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Supreme Court Restores Murder Convictions of Two Accused Acquitted by High Court; Holds Participation and Exhortation Established Common Intention Despite Only One Firing Fatal Shot

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Holding Victim While Another Shoots Him Establishes Common Intention: Supreme Court Reverses High Court Acquittal and Restores Murder Conviction

Facts

The case arose from an alleged ambush involving 17 accused, who were alleged to have attacked three brothers from one family and killed one of them. Three accused were absconding and their trial was separated. Of the remaining fourteen, the Trial Court convicted A1, A6, A12 and A13, while acquitting the other ten.

The prosecution alleged that the deceased, his brothers and others were initially sitting near their family barn when A1, along with A8 and A9, approached them, abused and threatened them. As they subsequently proceeded towards their home, they were allegedly ambushed by the group of 17 persons. The deceased was shot dead, while his brother PW1 was assaulted with a lathi and sustained injuries.

The Trial Court found that A1, Ajeet Singh @ Babbe Singh, fired the fatal shot. It further found that A6, Nagendra Singh, along with an absconding accused, caught hold of the deceased, while A12, Dalpratap Singh, exhorted A1 to kill him. A13, Rajeev Lochan Singh, was alleged to have been present carrying a double-barrel gun and threatening the family.

On appeal, the High Court maintained A1’s conviction but acquitted A6, A12 and A13. It also upheld the Trial Court’s acquittal of the other accused. The injured eyewitness/de facto complainant consequently approached the Supreme Court challenging the acquittals.

Issues

The principal issues before the Supreme Court were:

  1. Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the Trial Court’s convictions of A6, A12 and A13.
  2. Whether an accused who did not personally fire the fatal shot could nevertheless be held liable for murder on the basis of common intention or common object under Sections 34/149 IPC.
  3. Whether A6’s act of restraining the deceased and A12’s exhortation to shoot were sufficiently established by reliable evidence.
  4. Whether A13’s alleged presence with a firearm was proved sufficiently to reverse his acquittal.
  5. Whether the acquittals of the remaining accused could be disturbed merely because witnesses had generally alleged their presence in the unlawful assembly.

Petitioner’s Arguments

The injured/de facto complainant contended that the eyewitnesses had consistently spoken about the presence of the accused and the particular roles played by A6, A12 and A13.

It was argued that the Trial Court and High Court had failed to properly appreciate the effect of Section 149 IPC and had wrongly proceeded on the premise that an accused could not be convicted without proof of a separate overt act.

According to the appellant, the eyewitness testimony was consistent with the medical evidence and established the participation of the accused in the unlawful assembly and the fatal attack.

Respondents’ Arguments

The accused attacked the reliability of the prosecution’s eyewitnesses, pointing out that many were relatives of the deceased and therefore allegedly interested witnesses.

They emphasised that independent witnesses had turned hostile, there had been no recovery or seizure of the weapon, and no forensic or ballistic examination had been conducted.

Regarding A13, it was argued that several witnesses had not originally mentioned his presence and implicated him only after he was subsequently summoned under Section 319 CrPC.

A12 disputed the allegation of exhortation, particularly because the incident occurred at night amid a melee. A6 argued that the allegation of his physically restraining the deceased while a close-range gunshot was fired was inherently improbable.

Finally, it was argued that the High Court’s acquittal represented a plausible view of the evidence, and therefore should not be reversed merely because another view was possible.

Analysis of the Law

Common intention and common object

The Supreme Court disagreed with the proposition that an accused’s failure personally to fire at the victim necessarily excluded liability.

It observed that even a person present with a firearm who had not fired the fatal shot could potentially be implicated through common intention or common object, provided his participation as part of the group constituting the unlawful assembly or sharing the common intention was satisfactorily established.

Thus, absence of an individual fatal overt act is not by itself decisive. The relevant enquiry is whether participation and the requisite shared intention or object have been proved.

Related witnesses

The Supreme Court reiterated that a related witness cannot automatically be characterised as an interested or unreliable witness, particularly where that person’s presence at the scene is natural.

Nevertheless, the Court carefully scrutinised individual testimonies and found the accounts of PW1, PW10 and PW11 sufficiently reliable on the material aspects of the incident.

Appellate interference with acquittal

The Court expressly acknowledged the settled principle that an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with. It therefore independently scrutinised the evidence before deciding whether the High Court’s acquittals could stand.

Precedent Analysis

The judgment does not undertake an extensive case-by-case discussion of named precedents. Instead, it applies established criminal-law principles concerning:

  • appellate restraint in reversing an acquittal;
  • common intention and common object under Sections 34 and 149 IPC;
  • appreciation of related-witness testimony; and
  • separation of reliable evidence from exaggeration or false implication.

Most significantly, the Court invoked the principle that “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” is not applicable in India. A court is required to separate the credible portion of testimony from embellishment or false implication—to separate the “grain from the chaff.”

Accordingly, the fact that witnesses may have exaggerated the involvement of some accused did not require rejection of otherwise credible evidence against those whose participation was independently and reliably established.

Court’s Reasoning

A6 — Nagendra Singh

The Supreme Court found credible evidence that A6 had held the deceased while A1 shot him.

It rejected the High Court’s reasoning that a person holding the victim during a close-range gunshot would necessarily have sustained an injury. The Supreme Court characterised that reasoning as surmise unsupported by expert evidence.

The medical evidence showed that the projectile entered the victim’s body and remained within it, with pellets embedded internally. Thus, the assumption that A6 necessarily would have been injured was factually unsupported.

Whether A6 had “held” or “dragged” the deceased was considered immaterial because his overt participation was sufficiently established.

A12 — Dalpratap Singh

The Court found A12’s exhortation to shoot consistently reflected in PW1’s first information statement as well as his testimony.

The Court held that A12’s common intention was discernible from this exhortation and was sufficient, at least under Section 34 IPC, to connect him with the fatal offence.

A13 — Rajeev Lochan Singh

Although the Supreme Court disagreed with some of the High Court’s reasoning concerning A13, it ultimately declined to reverse his acquittal.

Crucially, PW10 and PW11 stated that A13 was not present at the scene, and allegations that he carried a firearm or threatened the family were absent from earlier statements. Several witnesses mentioned A13 only after he had been subsequently brought into the trial under Section 319 CrPC.

The Supreme Court therefore found insufficient substantive evidence to overturn his acquittal.

Remaining accused

As regards the other accused, the Court found essentially omnibus allegations of presence without sufficiently specific evidence concerning their individual participation.

Although membership of an unlawful assembly can attract liability through common object, their involvement or even participation in the assembly had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Their acquittals were therefore maintained.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals against acquittal.

It:

  • reversed the High Court’s acquittal of A6 Nagendra Singh and A12 Dalpratap Singh;
  • restored their convictions and sentences imposed by the Trial Court;
  • sustained the acquittal of A13 Rajeev Lochan Singh;
  • declined to interfere with the acquittal of the remaining accused; and
  • left A1’s already affirmed conviction undisturbed.

A6 and A12 were granted two weeks to surrender before the Sessions Court to undergo their sentences, failing which the Sessions Court was directed to take appropriate steps for their apprehension.

Case Details

Case: Santosh Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Number: Criminal Appeal Nos. 1303–1305 of 2022 with Criminal Appeal No. 1306 of 2022; 2026 INSC 972
Judge: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran
Date: 8 September 2026
Result: Acquittals of A6 and A12 reversed and Trial Court convictions and sentences restored; A13’s acquittal and acquittals of remaining accused sustained; A6 and A12 directed to surrender within two weeks

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