether the District Magistrate could reopen or review previously closed externment proceedings without any express statutory power.
- Whether an externment order could be passed after such reopening without giving the proposed externee fresh notice and an opportunity of hearing under Section 8.
- Whether the alleged offences satisfied the statutory requirements of Section 5(a) or 5(b) of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990.
- Whether registration of multiple criminal cases or allegations of public outrage were sufficient to justify the extraordinary measure of externment.
- Whether the High Court was justified in refusing to exercise Article 226 jurisdiction merely because the appellant had an alternative statutory appeal under Section 9.
The Supreme Court formulated the substantial question as whether the externment order was legal and valid and whether the High Court was justified in refusing to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction.
Petitioner’s Arguments
The appellant argued that the externment order was passed ex parte while he was in custody, without his knowledge that the already closed proceedings had been revived.
He contended that Section 8 expressly required notice and a reasonable opportunity of hearing before an externment order could be made. Its violation rendered the order fundamentally defective.
He further argued that the District Magistrate had no express or implied statutory power to review, recall or reopen the earlier order closing the externment proceedings.
The appellant also highlighted that Crime No. 117/2023 had been quashed and that he had subsequently obtained bail in Crime No. 483/2025.
Since the order suffered from both breach of natural justice and lack of jurisdiction, the existence of an alternative appellate remedy could not justify the High Court’s refusal to exercise writ jurisdiction.
Respondent’s Arguments
The State relied upon the statutory appellate remedy under Section 9 and argued that the appellant should ordinarily have pursued that remedy rather than directly invoking Article 226.
It contended that the District Magistrate had not undertaken an impermissible review. According to the State, the externment proceedings merely continued after supervening events, particularly the appellant’s alleged involvement in fresh criminal activity despite the earlier warning.
The State further argued that because the appellant had already been heard before the original closure order, a fresh opportunity of hearing was unnecessary.
It emphasised the preventive character of externment and argued that the social-media incident had created substantial public outrage and threatened public order and social peace.
Analysis of the Law
Mandatory Hearing Under Section 8
The Supreme Court treated Section 8 as a mandatory statutory safeguard.
Before an order under Sections 3 to 6 can be passed, the District Magistrate must inform the proposed externee in writing about the general nature of the allegations and provide a reasonable opportunity to explain them.
Notice and reasonable hearing were held to be conditions precedent to the exercise of externment power. An order violating these requirements is liable to be treated as void ab initio.
The statute permits ex parte proceedings only in specified circumstances concerning failure to execute a required bond or failure to appear. Those circumstances were absent here. Therefore, there was no statutory basis to deny the appellant a fresh hearing.
No Inherent Power of Review
The Supreme Court reiterated the settled principle that an administrative authority cannot review its own concluded order unless the governing statute confers such power.
No provision empowering the District Magistrate to reopen or review the closed externment proceedings was shown to the Court.
The subsequent police report could potentially justify fresh proceedings, but the District Magistrate was then required to follow the statutory procedure afresh, including Section 8.
Alternative Remedy Did Not Bar Writ Jurisdiction
The Court strongly disapproved the High Court’s refusal to examine the challenge merely because an appeal under Section 9 was available.
Where an administrative order suffers from jurisdictional infirmity and violation of natural justice, existence of an alternative statutory remedy does not prevent the High Court from exercising Article 226 jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court characterised the High Court’s approach as a failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in it.
Requirements for Externment
The Court stressed that externment seriously restricts fundamental freedoms and therefore cannot be ordered routinely.
Multiple FIRs by themselves do not justify externment. The competent authority must have objective material and form a bona fide, informed subjective satisfaction demonstrating a rational nexus between that material and the need for such an extraordinary preventive measure.
Precedent Analysis
Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 2 SCC 121
The Court relied upon this precedent concerning an externment order under the Bombay Police Act.
It reinforces that where a statute mandates hearing before an administrative action restricting fundamental rights, failure to provide that hearing is fatal. An administrative order made without complying with such a fundamental requirement of natural justice lacks legal efficacy.
Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority
The Court referred to this judgment for the distinction between the maintainability and entertainability of a writ petition and the recognised circumstances in which Article 226 jurisdiction may be exercised despite an alternative statutory remedy.
The present case fell within such an exception because the externment order suffered from both breach of natural justice and lack of jurisdiction.
Deepak v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 14 SCC 707
The Court relied upon Deepak to emphasise that externment is an extraordinary measure directly interfering with a citizen’s freedom of movement.
Objective material must support the authority’s subjective satisfaction, and mere registration of multiple offences is insufficient. Judicial review remains available where there is no supporting material, relevant material is ignored, or the administrative action is arbitrary or unreasonable.
Jittu Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh
The State relied upon Jittu Yadav concerning the appellate remedy under Section 9. The Supreme Court held that the decision dealt with application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to a delayed statutory appeal and had no bearing on the issues in the present case.
Court’s Reasoning
The Supreme Court found several independent and cumulative defects in the externment order.
First, the earlier proceedings had already been closed. The District Magistrate had no statutory power to simply review or reopen his concluded decision.
Second, even assuming that subsequent criminal allegations justified fresh consideration, fresh notice and hearing were mandatory. The appellant could not be externed behind his back while he was in judicial custody.
Third, Section 5(b) was wrongly invoked. The offences relied upon did not involve force or violence and did not fall within the categories of offences specified by Section 5(b). Therefore, the statutory conditions precedent were absent.
Fourth, even when considered under the broader Section 5(a), the order was defective. It merely referred to resentment and public outrage without identifying adequate objective material explaining why the situation was sufficiently serious to require externment.
The Court therefore found the order “infirm and indefensible” for want of cogent supporting reasons.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed both the Chhattisgarh High Court judgment and the District Magistrate’s externment order.
The Court held that:
- mandatory notice and hearing under Section 8 had been violated;
- the District Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to review/reopen the closed proceedings;
- Section 5(b)’s statutory requirements were not satisfied;
- the externment order lacked adequate objective material and cogent reasons; and
- the High Court should not have refused writ relief merely because an alternative statutory appeal existed.
The appellant was expressly declared free to enter Raigarh and the other districts from which he had been externed. The Court clarified that its observations would not affect the merits of the pending criminal cases against him.
Case Details
Case: Vijay Kumar Rajpoot alias Vijju v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 4083 of 2026, arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 12330 of 2026; 2026 INSC 926
Judge: Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu
Date: 31 August 2026
Result: Appeal allowed; High Court judgment and externment order quashed; appellant permitted to re-enter the districts from which he had been externed
